New APPS: Art, Politics, Philosophy, Science

Ancient, Early Modern, and Philosophy of Physics are the Specialist areas of Philosophy

The following three sub-fields are highly specialized: Ancient philosophy, seventeenth/eighteenth century philosophy, and philosophy of physics. The following sub-fields have a low level of specialization: metaphilosophy, philosophy of religion, philosophy of probability, philosophy of the social sciences, decision theory, and philosophy of race and gender. Highly specialized sub-fields tend to require extensive knowledge in some area beyond the typical training of a philosopher, and outside of philosophy proper.--Brad Wray.

Brad Wray, a Kuhnian-naturalistic philosopher of science,  has mined the PhilPapers data with an eye toward "the degree of specialization in each area of specialization" in the discipline. (Wray is a bit too confident that this is a "representative sample of the profession;" I worry about selection and, especially, geographical effects; even so the numbers are pretty large (3,226 people in total and 1,803 'philosophy faculty or PhD') so that the results can be illuminating if used with caution.)

Wray: "The degree of specialization of an area is a relative measure of how specialized a particular area is" and is calculated as follows: "The number of people who claim the area as their primary area of specialization/The number of people who claim the area as an area of specialization." I have posted a chunk of the abstract, which contains the core results, in the epigraph above. One of Wray's finding would not have surprised Adam Smith: "an analysis of the data suggests that the size of a specialization is correlated with the degree of specialization."

Wray's crucial result (which seems to have been explored at the prompting of a referee) is this one: "a high degree of specialization is the exception, not the norm in philosophical specialties. Many specialties seem to depend, to a significant degree, on the involvement of many who work in the area but who do not identify the area as their primary area of specialization." Of course, this says nothing about the way in which specialists set the agenda with a specialization.

Either way, this data suggests that there are still quite a few generalists in philosophy (it is amusing to me that I work in a 'specialist' area because us 'early modernists' cover two hundred years of systematic philosophy with ongoing discussions pertaining to M&E, value, science, and increasingly philosophy of religion). The question as to what degree Wray's pattern is born out by publication and citation-data is worth exploring in the future.

On the Contrast between post-Lewisian M&E and Philosophy of Scientific Practice

Brian Weatherson has done some nice data crunching of his own inspired by the Healy-data (eliciting an important comment by Jennifer Nagel), especially here. In particular, he looked at citations in a broader range of journals than the H4. Now Brian's crucial point is: "Lesson 1: It’s easy to be wrong about what people are talking about, if you try to generalise from personal experience." This is important to keep in mind for all of us that need to make decisions about the future of the field (i.e., future job candidates and those that supervise them.) Brian is a privileged observer having helped shape cutting-edge M&E as a presence at a variety of top departments. (I made a similar observation last week in light of converging evidence.) His data also show that the recent debate over philosophical intuitions (see Catarina [and Mohan and here]) is generating a lot of discussion outside of the H4. This is part of a larger phenomenon: while H4 articles are cutting edge (by stipulation), their citations are a lagging indicator of current trends (see also here and here). This may be due, in part, to their relatively slow refereeing process (thus, building in delay from submission to acceptance), or it may be due to in-crowd refereeing (so that in effect citations of high status males are privileged).

Here I focus on Brian's surprise about "336 citations for a paper about mechanisms!" This is a reference to "Thinking about mechanisms" by P Machamer, L. Darden, CF Craver in Philosophy of science (2000) [here for direct access]. (Hereafter MDC) There is no evidence that Brian thinks MDC does not merit attention. Brian's lack of awareness of the importance of this paper is indicative of a genuine split between: (a) post-Lewisian folk that take the metaphysics and epistemology of science, especially inspired by text-book physics, seriously and (b) those of us that focus more on scientific practice, past and present, in our philosophy of science, epistemology, and even metaphysics. Moreover, Brian's tendency to suggest that the high citation-rate for MDC must be due to a non-philosophical audience suggests (with N=1) that folk in (a) tend to underestimate how large the community of (b) is within philosophy.

Splendid skips a week

I am traveling today; if you are in San Diego area come catch me at UCSD (although the paper is read-ahead), and stick around for Jessica Wilson's talk.

Splendid Philosopher of the week: Yumiko Inukai

I welcome private and public nominations for my weekly, splendid philosopher of the week post! [Yes, enough folk persuaded me that "most underrated" could cause unintended harms.] Here are the rules: 1. no dead people; 2. no people currently or about to be employed in a Leiter top 50 (or equivalent) department (even thought these are also filled with splendid folk); 3. no former dissertation advisors, or other teachers from graduate school; 4. no former students; 5. No un-tenured junior folk (again accepting emendation); 6a: Excellence in more than one AOS, or 6b: noticeable public impact; 6C Just plain inspiring. (That is I want to recognize interesting philosophers, not just hyperspecialized ones!)

This week's splendid philosopher of the week , Yumiko Inukai, is a scholar who works on Hume, James, and the history of Buddhism in comparative light. (As an ignoramus about Buddhism I won't discuss her work in the area.) I have long admired her ability to bring Hume and James in conversation with each other. I think the first paper of hers I heard was on Hume’s so-called “bundling problem.” Later published in History of Philosophy Quarterly. In short, she called attention to the fact that cognitive mechanisms that Hume presupposes to explain the working of the mind undercut his argument for his theory of the self (infamously a bundle of perceptions). A companion piece to this article is now in press with the British Journal of the History of Philosophy and explores the same issue(s) from the point of view of William James. Yumiko argues that the deficiencies in James’ approach signal a general limitation to the Empiricists approaches to the mind.

My favorite of her papers is on Hume’s theory of relations; I hope it will become a classic. This article exhibits all of Yumiko's scholarly virtues: a fine nose for important (but relatively neglected) topics; careful, detailed analysis of key concepts, and surprising conclusions. It also has a great closing line: "James thus rightly characterizes Hume on this point: 'Hume is at bottom as much of a metaphysician as Thomas Aquinas.'" (She is just part of a growing trend in Hume Scholarship; I am thinking of Don Baxter and Jani Hakkarainen, especially.) Relations are a crucial concept in Hume’s metaphysics and philosophy of mind. (On the whole Hume's theory of relations has received mostly very bad anachronistic attention.) While I disagree with some of the details of her analysis, it should provide the baseline for future scholarship--and hopefully the core component of her future monograph on David Hume’s metaphysics and cognitive science?

Splendid Philosopher of the Week: David Teira

This week's splendid philosopher (cf. the rules) is David Teira, who teaches at the distance learning university of Spain in Madrid. David is a versatile philosopher who is constantly reinventing himself philosophically. He claims to be a philosopher of statistics, but he has written on a wide variety of topics in the history and philosophy of science/medicine/economics as well as social policy. (A real gem is this piece on Bernoulli's theology and the Ars Conjectandi.) Trained at LSE, he would probably be better known in the English speaking world if he didn't keep a solid research profile in Spanish. Teira is one of my heroes because he shows how rich the philosophic pay-offs from historical explorations of economics are.

Research on Chicago economics is fraught with ideological polemics. And while David's views are not hard to discern, he has written the single most insightful paper on Milton Friedman's methodology. It is a lovely mixture of philosophically motivated history with razor sharp analysis. It should be read with a companion piece, which is penetrating critical analysis of Friedman's statistical methods. The latter piece leaves us with the ironic thought that Friedman's fundamental methodological weakness does not concern a particular technique, but revolves around the commitment that all economists are disinterested truth-seekers, rather than political animals that may have incentives that can slant them (an argument extended here).

Splendid Philosopher of the week: Dan Haybron

I welcome private and public nominations for my weekly, splendid philosopher of the week post! [Yes, enough folk persuaded me that "most underrated" could cause unintended harms.] Here are the rules: 1. no dead people; 2. no people currently or about to be employed in a Leiter top 50 (or equivalent) department (even thought these are also filled with splendid folk); 3. no former dissertation advisors, or other teachers from graduate school; 4. no former students; 5. No un-tenured junior folk (again accepting emendation); 6a: Excellence in more than one AOS, or 6b: noticeable public impact; 6C Just plain inspiring. (That is I want to recognize interesting philosophers, not just hyperspecialized ones!)

Unless Wittgensteinian, analytic philosophers often get a bit discomforted when faced with criticism of Science. We much prefer to emulate science in various ways (this can range from the adoption of scientific virtues by metaphysicians or the sneaky tactics of Analytic Creationists) or cite copiously from it. This is a shame because one of the crucial tasks of philosophy today is to be critical of science in order to improve it. This improvement can take (at least) two forms: a) by conceptual clarification/engineering/coining help science track the empirical world better; b) make science wiser. Like last week's splendid philosopher this week's, Dan Haybron, is a wonderful exemplar of a philosopher that critically engages with various sciences in order to improve it. Haybron works primarily at the intersection of psychology, economics, political science, and ethics in the suddenly fashionable field of happiness studies. (He has a strong background in methodological issues; see this lovely paper.)

Splendid philosopher of the week: Mary Domski

This week's splendid philosopher (cf. the rules), Mary Domski, is fast becoming the leading scholar of the intersection of early modern mathematics (including Kant) and philosophy, and along the way one of the world's leading debunkers of myths: for example, one of her earliest publications, refutes the influential misunderstanding that Newton has a “constructivist” account of geometry. On Newton’s behalf she drives a wedge between constructability and intelligibility. One of her most important papers is about to appear in a volume that I co-edited. (Okay, so I am biased!) Against the myth promoted by Voltaire (and echoed by lots of later scholars) of a happy union between the thought of Locke and Newton, she argues that that Locke’s eventual endorsement of Newton’s claims was very qualified. She shows that in Locke there are grounds for the development of a distinct, philosophic critique of Newton that, in my view, is visible throughout the eighteenth century.

On of my favorite papers, is her article on Descartes’ early mathematics and metaphysics. She reads the practice in Descartes’ Geometry and Le Monde in light of each other and uses these to reevaluate Descartes’ methodological statements. (It is also a lovely exposition of the reception of the Pappus-problem!) She clears the ground for a proper understanding of how Descartes’ way of ‘operationalizing’ intelligibility could have had such an intellectual grip over early modern mechanical philosophy. In particular, on her reconstruction of Descartes, mathematical intelligibility constrains the (metaphysically) possible. While Mary does not argue this, the position she attributes to Descartes involves a far-reaching redefinition or re-conceptualization of nature in terms of a limit that cannot be breached. (Something my colleague, Maarten Van Dyck, has been claiming about Galileo.) So, against a lot of recent, revisionary literature that tries to link Descartes rather closely to the Scholastics, Mary brings out Descartes’ modernity on crucial matters.

Splendid Philosopher of the week: Wendy Parker

This week's splendid philosopher of the week (cf the rules), Wendy Parker, an associate professor at Ohio University in Athens, OH, was 'nominated' by my some-time co-author, Chris Smeenk, who has known Wendy since at least graduate school. Wendy has been a pioneer among philosophers of science systematically engaging with the role of computer simulations in the sciences (now becoming a more mature niche within GPOS [see yesterday's discussion on NewAPPS), more generally, and climate modeling, in particular. Her earliest philosophy publication, became a classic in the field. It investigated how in the context of the "messy" nature of climate modal evaluation conflicting complex models persist side by side. On re-reading, I was particularly struck by the sensitivity to the potential for systematic error in the whole family of models in her discussion. (She develops that argument in far more technical detail in a superb, recent paper, which critically examines various strategies/arguments in favor of robustness, including those favored by two earlier splendid philosophers of the week, Kent Staley and Jay Odenbaugh. ) I wish Parker could teach economists on how to live and even measure underlying uncertainty by working with such a portfolio of potentially conflicting models! [I may write about this in my philo eco weekly post in near future.]

Wendy is a role model because she is not afraid to enter in ongoing controversy within the sciences. (I believe that this ought to be one of the missions of philosophy of science.) Her work exhibits a healthy (and among philosophers of science too rare) skepticism about quick technical fixes. A very nice example of both these virtues in action is this recent paper in which she critically evaluates competing ways to handle the presentation of uncertainty to policy-makers. She offers her own proposal based on some criteria that she has developed.

All of Wendy's work is based on an awareness of how hard it is to do empirical science and how hard it is to get high quality data that really is evidence for anything. (No doubt she is drawing on her experience as a working scientist.) A very important contribution to this topic is this paper in which she shows that data "do not confirm climate models; what they might confirm, however, are hypotheses about the adequacy of climate models for particular purposes." Wendy offers informed, critical distance on science in order to improve science and how it relates to policy and policy-makers. Meanwhile, a large number of papers are in the pipeline, so there is much to look forward to!

Splendid philosopher of the week; Kathleen Akins

I welcome private and public nominations for my weekly, splendid philosopher of the week post! [Yes, enough folk persuaded me that "most underrated" could cause unintended harms.] Here are the rules: 1. no dead people; 2. no people currently or about to be employed in a Leiter top 50 (or equivalent) department (even thought these are also filled with splendid folk); 3. no former dissertation advisors, or other teachers from graduate school; 4. no former students; 5. No un-tenured junior folk (again accepting emendation); 6a: Excellence in more than one AOS, or 6b: noticeable public impact; 6C Just plain inspiring. (That is I want to recognize interesting philosophers, not just hyperspecialized ones!)

This week's splendid philosopher of the week is Kathleen Akins an associate professor at Simon Fraser, whose moving struggle with HLA-B27 Negative Ankylosing Spondylitis is recounted at Disabled Philosophers. (A site worth visiting and reflecting on regularly.) I adore her work because she doesn't merely use neuro-science to answer philosophical questions, but she also offers a critical and pro-active stance back on the sciences. (She also provided one of the first public mentions in philosophy of one of my undergraduate mentor and sometime co-author, George Smith.) Akins is one of the best color vision people in philosophy, and I can't wait to read her book-in-progress.

But Akins' fame rests, I think, on two remarkable articles. One is a paper that challenged one of the central dogma's of the second half century of analytic philosophy (that is) that intentionality/aboutness is somehow central to mental states. (It is amusing that this Scholastic concept been so greedily adopted by so-called naturalistic philosophers.) Her (complex) argument does not deny that there is such a thing as aboutness, although she insists -- "pace Sellars" [and Chisholm] -- with lots of empirical evidence that we really don't know what it is. But she simply dislodges it from its central position in the explanatory enterprise. More significantly, her 1996 article lays the groundwork for much of the recent focus on embodied and active cognitive capacities in philosophy of mind (so beloved by many of my fellow NewAPPSers).

Second, her two (related) papers in which she criticizes Nagel's famous essay with bats in its title. "What is it like to be boring and myopic" (1993) and "A Bat Without Qualities" [Sadly, I couldn't an electronic copy of each available online.] For me the take home message of these papers is that science can and will surprise us in many ways about how we experience the world. Science won't settle philosophic questions, but it can undermine our confidence in our thinking that we asked the right question. In doing so, it can also change our sense of who we are.

Most-underrated philosopher of the week: Jay Odenbaugh

[This is the last most-underrated until September.]

I welcome private and public nominations for my weekly, most-underrated philosopher of the week post! Here are the rules: 1. no dead people; 2. no people currently or about to be employed in a Leiter top 50 (or equivalent) department (even thought these are also filled with underrated folk); 3. no former dissertation advisors, or other teachers from graduate school; 4. no former students; 5. No tenure-track or junior folk; 6a: Excellence in more than one AOS, or 6b: noticeable public impact. (That is I want to recognize interesting philosophers, not just hyperspecialized ones!)

This week's most-underrated philosopher of the week, Jay Odenbaugh, teaches at Lewis & Clark (in the same department as an earlier winner, Becko Copenhaver). Jay is a world-class philosopher of biology, who works on the ontology of mathematical models, the nature of ecology, the nature of complexity, the relationship between science and values (and politics), especially environmental ethics, and (like many other splendid philosophers of philosophy) on the history of biology and its philosophy. Jay's first (I think?) major publication exhibits many of his academic virtues--he takes on a technical issue in philosophy of science (with mathematical and conceptual challenges) that has significant public policy ramifications; he works through the issues in order to reach a reasoned (and surprisingly hopeful) conclusion.

One aspect that I admire about Jay's work is that he is not afraid to practice what one might call normative philosophy of science. He not merely clarifies what science is up to, but is also willing to articulate what -- given their immanent commitments -- sciences should be willing to do (check out this paper, which blew me away when I first read it). It should come as no surprise that Jay has entered the climate science battle (here) [he has more faith in 'consensus' science than I do, although I agree with his policy conclusions].

My favorite piece is a classic article on evidential arguments and constraints on theoryin the context of attempts to model very complex systems. It is rich on detail on scientific practice without losing sight of a central (even old-fashioned) question in the philosophy of science--the nature of testing. It engages with a host of philosophical challenges, while illuminating the nature of evidential arguments. Along the way, it vindicates attempts to think of ecology as, in part, a lab science (I found this very surprising).

Most underrated philosopher of the week: Julie R. Klein

I welcome private and public nominations for my weekly, most-underrated philosopher of the week post! Here are the rules: 1. no dead people; 2. no people currently or about to be employed in a Leiter top 50 (or equivalent) department (even thought these are also filled with underrated folk); 3. no former dissertation advisors, or other teachers from graduate school; 4. no former students; 5. No tenure-track or junior folk (this is adapted in light of recent discussion). 6a: Excellence in more than one AOS, or 6b: noticeable public impact. (That is I want to recognize interesting philosophers, not just hyperspecialized ones!)

This week's most underrated, Julie R. Klein, teaches at Villanova. She is that rare bird, who does first class research on Medieval philosophy, including Jewish and Islamic, and early modern philosophy (which are still often scholarly worlds apart); she has also published on Continental figures (Derrida, Balibar). In fact, in Klein's work there is a fascinating slippage between historical and philosophical considerations. One of my favorite pieces, is her article on Descartes' engagement with the objection(s) to the Meditations that center on the "Atheist geometer." The upshot of her argument is that part of the ground of Descartes' philosophy is fundamentally moral.

In recent scholarship on Spinoza, the constructive role of the imagination for Spinoza has been rehabilitated (in English, see especially the work by Susan James and Michael Rosenthal). Klein has an early, perceptive piece on the topic. But my favorite article by her is another article that starts from consideration of Descartes' response to the atheist geometer. It explores the (in my view) not so hidden pantheist commitments in Descartes' thought.

Most underrated philosopher of the week: Richard Polt

I welcome private and public nominations for my weekly, most-underrated philosopher of the week post! Here are the rules: 1. no dead people; 2. no people currently or about to be employed in a Leiter top 50 (or equivalent) department (even thought these are also filled with underrated folk); 3. no former dissertation advisors, or other teachers from graduate school; 4. no former students; 5. No untenured folk. 6a: Excellence in more than one AOS, or 6b: noticeable public impact. (That is I want to recognize interesting philosophers, not just hyperspecialized ones!)

This week's most underrated, Richard Polt (Xavier University in Cincinnati), is probably the first destination for folk that want to figure out what the fuss is about with Heidegger, but find Heidegger's German (or in translation) too forbidding. After I read Polt's Heidegger: An Introduction as an advanced graduate student, I recall thinking that I had wished I had read it as an undergrad. I found his a clear and encouraging guide. Polt's acclaimed translations of Heidegger, Nietzsche, Baumgartner (and a few otehrs) are his service to the profession.

Much of Polt's scholarly output is related to work on Heidegger. That alone means one has to have a very sound grasp of much of the history of philosophy (if only not to be misled by Heidegger's often self-serving rhetoric). For example, Polt has written subtly on Aristotelian motion.

Of course, there has been much polemic on Heidegger's Nazism. Even so, few have had the courage to explore the episode in order to shed light on the nature and dangers of political philosophy. Polt's piece on the topic is a very fine exception: Polt is unflinching, and via Arendt returns us to Aristotle's enduring wisdom. One senses that Polt is a genuine critical friend of Liberal Democracy--he won't sign up for its self-serving myths, and wishes more from it. But he does not succumb to the fantasies of its enemies either...

Most underrated philosopher of the week: Helen Beebee

Some philosophers are really big deals in the profession, yet still fit all the rules for most underrated. (They inhabit a metaphysical grey zone?) This week's most underrated, Helen Beebee (Birmingham), is one of the most prominent metaphysicians of our time (with influential work on causation, free will, natural kinds, etc), an inspiring scholar of David Hume, and an important public philosopher as Director of the British Philosophical Association. During the last week I have been browsing in the OUP Handook volume on causation she co-edited, and I was reminded how much she offers the discipline by way of edited volumes and taking on the task of representing us to the outside. Her most famous paper (judging by citations) is her "causing and nothingness" (in which she defends Lewisian orthodoxy). I have long admired the frankness (involving the cost of adopting her position) exhibited by another paper that defends a descriptive account of the laws of nature. Of course, I am most familiar with her work on Hume's account of causation. She has a very fine book on the topic. But in my view her 2007 joint session piece was really important because it finally said "stop" to all the folk who try to read Hume entirely in light of the Old/New Hume debate. Moreover, it wisely points out that Hume's "definitions" are not what *we* would call definitions.

Most underrated philosopher of the week: Richard T. W. Arthur

I welcome private and public nominations for my weekly, most-underrated philosopher of the week post! Here are the rules: 1. no dead people; 2. no people currently or about to be employed in a Leiter top 50 (or equivalent) department (even thought these are also filled with underrated folk); 3. no former dissertation advisors, or other teachers from graduate school; 4. no former students; 5. No untenured folk. 6a: Excellence in more than one AOS, or 6b: noticeable public impact. (That is I want to recognize interesting philosophers, not just hyperspecialized ones!)

This week's most underrated, Richard Arthur, possesses that rare combination of historical breadth with philosophic and mathematical acuity. He also works on a dizzying number of topics and figures: philosophy of time, history of mathematics, thought experiments, philosophy of physics, and early modern (some of this overlaps, of course). Rare among major Leibniz scholars, he knows his Newton (see a lovely comparison). Rare among serious Descartes specialists, he knows his Beeckman. I admit I have a soft spot for anybody that can swtch between work on Minkowski space-time and Daniel Sennert! In my view, Arthur's key virtue is that he is constantly critically engaging with a wide range of others (from Deleuze to Howard Stein)--I am always dazzled by the scholarship and secondary literature he has assimilitated in his work. Among my favorites of his work, is the very important old piece (destroying lots of myths) on space-time in Newton and Leibniz. More folk should know his work!

Most underrated philosopher of the week: Rebecca Copenhaver

When I entered the job-market with a dissertation on Adam Smith (as well as Newton, Hume, and some Rousseau), I discovered that even when I was being introduced for job-talks this fact could trigger snickering or worse. Despite the best efforts of Steve Darwall and Sam Fleischacker, I still encounter the prejudice that Smith is not a philosopher or, worse, that if one works on Smith one must be a right wing lunatic (this is not to deny there are right wing lunatics that work on Smith). This sad experience did not prevent me from developing an equally noxious prejudice that folk working on Reid must be religious zealots; it didn't help that in my perception many Reid-fans would have some secret code that was tied together by snarky comments about Hume. (I really had no excuse for holding any such view because I knew Norman Daniels and his monograph on Reid since before I went to graduate school!) Luckily, I have been disabused of my stupidity by the terrific work of this week's most underrated, Rebecca Copenhaver, (and later many others).

In addition to being one of the world's experts on Kant's reception in Italy, Copenhaver is the world's leading authority on Reid's philosophy of mind. But her interest is clearly not antiquarian. On the contrary, she explores the details of Reid's approach dialectically to develop her own philosophy of mind (see here for a convenient set of links to her publications). (So her profile fits the rules for this category perfectly.) This approach to history (where the dead philosopher is alive as an interlocutor) is still reasonably common among ethicists (and continental philosophers), but, leaving aside folk that work on 'early analytic', fairly uncommon in philosophy of mind and metaphysics (although Della Rocca's work on Spinoza also springs to mind). 

Most underrated philosopher of the week: Erik Angner

Apologies to loyal readers of this post for skipping a week: the Synthese avengers killed my laptop!

This week's most underrated (cf the rules), Erik Angner (who is about to move from UAB to George Mason University, where he will be a member of their new institute of philosophy and public policy, housed in the dept. of philosophy, and with possible joint appointments in the dept. of economics and in the school of public policy), is one of my intellectual heroes: he combines history and philosophy of economics with straight up contributions to economics and the many places where it intersects with philosophy! He is one of a small group of philosophers who is completely transforming philosophy of economics. Rather than taking pre-existing questions from (often outdated) philosophy of science and focusing on text-book economics (or decision-theory), Erik (who also has a PhD in economics) combines detailed knowledge of ongoing economics research (in hot areas like neuro & behavioral economics, happiness theory, etc) and generates philosophic questions from these. (He often teams up with economists and psychologists in doing so.) He is special in being also genuinely interested in the history of economics. 

Erik's (2007) book on Hayek is a major scholarly feat: neither hagiography nor ideological revenge. But my favorite piece of his, is a very clever methodological-historical-psychological (2006) article on how experts are prone to overconfidence. (He draws on a case study of the so-called shock-therapy applied to Russia.) Erik's most cited work are his methodological papers (here and here) with the famous behavioral economist, George Lowenstein. Much of his recent work is in subjective well-being and experiments on the value of time. Most of his research has significant policy implications. Before long a lot more people will realize that Erik has been developing a new brand of political philosophy--one that is in constant dialogue with the cutting edge of empirical social sciences. Or, to be more precise, Erik is is returning political philosophy to its traditional roots. 

Most underrated philosopher of the week: Ursula Renz

I am still fairly new to the European philosophy scene, but one of the first things I noticed here is the very stark division among co-called theoretical and practical philosophers. Their sole point of contact seems to be a shared contempt or (among the more kindly souls) benign neglect of the third category, historians of philosophy. (Sometimes this intersects with analytic/continental, but about all of this another time.) So, folk that move between or straddle such natural kinds are a source of confusion because hard to classify. At the time same time, European philosophy is changing dramatically and quickly because folk move around on European wide scholarships, short-term positions, etc.

This week's winner (recall the rules), Ursula Renz (who has lived and worked in numerous countries), teaches at Alpen-Adria University in Klagenfurt, a small provincial capital in Austria. She just published a lovely, scholarly article on Cassirer in a recent special issue of Synthese (no not THAT special issue). She is a path-breaking thinker (who publishes in theoretical, practical, and history). I know her work primarily because she is one of the world's most exciting, philosophical Spinoza scholars (below an image of the cover of her recent book). Her work on Spinoza always has an eye toward ongoing philosophical debates, yet at the same time is rigorous and insightful. Her renown is still limited to the clubby (male-dominated) world of German speaking philosophers, because most of her publications are in German. But she is a very versatile philosopher: she has published widely on the moral emotions and epistemic individualism (see this lovely piece in German).

Ursula is probably still best known as the author of an acclaimed monograph on Cohen, Natorp, and Cassirer, and more generally a leading authority on what I call Fin de siècle neo-Kantianism. I can't wait to read her paper on how Pitt philosophy is related to the Marburg school!
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Most underrated philosopher of the week: Kent Staley

One might think that one bias that has entered into this weekly most underrated post (cf. the rules; new nominations welcome!) is my history as journeyman philosopher  (around the world). Indeed, after my two year stint at WashU in St. Louis, I am familiar with its excellent philosophic community (with its many splendid philosophers at UMSL, SIUE, SLU, Webber, etc). So, one might think that this week's 'winner,' Kent Staley, 'benefits' from that particular bias. But Staley, who publishes in philosophy of physics, philosophy of science more generally, and the history of the philosophy of science, has been on my radar-screen since I saw him give a mind-blowing talk at The University of Chicago more than a decade ago. It was on the role that Hegelian background beliefs played among a community of Japanese particle physicists, which played a prominent role in developing the so-called Standard Model. (I have not seen the paper in print, but maybe I missed it.)

While within science studies it is a cliche to claim that science has become "big science" and, essentially collaborative, Staley's work is significant among philosophers in exploring the methodological and epistemic implications of this (as it is in Brad Wray, an earlier 'most underrated'). My favorite Staley papers (and his book) dig deep into experimental and statistical practice to analyze how evidential arguments work in the sciences without degenerating into purely descriptive philosophy (for a lovely example here). Staley often does so while building on Deborah Mayo's influential work. Staley's most cited paper is this paper on robustness. My favorite paper is this one, which mixes a subtle appreciation of Pierce as a philosopher of scientific practice with careful analysis of how to think of bias when using statistics. And for those of you with an interest in fine-tuning arguments this paper is worth exploring!

Most underrated philosopher of the week: Sandra Lapointe

A few weeks ago on this blog, I made a serious joke-suggestion that Moritz Schlick should replace Frege-our-Father as the representative founder of analytic philosophy. This week's most underrated philosopher of the week, Sandra Lapointe (who teaches at Kansas State), is a far more serious scholar of these matters; she has almost single handedly revived interest in Bolzano with a large number of books (including a few more in French) articles (including this one that I find very helpful), and conferences. (Of course, there was work on Bolzano before Lapointe, but sometimes a devoted scholar can really focus attention.) I don't know if Lapointe thinks of Bolzano as founder of analytic philosophy, but she certainly makes a good case for him being one of our direct ancestors. I am also impressed by her work in the history of philosophy more broadly--few scholars can get Frege and Husserl into focus at same time; this may be my favorite paper of hers.

Anyway, I welcome private and public nominations for my weekly, most-underrated philosopher of the week post! Here are the rules: 1. no dead people; 2. no people currently or about to be employed in a Leiter top 50 (or equivalent) department (even thought these are also filled with underrated folk); 3. no former dissertation advisors, or other teachers from graduate school; 4. no former students; 5. No untenured folk. 6a: Excellence in more than one AOS, or 6b: noticeable public impact. (That is I want to recognize *interesting* philosophers, not just hyperspecialized ones!)

Most underrated philosopher of the week: Jon McGinnis

One of the great travesties of our discipline is our collective ignorance of Avicenna: the philosophical giant between late antiquity and, say, Kant. Even Avicenna's "flying man" argument (which the late Ian Mueller would teach with gusto without his usual aporetic style) is not taught as the usual starting point of modern philosophy. It is to be hoped that (after Tahir square) with the imminent arrival of a newly confident, youthful Islamic intellectual culture, philosophers will return to Avicenna for inspiration, criticism, and guidance (both as a reader of the Ancients as well as a source of reflection on the complex relationship between philosophy, polity, and religion).

So in that spirit, this week I return to University of Missouri, Saint Louis (recall an earlier winner), for yet another, amazingly versatile and splendid philosopher: the prolific, Jon McGinnis. This week's most underrated philosopher (who has won plenty of more official awards already), is one of the world's great experts on Avicenna and medieval physics and philosophy of science more generally. Of course, besides considerable linguistic and mathematical skill, this presupposes considerable knowledge of Aristotle and Plato, and their commentators! I consider Jon's Stanford Encyclopedia survey of Arabic and Islamic Natural Philosophy and Natural Science, a masterpiece of the genre. For those of us who wish to think about the roots of experiment, this older piece is very illuminating. McGinnis' monograph length introduction to Avicenna may well be the place from which a revival in Islamic philosophy will commence!

Most overrated philosopher of the week.

In the wake of the resounding success of our weekly most underrated philosopher post (featured every Monday), we thought it would be  a good moment to start a new weekly blog post on Fridays: the most overrated philosopher of the week. Here are the ground rules: 1) Must be employed in a Leiter WORLD Top 50 department; 2) he (yes!) must have an impeccable Oxbridge or Ivy pedigree; 3) must be constantly recycling the same point over and over again; 4A) must confidently speak of "naturalism" without ever having struggled with empirical data; and/or 4B) must confidently inhabit the (affine) space of reasons; and/or 4C) is a "philosopher of science" on the basis of knowing how to manipulate Bayes' rule; and/or 4D) thinks mereology is "an improvement" over set-theory; 5A) dismisses unread rival positions with a sneer (e.g., "thin," "superficial," "confused," "unintelligible"); 5B) considers his views as "fundamental" or "ultimate"'. Nominations, including self-nominations, are now open.

This week's winner is:

Most underrated philosopher of the week: Christina Chimisso

Much of the ongoing history and philosophy of science (say as we find it at Max Planck in Berlin) that tries to avoid taking its cue from the Vienna Cirlce, has its roots in the thought of Nietzsche as re-interpreted or re-oriented by Max Weber, Freud, Léon Brunschvicg, and Durkheim. The crucial philosopher (institutionally and intellectually) is Gaston Bachelard, who stands behind the thought of Kuhn and Foucault. For the usual parochial reasons, Bachelard is still largely ignored among English speaking philosophers. (I am also guilty of this. I suspect Bachelard is only studied among lit crit types.) Yet, one day some ambitious soul must re-think philosophy of science from the ground up, and when s/he traces our roots back, she will encounter Bachelard as one of the crucial figure that needs to be overcome. In doing so, s/he will find a supremely helpful philosophical guide in Christina Chimisso's monograph. Chimisso, who teaches at the Open University in the UK, is this week's most underrated philosopher (see the rules here; I welcome nominations privately and publicly)!

Chimisso follows her own intellectual lodestone. In her works she reveals the high aspirations that once animated history and philosophy of science with a lovely eye for contextual and intellectual detail. She helps reminds us what was once at stake in the distinctions and conceptual moves that are now taken for granted in the sediments on which three year PhDs are built. One of my favorite pieces by Chimisso is this honest assessment of the tragic Helen Metzger. But, perhaps, this piece is the more important one.

Most underrated philosopher of the week: Saul Fisher

I welcome private and public nominations for my weekly, most-underrated philosopher of the week post!  Here are the rules: 1. no dead people; 2. no people currently or about to be employed in a Leiter top 50 (or equivalent) department (even thought these are also filled with underrated folk); 3. no former dissertation advisors, or other teachers from graduate school; 4. no former students; 5. No untenured folk. 6a: Excellence in more than one AOS, or 6b: noticeable public impact. (That is I want to recognize *interesting* philosophers, not just hyperspecialized ones!)

One of the great joys of writing this weekly post is discovering new and interesting facts about folk that  are interesting. For example, I already knew that this week's most underrated philosopher, Saul Fisher (and interim provost at Mercy College), wrote a splendid book on Gassendi (surely one of the most underrated philosophers in history). I admire the book because while Saul clearly knows his sources and intellectual context, he is not afraid to engage Gassendi with (and compare him to) recent philosophic theories. Rather than creating anachronism, Fisher animates Gassendi's philosophic and scientific projects. Saul has also been an early contributor to the now 'very hot' field of early modern life sciences (see here, and here).

This Week's Most Underrated Philosopher: Sarah Hutton

This week's most underrated, Sarah Hutton, teaches (I believe) in the English Department at Aberystwyth University in Wales. She is the great explorer of what one might call the shadow history to the canonical story of Early Modern philosophy. She has written (among other topics) on the great Renaissance and Cambridge Platonists, the Quakers, and the fascinating Anne Conway. Sarah Hutton is an important historian of medicine and she has made many significant scholarly contributions by, for example, editing Cudworth and the Letters between Anne Conway and Henry More. Her contributions are also more social: she is famous for bringing people together in conferences and pioneering volumes.

I am particularly fond of her paper on Emilie du Châtelet which called attention to one of the greatest minds of the eighteenth century; she attempted a creative synthesis of Newton and Leibniz. I remain baffled that people interested in the reception of Leibniz or, say, the long gestation of Kantianism remain ignorant of Voltaire's better half.

This week's most underrated: Brandon Look

This week's most underrated philosopher, Brandon Look, was a cohort ahead of me in graduate school. (So, I am not entirely unbiased in the matter.) Besides being a very nice guy, his scholarship is not merely impeccable and insightful, but covers stunning breadth. He is best known for his scholarly work on Leibniz (see here and here, for example). Now, work on Leibniz can be life consuming in its breadth, scholarly challenges, and philosophic demands it places on the interpreter. But what I have always admired about Brandon's work is that he does not shy away from bringing Leibniz into conversation with his predecessors and the many critical readers of Leibniz. 

My second most favorite piece by Brandon is his work on Godel's ontological argument (in light of Spinoza and Leibniz). That shows some of his range in being able to juggle several philosophic perspectives all at once, while illuminating them all. I wish Spinoza scholars would take more note of it. But my favorite piece is the as-of-yet unpublished work on Euler, which promises to be pioneering in this too neglected major thinker!

 

Most underrated philosopher of the week: Berit Brogaard

This week's most underrated philosopher of the week, Berit Brogaard, teaches in the philosophy department at UMSL (a department full of splendid philosophers), but she also has an appointment in psychology. Most of us within philosophy know her as an extremely prolific metaphysician (her cat's name is David Lewis) and, increasingly (I think), philosopher of mind. However, the paper with the most immediate impact is a contribution to experimental philosophy (it criticizes Joshua Knobe) and behavioral economics. (It follows, I hope, that philosophy of economics becomes the cool thing to do!) So, Berit (pronounced,''Brit') fits the criteria for most underrated to the dot!

Berit also reaches a wide audience with her media appearances and a journalistic-philosophic writing. My favorite in the genre is the top ten pizza destinations in Chicago! She may well have the most widely followed blog written by a philosopher (cf. this one), and also the cheesiest; but don't forget to check out her poetry!

Most underrated philosopher of the week: Patrick Frierson

I welcome private and public nominations for my weekly, most-underrated philosopher of the week entry!  Here are the rules: 1. no dead people; 2. no people currently or about to be employed in a Leiter top 50 (or equivalent) department (even thought these are also filled with underrated folk); 3. no former dissertation advisors, or other teachers from graduate school; 4. no former students; 5. No untenured folk. 6a: Excellence in more than one AOS; 6b: noticeable public impact. (That is I want to recognize *interesting* philosophers, not just hyperspecialized ones!)

I have known this week's most underrated philosopher of the week, Patrick Frierson, since my first years of graduate school. (Patrick, who teaches at Whitman College, is a graduate of Notre Dame, but he lived in Hyde Park for a while.) He  was the first nice Kantian ethicist I met, and for a long time the only nice one. Patrick turned his dissertation into an impressive and regularly cited book, Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's Moral Philosophy, which was not the first to look at Kant's anthropology, but certainly among the first to integrate successfully Kant's metaphysics and ethics with his anthropological (and religious) writings. He has continued writing on Kant with clarity and insight. One of my favorite pieces is the one on the implications of Kant's account of mental disorder.

Patrick's work has always been broader than Kant scholarship. He has published a fine paper on Descartes' neglected ethics. Along the way Patrick has mined the work of Adam Smith to developed a highly original take on environmental ethics.

Most Underrated philosopher of the week: Laura Snyder

Last week's most underrated philosopher, John Corvino, is (as was noted) besides being an accomplished philosopher a public intellectual and advocate. This made me wonder if there weren't other most underrated philosophers who fit the public intellectual profile. (You may recall that my criteria for this entry are meant to pick out interesting philosophers, not just hyperspecialized ones.)  Laura Snyder may well fit the bill in a week or two. Her book,The Philosophical Breakfast Club: Four Remarkable Friends Who Transformed Science and Changed the World, which will tell he story of how William Whewell,  Charles Babbage, John Herschel, and Richard Jones, founded the Philosophical Breakfast Club, devoted to scientific discussion, at Cambridge. If it sells and captures the public's imagination a radiant philosophic star may be born.

Laura is a past president of HOPOS (the History of philosophy of science society--full disclosure: I served under her); she is an expert on nineteenth century (British) philosophy of science and how it fits into a wider intellectual culture. She is an author of an important monograph on the Mill-Whewell debate(s) over induction. I like it, especially, because it treats discussions over political economy as integral to our philosophic heritage. She has also written on nineteenth century fiction, including a fun article on forensic science's influence on the creation of Sherlock Holmes. With the popularity of structural realism (especially in British philosophy of science), it is a bit peculiar that her early paper on the topic has not garnered more attention.

Most underrated philosopher of the week: John Corvino

A recent discussion on public intellectuals in philosophy of science on our blog made me think of this week's most underrated philosopher: John Corvino (Wayne State). In many ways, John reminds me of one of my undergraduate teachers, Hugo Bedau, who despite considerable philosophic breadth became closely identified with his criticisms of the death penalty (and along the way a great moral exemplar to generations of philosophers). Besides being a well known public speaker, a "heavy" on the campus debating circuity, and a regular columnist, John is also  the author of one of the most heavily anthologized piece in recent ethics, “Why Shouldn’t Tommy and Jim Have Sex: A Defense of Homosexuality." (It is probably taught quite a bit, too, in undergradaute courses.) Along the way, John has become a serious gender theorist in his own right. One of my favorite pieces by him is his defense of naughty fantasies (sadly I could not find a nice link to it online).

All of this would be more than enough to qualify for most underrated. (Someone might object that while Corvino fits the formal criteria for most underrated, his fame rules him out--but precisely among professional philosophers fame is often a compelling reason to disqualify somebody; who would deny that as a group we're prone to reverse elitism?) It would be easy to forget that John is also a quite accomplished (and funny) Hume scholar.

Most underrated philosopher of the week: Lisa Gannett

I welcome private and public nominations for my weekly, most-underrated philosopher of the week entry! (I have received a few promising entries.) Here are the rules: 1. no dead people; 2. no people currently or about to be employed in a Leiter top 50 (or equivalent) department (even thought these are also filled with underrated folk); 3. no former dissertation advisors, or other teachers from graduate school; 4. no former students; 5. No untenured folk. 6. Excellence in more than one AOS. (That is I want to recognize *interesting* philosophers, not just hyperspecialized ones!)

Most previous winners were folk that I have had some significant intellectual connection with at one point or another. This week's winner, Lisa Gannett, who teaches at Saint Mary's University in Halifax in Canada, I know primarily through her writing. Her work is at the intersection of philosophy of biology/science, philosophy of race, science/values (no doubt, in part, informed by some healthy feminism). Her most famous (and widely cited) paper  brilliantly blends philosophy of biology, history of biology, and moral philosophy. It should be an example to all philosophers of science who want to ask critical questions about where science might head (and it is a useful corrective to to those philosophers of science, who think there is a trade-off between technical and historical knowledge). Another of her papers shows that pragmatist philosophy of science is alive and kicking.