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Kant on Big Data?

A recent paper by Ermanno Bencivenga in Philosophical Forum argues that it’s “time for philosophy to step into the conversation” (135) about big data, in particular to refute the thesis, which the article identifies in a 2008 piece in Wired, that big data will mean that we no longer need theory: “with enough data, the numbers speak for themselves” (qt. on 135).  The paper draws on concerns about spurious correlations: to demonstrate that a correlation is legitimate, it “must be shown to manifest a lawlike regularity; there must be a theoretical account of it,” that laws have to cohere with one another, and so on (139).  In other words, “knowledge is constitutionally dependent on theory” (ibid.).   Bencivenga concludes:

“Big Data enthusiasts are (unwittingly advocating a new definition of what it is to know.  Their agenda is (unwittingly) semantical.  Except that it is not worked out, and any attempt at developing it in the semantical terms that have been current (and antagonistic) for the past two millennia is hopeless.  I will not rule out that a new set of terms might be forthcoming, but the burden is / on those enthusiasts to provide it; simply piling up data and being awed by them will not do.  What would be needed, ironically, is a new theory of knowledge, which so far I have not seen.  This is the reason why I have made an effort to get clearer about the claims being made, so that we can have a more orderly discussion of them and what it would take to make progress in it” (141-2).

Fair enough, though I do want to note that the paper does not engage with any literature about big data other than the dated piece from Wired; and to hear enthusiastic techno-babble from Wired is not surprising.  That’s what they do.

It’s also worth pointing out that these sorts of concerns have been expressed before.  Here are danah boyd and Kate Crawford from a widely-cited paper in 2012.  After noting that “Big data reframes key questions about the constitution of knowledge, the processes of research, how we should engage with information, and the nature and categorization of reality” (665), they caution that:

“Interpretation is at the center of data analysis. Regardless of the size of a data, it is subject to limitation and bias. Without those biases and limitations being understood and outlined, misinterpretation is the result. Data analysis is most effective when researchers take account of the complex methodological processes that underlie the analysis of that data” (668)

These are cherry-picked quotes – arguably, the entire paper is a response to the sort of enthusiasm in the Wired piece, and the focus on our hidden rules for interpretation is clearly directed at the view that somehow data self-interprets.  And there are certainly more papers that bring up this and analogous topics; Luciano Floridi raises similar ones here (Floridi’s worries resonate well with Amoore’s, discussed below).  That said, I think there’s something to be said for speaking of big data in Kantian terms, though not perhaps for the reasons Bencivenga advances.

Interpersonal justification, argumentation, and epistemic autonomy

By Catarina Dutilh Novaes

I am currently supervising a MA thesis on interpersonal justification (by Sebastiano Lommi), and this is providing me with the opportunity to connect the dots between a number of topics and questions I’ve been interested in for years. In particular questions pertaining the epistemic value of deliberation, metaphors for argumentation, and the Enlightenment ideal of epistemic autonomy are all coming together. In this post I argue that the process whereby knowledge is shared through argumentation and exchange of reasons preserves the autonomy of the knowing subject to a greater extent than through testimony alone. Ultimately, the goal is to hit the sweet spot between preserving the autonomy of the knower while avoiding an overly individualistic picture of knowledge, i.e. one where the social dimension of knowledge is not sufficiently recognized.

The work of developmental psychologist Paul L. Harris (e.g. his book Trusting what you’re told) has been an important influence for my thinking on these matters. It is thanks to him that I got to see these issues through the lenses of Enlightenment ideals -- the exhortation to think for yourself -- which were a reaction to the then-prevailing model of (excessive) deference towards authority and testimony. Harris argues that the emphasis on the autonomy of the knowing subject thus conceived (as found in e.g. Kant, Rousseau, and centuries later in Piaget) swung the pendulum too far in the opposite direction, leading to a mistaken conception of knowledge and learning as essentially individual processes, disregarding how much we in fact learn from others.

In recent decades, the importance of taking into account the social aspects of knowledge became increasingly acknowledged in epistemology, leading to the emergence of the subfield of social epistemology. Arguably, the main focus of social epistemology until now has been on testimony, though there has also been some work on interpersonal justification, understood as "argument addressed to those who disagree with us, or to ourselves when we are of two minds" (Ralws) (see here for Goldman’s classic ‘Argumentation and interpersonal justification’, where he argues (mistakenly, in my opinion) that personal justification remains the primitive notion). While these may not be the two only processes whereby a person shares knowledge with others, for present purposes I take these to be paradigmatic cases.

What the heck is Eckart Förster talking about with his slam on Heidegger?

Page 163 of Eckart Förster's The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: A Systematic Reconstruction*contains a footnoted dig about Heidegger I just don't get. The sentence in the text is:

Fichte's discovery is unprecedented in the history of philosophy: it is the insight that the proposition 'I am' expresses an utterly different kind of being than any existential proposition about a thing or state of affairs:¹⁴ "The initial incorrect presupposition, and the one which caused the Principle of Consciousness** to be presupposed as the first principle of all philosophy, was precisely the presupposition that one must begin with a fact. We certainly do require a first principle which is material and not merely formal. But such a principle does not need to express a deed [Tatsache], it can also express an action [Tathandlung], if it is permissible to wager a proposition which can neither be explained nor proven here" (GA 1,2:46; W 1:8) (164).

This is how Fichte is able to come up with non-divine instances of Kantian "intellectual intuition,"*** non-sensory experiences that, like concepts, are active. Just as for many theists (Kant included), God's creation and knowledge of the world are not two separate acts, for Fichte we become selves by the very act of gaining knowledge about ourselves.***** This makes self-knowledge radically different from normal varieties of empirical and a priori knowledge.

Some Kantian reflections on equating Marginal Productivity with Wages

[This post was prompted by this short encyclopedia piece.--ES.]

Nature does nothing in vain, and in the use of means to her goals she is not prodigal. Her giving to man reason and the freedom of the will which depends upon it is clear indication of her purpose. Man accordingly was not to be guided by instinct, not nurtured and instructed with ready-made knowledge; rather, he should bring forth everything out of his own resources. Securing his own food, shelter, safety and defense...all amusement which can make life pleasant, insight and intelligence, finally even goodness of heart-all this should be wholly his own work. In this, Nature seems to have moved with the strictest parsimony, and to have measured her animal gifts precisely to the most stringent needs of a beginning existence, just as if she had willed that, if man ever did advance from the lowest barbarity to the highest skill and mental perfection and thereby worked himself up to happiness (so far as it is possible on earth), he alone should have the credit and should have only himself to thank-exactly as if she aimed more at his rational self-esteem than at his well-being. For along this march of human affairs, there was a host of troubles awaiting him. But it seems not to have concerned Nature that he should live well, but only that he should work himself upward so as to make himself, through his own actions, worthy of life and of well-being.--I. Kant Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784). Translation by Lewis White Beck.

Kant's nature is a brilliant economizing-social planner; one that designs circumstances that are conducive to the optimal social good, yet requiring a market failure in praise (I almost wrote 'credit', but decided that would cause the wrong kind of confusion).

James Schmidt on Foucault, Cassirer, and the Enlightenement

With Habermas as foil, constant reference to Kant, and a guest appearance by Nietzsche. Here. Pull quote: 

In short, the author of Les mots et les choses appears to have felt that the author of Die Philosophie der Aufklärung was very much a kindred spirit:  both were attempting to understand how cultures were shaped by an a priori that was historical, rather than transcendental.

James Schmidt's blog, Persistent Enlightenment, is a wonderful resource, with a recent series on issues in translating Kant's "Was heißt Aufkärung?" that is extraordinarily rich.