As a final installment of reviewing some older “injury in fact” cases, I’d like to look at a few older state libel cases, because the distinction emerges especially clearly in them. A North Carolina case, for example, noted that “he who publishes slanderous words even as those of a third person with the intent, (to be collected from the mode, extent and circumstances of the publication,) that the charges should be believed, does an injury in fact to the person slandered and ought to answer for it” (Hampton v. Wilson, 15 N.C. 468, 470 (1834). Here’s a few cases in more detail. The 19c gender politics is really helpful in seeing how their minds worked on defamation per se.
(a) Chastity in Iowa
A pair of Iowa cases are particularly clear. In Abrams v. Foshee, the Court was asked to rule whether accusing a woman of having an abortion was actionable as slander. The Court lays out its reasoning particularly clearly:
“To maintain an action of slander, the consequence of the words spoken, must be to occasion some injury or loss to the plaintiff, either in law or fact. As the declaration in this case, claims no special damages, or a loss or injury, in fact, we are left to inquire whether the charges referred to in the instructions refused, was of such a character as to amount to an injury in law. To determine this, it becomes material to ascertain in what cases this action may be maintained, without proof of special damages. Starkie, in his work on Slander, page 9, lays down the rule, that such action may be maintained "when a person is charged with the commission of a crime; when an infectious disorder is imputed; and when the imputation affects the plaintiff in his office, profession, or business." In this case, we only need examine the rule so far as it relates to the charge of a crime. And what is that rule? In Cox and wife v. Bunker and wife, Morris, 269, the Supreme Court of this territory, recognized the rule laid down in Miller v. Parish, 25 Mass. 384, 8 Pick. 384, as the proper one. And in that case it is said, that " whenever an offense is charged, which if proved, may subject the party to a punishment, though not ignominious, but which brings disgrace upon the party falsely accused, such an accusation is actionable. And this is, perhaps, as correct, and at the same time as brief a statement of the general rule, as has been given. For while the rule is variously stated, by different authors and judges, yet in all of them, it is laid down as necessary that the charge shall impute a punishable offense.” (Abrams v. Foshee, 3 Iowa 274, 277-8 (1856)).
That is, if the false statement would have subjected the victim to legal punishment if true, it was considered libel per se – actionable as an act, independent of any damages sustained. In 1843, “willful killing of an unborn quick child, by an injury, etc., was made manslaughter” (278). This statute was repealed in 1851. So abortion was not a crime. Plaintiffs urged that the fetus was a “human being” and thus subject to murder. The Court, at length, disagreed, citing both statute and common law precedents (including Coke and Blackstone) to the effect that abortion was not “murder” even if it were a misdemeanor or otherwise bad.
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