New APPS: Art, Politics, Philosophy, Science

Foucault’s “Analytic Philosophy of Politics”

By Gordon Hull

The current issue of Foucault Studies contains the first English translation of a lecture Foucault gave in Japan in 1978.  This “Analytic Philosophy of Politics” is essential reading if you have an interest in the transition between Foucault’s “power” and “ethics” work and/or his later understanding of power and resistance.  The Tokyo lecture underscores a profound continuity in his thought along a number of lines. Here are a few things that emerged for me on a first reading (there are also references to Confucianism that I am totally unqualified to address, so I will simply note that they are present):

(1) Foucault proposes that the question of power emerges in the wake of fascism and Stalinism, which he treats as both singular but as tied to “a whole series of mechanisms that already existed within social and political systems” (189).  That is, movements now challenge “this overproduction of power that Stalinism and fascism clearly manifested in its stark and monstrous state” (189).  The emphasis on Stalinism and fascism corresponds to the lectures that bookend Society must be Defended a few years prior, where Foucault begins by critiquing “totalitarian” discourses in the form of orthodox Marxism and closes with an analysis of state racism (exemplified by the Nazis) as a form of biopower.  So too, at the beginning of SMD, he refers to some of the same movements – anti-psychiatry, the recovery of “subjugated knowledges” that are the examples in the Tokyo lecture.

(2) Second, Foucault is interested in the role of the philosopher and philosophy.  This is not a surprise given his other interviews and essays on the topic, but it’s worth mentioning that he explicitly poses as a problem that philosophies of liberation presented during the 19c have become tools of oppression in the 20^th.  As he puts it, “each and every time these philosophies of freedom gave birth to forms of power that, whether in the guise of terror, bureaucracy, or even bureaucratic terror, were the very opposite of the regime of freedom, the very opposite of freedom as history” (191).  As with the critique of Marxism and Freudianism at the start of SMD, the text here underscores why Foucault is skeptical of revolutionary discourses and thinks they may be a part of the problem, not the solution.  Thus, “one should no longer imagine that one can escape relations of power all at once, globally, massively, through a sort of radical rupture or a flight without return” (193).

In this, Foucault is on a page very similar to Deleuze, at least on this point.  A moment in an interview of Deleuze by Antonio Negri is instructive. In it, Negri asks about a “tragic note” he detects in Thousand Plateaus. Deleuze responds with a gesture to Primo Levi and a “shame at being human,” of being tainted with what people have done. “This,” he adds, “is one of the most powerful incentives toward philosophy, and it’s what makes all philosophy political…. What’s so shameful is that we’ve no sure way of maintaining becomings, or still more of arousing them, even within ourselves” (Negotiations, 171-3).

Instead of wanting to know if power is good or bad, etc., “one should simply try to relieve the question of power of all the moral and juridical overloads that one has placed on it, and ask the following naïve question, which has not been posed so often … what do power relations fundamentally consist in?”  In so doing, the job of the philosopher is to “make visible what precisely is visible, which is to say to make appear what is so close, so immediate, so intimately connected with ourselves that we cannot perceive it” (192).  The remark certainly recalls the early Heidegger on the question of Being, but it’s here put in service of understanding power as a form of subjectification: the later part of the Tokyo lecture is precisely interested in pastoral power as a technique of individuation.

The Big Data Train Chugs On, Predictive Personality Edition

By Gordon Hull

One of the things that marketers like about big data is that they can personalize ads.  That operation is getting increasingly sophisticated.  We’ve known for a while that basic personality traits (like introversion/extraversion) can be predicted from Facebook likes.  I missed this paper when it came out, but some of the same authors as the initial Facebook “likes” paper have now done the inevitable follow-up.  By targeting Facebook ads on the basis of openness and extraversion (where the correlation with likes is fairly robust), they were able to make users 1.54 times more likely to make a purchase (thus about 40% more likely) than with non-“psychologically-tailored” advertising.  The study size, as with most research on FB, is enormous – the study reached some 3.5 million users (a point the authors use to try to defuse some objections).  The authors duly note the murky ethical issues that emerge: on the one hand, you could proactively try to assist people who show signs of depression; on the other hand, weaknesses like susceptibility to addictive gambling or dubious political targeting could be exploited.  That observation is pretty obvious now, in the wake of Cambridge Analytics.  Two other takeaways stood out more to me.  First, the study predicted personality on the basis of only one like.  As the authors note, that means the study likely underestimates the potential effect of psychological targeting.  Second, the authors emphasize that a point that a lot of us have been trying to make for a while: that these results undermine a lot of the current regulatory strategy for privacy. I’ll let them speak:

Malthus’ Marshmallow

By Gordon Hull

We’ve all heard of a version of the experiment: you set a kid down with a marshmallow, and tell him that if he can sit there and not eat it for a while, he can have two.  Some kids can do it, and others can’t.  A famous paper suggests that whether the child has the willpower to wait is predictive of his future success in life.  Apparently, not so much.  According to a piece by Jessica McCrory Calarco in the Atlantic, new research casts this finding into doubt.  It seems that the original study enrolled fewer than 90 children, all of them selected from Stanford’s lab school.  Let’s just call that an unrepresentative sample.  A new, larger and more representative study concludes that willpower isn’t what’s driving the result; it’s socioeconomic status.  As Calarco puts it, “the capacity to hold out for a second marshmallow is shaped in large part by a child’s social and economic background—and, in turn, that that background, not the ability to delay gratification, is what’s behind kids’ long-term success.”  For example, once you factor in whether the mother has a college degree or not, the children’s ability to wait wasn’t predictive:

Hypernudges as Subjectification

By Gordon Hull

In a recent paper, Karen Yeung introduces the concept of a ‘hypernudge’ as a way to capture the way Big Data intensifies design-based ‘nudges’ as a form of regulation.  Yeung’s discussion draws partly from discussions of Internet regulation, partly from literature on design, and partly from legal literature around privacy and big data.  Yeung’s basic argument is that, in the context of big data:

“Despite the complexity and sophistication of their underlying algorithmic processes, these applications ultimately rely on a deceptively simple design-based mechanism of influence – ‘nudge.’ By configuring and thereby personalizing the user’s informational choice context, typically through algorithmic analysis of data streams from multiple sources claiming to offer predictive insights concerning the habits, preferences and interests of targeted individuals (such as those used by online consumer product recommendation engines), these nudges channel user choices in directions preferred by the choice architect through processes that are subtle, unobtrusive, yet extraordinarily powerful” (119)

Ordinary nudging technologies – she cites the humble speed bump – are static.  In contrast, the sorts of nudges provided by data analytics are dynamic, continuously and invisibly updating the choices a user sees.  They work both to make decisions automatically based on what users have done or can be predicted to do, and by guiding decision-making by influencing what choices are available (and how they are presented).  Because of both the dynamism and invisibility, data-driven nudges can be incredibly powerful in comparison to their static cousins. 

Yeung’s paper also enables one to advance a couple of points in the context of information ethics.

Are Patents Property? Depends on what you mean…

By Gordon Hull

The Supreme Court issued a landmark patent ruling yesterday in Oil States v. Greene.  The most recent major revision to the Patent statute specifies that the validity of patents – in terms of whether they meet conditions of patentability (utility, non-obviousness and novelty - the opinion does not directly specify whether questions about patentable subject matters are included here, but it cites §101, so I think that’s probably covered too)  – can be challenged and resolved through an administrative inter partes review.  This review process has a number of procedural requirements, but at the end of the day the decision reached can result in a patent revocation and is conducted entirely within the administrative apparatus of the PTO.  The question posed is therefore whether the government can revoke a patent without going through the courts.  The answer delivered in a 7-2 opinion by Justice Thomas, is yes.  I haven’t digested the opinion fully, and there was another, somewhat related case yesterday that I haven’t even started on.  That said, Oil States is a very interesting decision, including the dissent authored by Justice Gorsuch.  Here’s some initial reflections on it (I did some context-setting earlier: see here).  I’ll first talk about the opinion, and then end with a thought about the underlying policy problem, for which inter partes review is basically a band-aid solution.

The basic argument of the opinion is that patents aren’t private property so much as they are a public franchise, and as such aren’t the sort of thing the Constitution is talking about when it says property claims have to run through the judicial branch.  As Thomas argues, “the decision to grant a patent is a matter involving public rights—specifically, the grant of a public franchise” (op. slip, 7, his emphasis).  As 19c case law establishes, a patent “take[s] from the public rights of immense value, and bestow[s] them upon the patentee” (op slip, 8), by granting a right of exclusion (traditionally the core of property).  It does so to incentivize invention.  It then follows logically that the decision to remove a patent is also a matter of public franchise.  Thomas cites a 1966 ruling that administrative review covers the “issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain” (8-9).  In other words, if the patent doesn’t cover something novel, it takes knowledge that was available to the public and privatizes it.

The ruling strikes me as exemplifying what I call “public biopolitics,” which is basically the pre-neoliberal version that Foucault identifies (especially in Security, Territory, Population and Birth of Biopolitics) with classic liberalism.  They don’t quote Mill, but the opinion is the sort of thing that the Mill of the Principles of Political Economy could get on board with. For example, Mill justifies the departure from laissez faire on the grounds that inventions are of tremendous public value, but require nurturing by the state. Similar instances of justified state intervention include public funding of things like universities (p. 968).  He also explains what happens in terms of a publicly-granted patent license: “this is not making the commodity dear for [the inventor’s] benefit, but merely postponing a part of the increased cheapness which the public owe to the inventor, in order to compensate and reward him for the service” (p. 928). Thus, even in the case of patents, Mill conceives of the production of knowledge as the production of something that benefits the public generally, and which the application of laissez-faire will not supply. The point is not to internalize externalities for the sake of the inventor.  This sense of knowledge as a public good is specific to modern liberalism.  As Foucault puts is, “activity that may go beyond this pure and simple subsistence will in fact be produced, distributed, divided up, and put in circulation in such a way that the state really can draw its strength from it” (STP 326).

Hostile Information Architecture

By Gordon Hull

Surprise! Facebook is back in the news and the doghouse, this time for allowing vast amounts of user data to find its way to Cambridge Analytica, which then used it to try to elect Donald Trump.  The only surprise is that anyone is surprised.  I’ll review why that is first, then offer a term that gets at what I take to be the real problem: we live in a deliberately-created hostile information architecture.  Let’s first rehearse why the FB-Cambridge Analytica nexus is not a surprise.

Property as Juridical and Biopower (part 3, with a little bit about subjectification)

By Gordon Hull

In the two previous posts, I first suggested that Thomas Merrill’s logical argument for why the right to exclude was the sine qua non of any conception of property was inconclusive.  I then offered a brief reading of the Foucauldian distinction between juridical and biopower, applying it to Locke to suggest that in Locke’s case, both aspects of power were present, but juridical was dominant.  In what follows, I want to argue that the opposite is the case with the contemporary Demsetzian account: here, biopower is dominant.  In other words, a look at endpoint historical instances of property theory suggests that the view of power underlying them has changed from Locke’s time to ours, even as the (quasi-juridical) right to exclude remains a common thread.

To return to Merrill’s thoughts on exclusion, how might we combine exclusion with Foucauldian theories of power?  An initial argument is straightforward, and goes something like this: any conception of property that says the right to exclude is essential retains at the very least that much of a juridical understanding of property.  Since rights are an aspect of juridical power, and since juridical power is about the right to repress and to prevent, it’s easy enough to see the exclusionary right as juridical.  Merrill’s arguments about the priority of the right to exclude over the right to use and develop suggests that any biopolitical emphasis on optimization is ultimately secondary to a basic ability to repress.  Importantly, Merrill extends his argument to commons-based regimes: any internal use privileges are secondary to the initial ability of the villagers to exclude non-members.  In short, even as we increasingly live by biopolitical regimes, juridical power retains its force at the very core of those regimes: the property right which has been the central feature of capitalism.

Property as Juridical and Biopower (part 2)

By Gordon Hull

Last time, I suggested that Thomas Merrill’s logical argument for why the right to exclude was the sine qua non of any conception of property was inconclusive.  With that space cleared, I want to focus on what I think a focus on the right to exclude does emphasize.  Merrill is right that property theory has tended to take the right to exclude as fundamental.  A historical dive into how that right is conceptualized says something important about how we have understood power.

That is, the focus on the right to exclude does show us something important has changed.  If we use Locke and Demsetz as points of comparison (in the sense that they present historical endpoints), it is clear that both theories of property rely on both juridical and biopolitical justifications.  However, in the Lockean case the biopolitical end is subordinate to the juridical one; in the Demsetzian case, the opposite holds.  In other words, we have away moved from a model of property in which juridical power is dominant to one where biopolitical power is dominant.

Property as Juridical and Biopower (part 1)

By Gordon Hull

In a 1998 paper, Thomas W. Merrill argues that the presence of the right to exclude others is the necessary and sufficient condition for the presence of a property right.  In this, he views himself as arguing against a “nominalist” interpretation of the right.  This nominalist interpretation, associated with legal realism and the familiar Hohfeldian “bundle of rights,” says that property is best conceived as being located in a conventionally established set of rights, the exact contours of which will vary between jurisdictions and time periods, and within which no one element is necessary.  At the risk of importing a somewhat anachronistic term, we might say that the Hohfeldian bundle leads somewhat directly to a “family resemblance” theory of property (Julie Cohen applies it to property in the paper I’m using below; the approach has also been used to good effect for privacy, and with explicit reference to Wittgenstein).  In defense of this proposition, Merrill offers three kinds of justifications: a logical one, a historical one, and one based on established legal use.  More about the first in a moment; the latter two rely on accumulated historical record and precedent.

Healthcare and the Nature of the Firm

By Gordon Hull

Yesterday, a group of very rich and influential corporations – Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway and JPMorgan Chase – announced that they would be teaming up to form an independent healthcare company for their employees.  From the NYT:

“The alliance was a sign of just how frustrated American businesses are with the state of the nation’s health care system and the rapidly spiraling cost of medical treatment. It also caused further turmoil in an industry reeling from attempts by new players to attack a notoriously inefficient, intractable web of doctors, hospitals, insurers and pharmaceutical companies.  It was unclear how extensively the three partners would overhaul their employees’ existing health coverage — whether they would simply help workers find a local doctor, steer employees to online medical advice or use their muscle to negotiate lower prices for drugs and procedures. While the alliance will apply only to their employees, these corporations are so closely watched that whatever successes they have could become models for other businesses.”

The CEOs were very clear that they weren’t sure what they were going to do, but that they intended to improve the healthcare cost problem for their employees and corporations.  This announcement falls only a couple of weeks after a consortium of hospitals announced that they’d be forming an independent drug company to supply them with cheap generic drugs.  That announcement was spurred in part by the recent behaviors of investors who scoop up old drugs for rare diseases, and then raise the price enormously, knowing that the drug is uncommon enough that there won’t be market competition.  But the behavior of those who exponentially raise the prices of EpiPens and Daraprim is really only an exemplar of the more general pricing strategy of Pharma, as the Times reported with regard to the doubling of the price of rheumatoid arthritis drug Humira since 2012. 

What the Amazon/JPMorgan/Berkshire Hathaway consortium and the hospital consortium have in common, then, is that they are committing to find new ways to make health care cheaper.  And they are doing so by attempting to internalize costs that they would otherwise have to pay for on the market.  Two thoughts:

Intellectual Property, Creative Commons and Neoliberal Biopower

By Gordon Hull

In “Intellectual Property’s Leviathan,” Amy Kapczynski argues that both advocates of strong IP protection, and critics from the creative-commons (CC) side tend to view the state in the same way: “both those who defend robust private IP law and their most prominent critics … typically describe the state in its first instance as inertial, heavy, bureaucratic, ill-informed, and perilously corruptible and corrupt” (131-2).  On the pro-IP side, neoliberal economic doctrine (she cites Hayek) view the state’s role as establishing markets and getting out of the way.  The state otherwise lacks the information to decide winners and losers efficiently, and in any case, it would tend to be corrupted by political or other sectarian interests (ignore for the moment the corruptibility of markets).  On the creative commons side, which Kapczynski identifies with Yochai Benkler and Lawrence Lessig, there is a tendency to adopt exactly the same view of the state: “the commons, they suggest, is a concept that seeks not only to liberate us from predatory and dysfunctional markets, but also from predatory and dysfunctional states” (137).  As she points out, IP does present a number of obvious instances of regulatory capture, so the fear is not an irrational one.  The irony behind this distancing, however, is that both views also require the state to be a functioning entity capable of creating and executing reasonably coherent policy.  For the pro-IP camp, the state has to be able to administer a property regime (and a complex regulatory bureaucracy); for the commons camp, the state has to be able to do things like fund basic research through agencies like the NIH.

Kapczynski’s point is an important one, and I have only a couple of things to add.  First, she notes that the commons theorists tend to treat infrastructural projects and commons-based private ordering systems in the same camp.  As she notes, this is a strange move:

Revising Foucault on Neoliberalism: the Role of Monopolies (part 2)

By Gordon Hull

As I suggested last time, the current neoliberal expansion of IP hinges on the acceptance of monopolies, and the relation between deadweight loss (as advanced by Arrow) and incentives theory (as advanced by Demsetz) is accordingly essential to understanding it.  Here I want to expand on that point, and then say something about contemporary theory.

The debate is one that Demsetz’s side is winning.  When term limits came before the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Reno, a set of seventeen economists – including such neoclassical luminaries as Arrow, James Buchanan, Ronald Coase, and Milton Friedman – submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court opposing the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA).  These economists made arguments precisely in terms of incentives and deadweight loss: a further increase in term length is highly unlikely to make a meaningful difference to incentives to create works, while likely to burden the public with reduced access, and other creators with greater licensing fees.  They conclude:

Revising Foucault on Neoliberalism: the Role of Monopolies (part 1)

By Gordon Hull

In rereading Philip Mirowski’s critique of Foucault on neoliberalism (as it’s presented in Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, his book on the 2008 financial crisis), I noticed a limit in Foucault’s analysis that I hadn’t really thought about before.  Although Foucault correctly sees that a key (if not they key) feature in the transition from classical liberalism to neoliberalism is the realization that markets are something that the state can create and curate, he does not see that neoliberalism also puts a lot of weight on the neoclassical tolerance for monopolies.  This is a significant reversal from classical liberalism.  I work on intellectual property, which is a legal regime that attempts to create markets in intellectual goods by way of granting monopolies to their creators, which means it’s hard to ignore the tolerance of monopoly.  But the point is worth expanding on more generally.

As Foucault points out (as will be apparent, all of my references will be to Birth of Biopolitics; I’m not aware the topic comes up elsewhere in his work), classical liberalism – the “liberal art of government” (BB 65) – requires anti-monopoly legislation for the “freedom of the internal market to exist” (BB 64).  Competition, if left unchecked, will tend to lead to monopolies.  By the New Deal, and the political opposition is engendered, liberalism faced a “crisis … due to the inflation of the compensatory mechanisms of freedom” (BB 69) such that anti-monopoly legislation could be perceived as part of a “’legislative strait-jacket” (BB 68).  The ordo-liberals thus pick up on the “problem of competition and monopoly” but “do not depart in any way from the historical development of liberal thought” (BB 119).  For early neoliberalism, the “problem will be to demonstrate that monopoly is not in fact part of the economic and historical logic of competition” (BB 134).  Instead, they look at what non-economic policies are supposed to have led to monopolies, and argue that competition and markets do not, without these external distortions, lead to monopolies.  They also reframe the problem with monopolies, which is that they will distort the operation of the price mechanism (BB 136, citing von Mises).  The essential claim is thus that a monopolist will have to charge market prices, or competition will unseat him.  So intervention is not necessary (BB 137).

Net Neutrality, Bears Ears and Primitive Accumulation

By Gordon Hull

Ajit Pai is the Marie Antoinette of the Trump Administration.  How else can you explain his decision to do a little skit last week, in which he pretends that his chairmanship of the FCC is a part of a plot by his former employer, Verizon, to ensure full regulatory capture of the FCC?  This of course while he was inside a cozy dinner, ignoring people outside protesting his impending vote to end Net Neutrality, and while he claims the support of millions of provably fake comments?  If that moment put the sheer hubris of the Trump administration on display, then surely its naked appeals to the worst kind of partisanship was Pai’s attempt to deflect criticism of his decision by companies like Twitter.  There, his argument was that Twitter, not he, is an enemy of the open internet because it’s (supposedly) too liberal.  As for the millions of provably fake comments, Pai can’t be bothered to investigate, and won’t let anybody else do so either.

The Neoliberal Biopolitical Two-Step: Of Patents and Banking Arbitration

By Gordon Hull

It has seemed to me for a long time that one helpful theoretical lens through which to look at neoliberalism is to understand it as a phase (or perhaps a dispositive) of biopower. This is because neoliberalism does not generally rely on juridical rules (or tried to colonize the judiciary), it pushes for the marketization of everything, and involves an elaborate state apparatus to support that marketization. It also functions as an engine of subjectification, actively attempting to turn everyone into instantiations of homo economicus, whether directly by state action, or by way of empowering private actors. Even school students are quietly taught the ropes. The incessant demands for privatization have put enormous pressure on the public sector, both in the starvation of funding cuts and the efforts to privatize it. That, in turn, has led to such monstrosities as private prisons.

That said, today’s neoliberal biopolitics obviously needs to be distinguished from the biopolitics that came before, which was, as Foucault discussed, centered at the population level, concerned with birth rates, longevity, and so on (hence the distinction is readily apparent in health policy). One of the hallmarks of the emergence of biopolitics is the rise of the administrative state; as the state comes increasingly to try to optimize the population, an elaborate administrative apparatus – a large state bureaucracy – emerges to fill these functions. This does not mean that there are no more laws. Indeed, Foucault emphasizes that the biopolitical era involves multiple sites of power, both inside and outside the state:

Foucault and Marx: on Subjectification and Exhaustion

By Gordon Hull

I have been circling around the relation between Marx and Foucault for a while, and thinking in  particular about the ways that they can be viewed as productively engaged, particularly at the intersection of primitive accumulation and subjectification (e.g., here, here and here)  This of course flies in the face of Foucault’s acerbic dismissals of Marxism, as when in the early parts of Society must be Defended, he dismisses it as “totalitarian,” or in the Trombadori interviews more generally.  But there is a renaissance of interest in the topic, and there are a number of Foucault texts only now being studied in the English-speaking world that can be brought to bear on it.  Most prominent perhaps is the recently translated “Mesh of Power” lecture, where Foucault specifically credits chapters 13-15 of Capital for moving toward a non-juridical understanding of power.  As Foucault says, what Marx shows there is that “one power does not exist, but many powers” and that power is productive, not repressive:

“These specific regional powers [delineated by Marx – GH] have absolutely no ancient [primordial] function of prohibiting, preventing, saying ‘you must not.’ The original, essential and permanent function of these local and regional powers is, in reality, being producers of the efficiency and skill of the producers of a product.  Marx, for example, has superb analyses of the problem of discipline in the army and workshops.”

What I want to do here is extend some of the credit to the “Fragment on Machines” section of the Grundrisse. 

Is Intellectual Property actually Property?

By Gordon Hull

This sounds like a trick question, but it’s not.  It’s also currently before the Supreme Court, about which more in a moment.  First, however, let me summarize the case for why IP isn’t really “property” in the ordinary sense, even if we use the word.  In a paper from a little more than ten years ago, Michael Carrier proposed that although we claim that IP is a “property,” and treat IP as property in some respects, we do not actually treat it as we do other forms of property.  In the first step, we have come to treat IP as property “not only in the essentially unlimited scope and duration of its initial rights but also in the ubiquitous assertions that IP is absolute property” (12).  This is evident, Carrier suggests, in a number of ways.  In copyright, for example, term length, scope, and subject matter are all increasing.  In patents, enforcement is increasing (especially with the creation of the Federal Circuit, which stopped a lot of forum shopping, although the Eastern District of Texas until very recently functioned as a favored forum of so-called “patent trolls”), and patent rights are more and more viewed not just as innovations, but as investments.  The result should be familiar to anyone familiar with discussions of neoliberal financialization:

Radical White Terrorism as State Policy: Trump, Sovereign Decision and homo sacer

By Gordon Hull

As our tin-pot “President” continues his inexorable slide into narcissistic authoritarianism, it is worth noting recent events that establish beyond any residual doubt that radical white terrorism is now official policy.  When historians look at the Trump presidency, assuming we all survive long enough for there to be historians, I suspect last week is going to be a significant one.  It began with Trumps’s remarks after Charlottesville, in which he managed to say that counterprotestors shared in the blame for neo-Nazi violence and that there were many “fine people” hiding in the mob of white supremacists.  These made his own views clear (as though they weren’t already).  But they did not establish state policy.  Events Friday did: the pardoning of former Maricopa Country Sheriff Joe Arpaio, the border patrol’s decision to keep inland border patrol checkpoints open during the evacuation from Hurricane Harvey, and Trump’s apparent decision to end the DACA program.  Together these say: radical white terrorism is above the law, and the undocumented are homines sacri. Foucault remarked at one point that in a biopolitical state “it’s impossible to reconcile law and order because when you try to do so it is only in the form of an integration of law into the state’s [administrative] order” (Power, 117).  In Trump’s America, you get neither law nor order: Trump despises both the rule of law, as evidenced Friday, and the administrative state, as evidenced by his repeated appointment of incompetent, unqualified partisan hacks to head regulatory agencies the very existence of which they oppose.  The theoretical framework through which all of this behavior is intelligible finds its expression in the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt.

Intellectual Property Theory Wars (Part 2): IP as social power

By Gordon Hull

Last time, I introduced the exchange between Mark Lemley and Robert Merges on IP theory, and made the initial case that Lemley is essentially arguing for the theoretical primacy of neoliberal biopower in intellectual property.  Merges, as will hopefully become evident below, is more interested in grounding IP in juridical notions of rights-bearing subjects.  Lemley finds such grounding not just wrong but incoherent and irrational, on the grounds that it is a refusal to use empirical evidence.  What I want to do here is dig out some of the textual evidence to support my argument, specifically by looking at some of the work Lemley puts in the “faith-based” camp.  That is, the way Lemley critiques other efforts at IP theory seems to me to exemplify the hold that Chicago has on IP scholarship.  I want to look at his treatment of three such competing views: he finds them completely unintelligible when they use a non-utilitarian form of reason (Merges), he ignores it when they argue from an economic perspective that rejects the basic assumptions of the Chicago school’s development of IP (Amy Kapczynski), and he contorts them into an unpersuasive utilitarian frame when they challenge wealth aggregation as the appropriate standard for evaluation (Madhavi Sunder).  Let’s look at these in reverse order.

Intellectual Property Theory Wars (Part 1)

By Gordon Hull

A couple of years ago, Mark Lemley, one of the most influential and prolific of intellectual property scholars, published his “Faith-Based Intellectual Property,” a manifesto against what he characterizes as non-utilitarian or non-empirical theories of intellectual property.  In other words, “participants on both sides of the IP debates are increasingly staking out positions that simply do not depend on evidence at all” (1336).  He adds, “I call this retreat from evidence faith-based IP, both because adherents are taking the validity of the IP system on faith, and because the rationale for doing so is a form of religious belief” (1337).  He treats Robert Merges’ Justifying Intellectual Property (2012) as the paradigmatic example of this phenomenon, though he cites others.  A couple of months ago, Merges’ response, “Against Utilitarian Fundamentalism” appeared, arguing that it was the militant utilitarian position – which as Merges reads it assumes that “to abandon the solid world of empirical foundations is to automatically commit to a stubbornly irrational set of foundations” – that “commits precisely the error that [it] attributes to others” which “takes an extreme position, cutting off conversation and debate” (n5)

The point I want to make here (in this post and a follow-up) – and I should say that I absolutely agree with Lemley both that IP protections are too strong now, and that there is a good-sized body of evidence that supports this proposition – is that Lemley’s argument presupposes that IP is a form of biopower (or perhaps biopolitical governmentality) insofar as it sets policy, the aim of which is to optimize the welfare of the bios by pushing the “conduct of the conduct” of individuals within it toward higher levels of creative productivity (if you are uncomfortable calling that “biopower,” then it’s fine to stick with “governmentality” here – the point is the contrast with other kinds of thought).  I would also argue, though again not a lot hangs on the distinction here, that Lemley’s framework is almost entirely dependent on law and economics, as it developed out of the University of Chicago from the 1960’s onward.  In this, he is accepting what one might call a neoliberal understanding of intellectual property (on the move to law and economics, see especially William Davies).

More self-promotion: "Toward a critical theory of corporate wellness"

By Gordon Hull

Frank Pasquale and I have a new paper forthcoming in Biosocieties, "Toward a critical theory of corporate wellness."  Here is the abstract:

In the U.S., “employee wellness” programs are increasingly attached to employer-provided health insurance.  These programs attempt to nudge employees, sometimes quite forcefully, into healthy behaviors such as smoking cessation and exercise routines.  Despite being widely promoted as saving on healthcare costs, numerous studies undermine this rationale.  After documenting the programs’ failure to deliver a positive return on investment, we analyze them as instead providing an opportunity for employers to exercise increasing control over their employees. Based on human capital theory and neoliberal models of subjectivity that emphasize personal control and responsibility, these programs treat wellness as a lifestyle that employees must be cajoled into adopting, extending the workplace not just into the home but into the bodies of workers and entrenching the view that one belongs to one’s workplace.  At the same time, their selective endorsement of health programs (many scientifically unsupported) produce a social truth of wellness framed as fitness for work.  We conclude by arguing that the public health initiatives occluded by the private sector’s promotion of wellness programs would be a much better investment of resources.

Springer puts an embargo on the final version of the paper so it can't go up on SSRN yet, but they do invite authors to share a link to the final version  on their site.  Apparently you can read it there for free, and can download if you have institutional access.  The Biosocieties link is here, if you're using a connection with institutional access.

Shameless Self-Promotion: "The Subject and Power of Bioethics"

By Gordon Hull

I have a new paper up on SSRN, "The Subject and Power of Bioethics," which was invited to a forthcoming issue of the Journal of Ethics, Medicine and Public Health.  The abstract is:

The present paper argues that late work of Michel Foucault is helpful in understanding contemporary bioethics.  Specifically, Foucault’s writings on biopower and subjectivity are increasingly relevant as we consider the intersection of public policy and clinical ethics in a socio-political context increasingly structured by the demands of neoliberalism.  Although Foucault’s earlier work on the clinical gaze has been important to bioethics, that is no longer as important as his later, incomplete research into power and subjectivity. 

The paper develops this argument in four steps.  In the first, I look at a classic phenomenological approach to clinical bioethics by Richard Zaner, starting from which I develop a Foucauldian perspective.  In that section I also offer a basic outline of what I take Foucault’s primary theoretical contributions to be by way of an initial explication of the biopower-subjectification nexus.  The following two sections of the paper present exemplary applications of Foucauldian theory to two areas at the intersection of public policy and clinical bioethics.  The first is the procedure for testing women for the BRCA1/2 mutations, mutations that impose on carriers a significant risk of developing breast and ovarian cancer.  A comparison between American and Dutch practices underscores not only the new ways that genetic testing interpret the body, but also the importance of local political and cultural contexts for understanding how the test is presented, administered and managed.  The second is a consideration of the intersection of employee wellness programs and wearable technologies.  In it, I develop Foucault’s thought that subjects in the Christian West have long been encouraged to understand themselves confessionally, offering to authority figures the “truth” about themselves.  I then interpret the compulsory use of wearables as a verification strategy for compliance with wellness programs as exemplary of such confessional strategies.  The final section ties the discussion back to the clinical encounter as Zaner formulates it as an inherently moral encounter structured by vulnerabilities that matter for understanding the selfhood of patients.  Based on the preceding examples, I make the case that American understandings of selfhood are increasingly separated from any sense of publicness, and that this structuring of selfhood is of increasing importance in framing and adequately understanding bioethics today.

Travel Ban 2.5, the Camp, and the Airport

by Gordon Hull

On Wednesday night, the Trump administration implemented as much of its long promised Muslim Ban as it thought the Supreme Court would allow.  Travelers from a list of six countries who did not have a “bona fide” connection or “close familial relationship” to someone in the U.S. would be banned.  The administration interpreted the Supreme Court’s ruling as restrictively as possible – the Court said that a mother-in-law would be an example of a close familial relationship, but didn’t mention grandparents – so having a grandparent here (or being a grandparent there) isn’t a close familial relationship.  The ruling smacks of arbitrariness and was rolled out as secretly as possible, and it’s not even clear that it actually does much at all. Then again, the original ban also was a poorly-worded, arbitrary mockery of the rule of law.  For example, the “policy” began with zero warning, leaving travelers stranded in airports with no legal options.  So too, the six countries were allegedly named because of their propensity to breed terrorists, but no one from any of them has committed a terrorist act in the U.S. since 2001.  Countries from which terrorists have come – Saudi Arabia – are not on the list.  Some of the countries have no functioning governments, but Iran does.  And so it goes.  That’s what happens when you promise to get rid of Muslims and then realize that you can’t get away with just making that so by campaign promise.

In Homo Sacer, Agamben declares that the camp (the paradigmatic case of which is the Nazi concentration camp) is the archetype of modern power, suggesting that “the camp as dislocating localization is the hidden matrix of the politics in which we are still living” (175).  He proposes that the model of the camp can be seen in all sorts of institutions: the stadium at Bari where the Italians herded Albanian immigrants, the track where the Vichy herded the Jews before deporting them, and the halls at airports where foreigners asking for refugee status are detained, “all equally [are] camps” (174).  As someone who has read a lot of Adorno, I found this assimilation of airport waiting halls and the Holocaust somewhere between uncomfortable and offensive.  I am still uncomfortable with the comparison, but I do think some of the logic that Agamben is identifying is at work here.  That logic is one in which “the normal order is de facto suspended and in which whether or not atrocities are committed depends not on law but on the civility and ethical sense of the police who temporarily act as sovereign” (174).

Another week, another unanimous SCOTUS IP Decision – this time, disparaging Trademarks

The Supreme Court ruled unanimously today (well, an opinion and a concurrence) that a provision in the Lanham Act banning “disparaging” trademarks violated the First Amendment. In the case in question, an Asian-American musician named Simon Tam had attempted to register his band’s name, “The Slants,” in a clear effort to reclaim the slur.  The PTO had refused the registration, on the grounds that it was a disparaging term. The Federal Circuit ruled in favor of Tam (my thoughts on that decision are here).  Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Alito declined to resolve whether the case required strict or intermediate scrutiny, on the grounds that the disparagement clause failed the weaker, intermediate scrutiny standard.  Alito found two asserted government interests: one was protecting against speech that offends, and he dismissed that argument on the grounds that the “the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate’” (citing a 1929 dissent by Justice Holmes).  The second interest was in the protection of the orderly flow of commerce.  Here, he pointed out that the statute was in no way narrowly-drawn, as intermediate scrutiny would require.  In the first of a series of reductios, he argued that:

“The clause reaches any trademark that disparages any person, group, or institution [emphasis original; he is quoting statutory text]. It applies to trademarks like the following: “Down with racists,” “Down with sexists,” “Down with homophobes.” It is not an anti-discrimination clause; it is a happy-talk clause. In this way, it goes much further than is necessary to serve the interest asserted.”

Exhausting Patents

In another chapter of its ongoing battle with the Federal Circuit (and the second in a week), the Supreme Court (SCOTUS, I will refer to the Federal Circuit as the CAFC) ruled last Tuesday in Impression Products v. Lexmark International that the sale of a patented product “exhausts” the patent-holder’s claim to derive patent revenue from that particular article.  First, a brief background.  Printer toner is like razor blades: companies charge extravagant prices for the toner without which their printers will not operate, while selling the printer itself fairly cheaply.  Such a strategy creates secondary markets in toner, either in third party cartridges that are designed to be compatible with the printer, or in strategies for refilling used cartridges.  Naturally, printer companies hate this, and so engage in all sorts of strategies to stop it.  They warn consumers that using non-proprietary cartridges will cause poor print quality and void their warranty.  They design their devices to try to detect off-brand toner, and refuse to operate if one is installed. These strategies tend to fail in court.  In 2004, the 6^th Circuit ruled that efforts to circumvent the cartridge-detection system did not violate the DMCA (= copyright law).

In last Tuesday’s case, Lexmark had sued a manufacturer of aftermarket ink cartridges, which had been taking used cartridges from either overseas markets or from consumers who had emptied them, refilling them, and then selling them.  Lexmark argued that its exclusive rights should extend to the resold cartridges.  The SCOTUS threw cold water on that argument, citing settled common law on property: when you sell something, you don’t get to derive revenue from subsequent sales.  If Lexmark wanted to try to extend its patent rights, the company could contractually forbid users to give their spent cartridges to companies like Impression, for example, but that would be a matter of contract law, not property.  But patents are a species of property, and patent rights are “exhausted” – i.e., end – when the patented product is sold.

Biopower, Juridical Power, and Patent Trolls

Patent law seems like an easy place to talk about biopower.  After all, it has been possible to patent life forms for some time now, and large numbers of patents are issued for products that directly affect life, as in the case of pharmaceuticals and other medical innovations.  Biopolitical implications of patent law are thus easy enough to adumbrate, even if one wants to construe “life” in narrow, biological terms.   There is, however, another angle that needs to be considered, which is the institutional structure of patent law.  If one effect of the emergence of biopolitics is the rise of the regulatory state and the decline of judicial power, we see in the case of patent law an ongoing struggle between institutions representative of those forms of power.  Two Supreme Court decisions in the past week illustrate this conflict; this post will deal with the first (TC Heartland) and I will have something to say about the second in a follow-up post.

Republican Thanatopolitics

Foucault reminds us that biopolitics is describes a kind of power structure according to which some will be compelled to live (or have their lives as members of a favored population optimized), while others will be allowed to die.  As he puts it, “the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (HS1, 138).  Although much work has focused on techniques by which biopower works to optimize a population, it is worth attending to the disallowance of life, the thanatopolitics that is the other half of biopower, because the Republican party is engaged in producing a very effective case study.

As Foucault says a few pages later, “a power whose task is to take charge of life needs continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms.  It is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility” (HS1, 144).  Those who are deemed to be without sufficient value or utility are allowed to die.  Much attention here has focused on Foucault’s brief remarks on “race” war in Society must be Defended, where he proposes that biopower creates a “race” of those who must die, so that “we” can live.  He is thinking of Nazi Germany and the logic of cold war deterrence, but  current Republican policies show that thanatopolitics can operate at a much more granular and subtle level.

I am of course talking about the AHCA, the mean-spirited tax cut for the wealthy, sponsored by gutting the (limited) ability of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to provide for the needy.  Various theorists after Foucault – François Ewald in particular – have emphasized the role of insurance in biopolitics as it comes to regulate and define acceptable behaviors according to actuarial risk.  Here we see its role in thanatopolitics.  There’s a good analysis of the AHCA’s evolution and structure here; suffice it to say that the law, if enacted, would end up in at least 24 million people losing access to insurance (largely by gutting Medicaid and ending the mandate that people have insurance. Republicans are flatly lying about this).  It also allows states to scale back guarantees for coverage of those with pre-existing conditions, and allow states to scale back what services have to be included in health insurance; the primary target appears to be maternity and contraceptive coverage.  Apparently the old, white men who are behind this forgot that they had mothers who required medical care.  There’s a fig leaf $8 billion to fund high-risk pools, which no one qualified thinks comes near to the cost of funding those pools.  It’s not a full regress to pre-ACA levels, but it’s about as far as things can go without requiring enough votes in the Senate to overcome a filibuster.

Do Brands Produce Value? Thoughts on de-fetishizing use value

Brands are of increasing importance to capitalism.  As an insightful book by Franck Cochoy argues, this is part of the logic of commodification, which generates a perpetual demand for product differentiation.  At the point that a product becomes a commodity – i.e., at the point that it leaves the bazaar, where individual vendors measure out products like food in bulk to individual customers, and enters the process of circulation in a capitalist market – it becomes necessary to distinguish commodities from one another.  This is because the initial process of commodification first produces a necessary standardization (where weights, notions of what a given product name signifies, etc. become more uniform – in Marxian terms, where exchange value becomes measurable and money becomes the primary way by which one measures equivalence between commodities whose use value is presumed equivalent), from which producers then have to distinguish their commodities.  This demand for differentiation generates packaging, brands, trademark, and the final detachment of commodities from brands, such that brands have value that can be applied to other commodities.  A good literature from anthropology and cultural studies illustrates this process with such products as “quality” salmon, canola oil, and teak.

There is currently a lively debate in the context of the internet about whether brands actually produce (surplus) value in the Marxian sense.  The pro side is represented in a recent piece by Adam Arvidsson and Elanor Colleoni, who argue that standard Marxian notions of labor apply poorly to the generation of value in places like social media, because the Marxian notion of labor is too tightly connected to time spent laboring.  Instead, and following Negri specifically and autonomist Marxism more generally, they claim that “in effect, social media platforms like Facebook function as channels by means of which affective investments on the part of the multitude can be translated into objectified forms of abstract affect that support financial valuations” (146).  That is, prosumers produce surplus value by means of affective investment in brands (it is perhaps worth pointing out that this argument is not confined to theories about information; for a similar argument from the anthropology literature, see this piece), and this unremunerated attachment is harvested by social media companies as surplus value.

In a critique of Arvidsson and Colleoni’s claim that brands produce value, Jakob Rigi and Robert Prey argue that affect “does not produce new value but instead helps the owner of the brand to appropriate a larger portion of the surplus value produced by workers in the realm of production” (400).  They identify three primary ways this happens: (1) by allowing brand owners to increase demand for their commodity at the expense of other commodities, enabling them to sell their commodities at prices above their value; (2) by allowing brand owners to extract monopoly rents in the form of intellectual property licensing; and (3) by allowing speculative value and what Marx calls “fictitious capital” to attach to the brand via the stock market.  I want to take a closer look at the first claim here, because it comes across to me as mistaken.  At the very least, it seems to me to require more argument than Rigi and Prey supply to defeat the supposition that brands create value, even if Arvidsson and Colleoni aren’t quite right to speak in terms of affective labor (though I’m going to defend at least a version of that claim below; part of my goal here is to be able to define it more precisely.  As I’ve suggested in the context of big data (see also here), I think that the surplus value discussion here is incomplete without reference to primitive accumulation).

Squaring the Circle on Big Data, Class, Value and Primitive Accumulation

A recent paper by Hamid Ekbia presents an interesting Marxian theory of the relation between exploitation and computer networks.   The paper is intended as an intervention in to discussions of the accumulation of value in what is now called cognitive capitalism (I’ve attempted to synthesize some of that literature here).  The most interesting part of the Ekbia’s paper seems to me that he’s able to construct a coherent notion of class (or close to class – he acknowledges that it’s not quite a class in the strict Marxian sense) within those who are part of the networked economy.  In particular, he is able to locate those who are exploited and to roughly define them as a group: the “condensers.”  The problem of locating a specific exploited class is important and salient partly because there is no way for a Marxian theory of value to work unless somebody is exploited, but also because the behavior of prosumers in particular has been the subject of intense controversy, particularly on the subject of whether they produce value.  Ekbia’s contribution, it seems to me, is to show how and why some prosumers manage to be exploited.

Notes on Big Data, Marx, Time, and the Production of Value

There is a running debate in critical theory circles about the applicability of Marxian analysis to big data specifically, and to an economy dominated by immaterial goods, more generally (I have blogged about this periodically, circling primarily around the concept of primitive accumulation: see here and here).  As part of working through that literature, here I want to lay out some of the broad outlines of the pro- side as I see it, and then offer some preliminary thoughts from Marx’s own work that address one specific objection.

Advocates of the applicability of Marx almost invariably (as far as I can tell so far; I don’t claim to have read anywhere near all of this literature yet) base their case on Italian autonomism.  Autonomism is best known in the work of Antonio Negri (with or without Michael Hardt); important in this context are also Paolo Virno, Maurizio Lazzarto and Franco Berardi.  Autonomism breaks with classical Marxism both insofar as it breaks with any sort of economic determinism (by shifting the base to class struggle, and not means of production), as well by advancing two more immediately applicable ideas.  First, autonomism adopts Marx’s “Fragment on Machines,” an unpublished (by Marx) and fragmentary set of notes to the effect that capital will be relying increasingly on accumulated science and knowledge (Virno has what is probably the best synopsis of this account of the “general intellect”).  Second, autonomist theory argues that capitalist relations have extended beyond the boundaries of the workplace to encompass all social relations.  In Negri’s terms, we now face the complete subsumption of society by capital.