I've ended up writing two posts worth of material on European Union Institutions, so there will be a second part to this post, itself part of a series of posts on the direction of the EU.
The European Union has got caught up in a strange mix of technocratic centralisation, inter-state politics, and federal political institutions, which is not a satisfactory form of federalism, or confederalism, or consociationism, or whatever transnational or interstate political structure one might believe best describes the European Union now, or what it should become. The reasons for this mix are themselves a mix of shifting compromises over time and the belief of Jean Monnet and other 'Founding Fathers' of the European Union, that European politics could follow on from 'institutionalisation', that is the formation of European institutions with economic and 'technocratic' functions that are somewhat below the horizon of everyday political awareness. This began with fostering trade between France and Germany in the post-war period, bringing great economic and political benefits at that time. The time has come for more explicit politics, including an acceptance that integrationist schemes must be abandoned if lacking political support from citizens of the European Union.
The three elements of the European Union mentioned, centralisation, inter-state, and federal, roughly correspond to three basic elements of the European Union: the Commission and other administrative bodies, or judicial bodies such as the European Court of Justice; The Council of Ministers in association with the European Council and summit meetings of leaders of members states; the European Parliament. The first elements can separated into the judicial and executive functions, but both contribute to the institutional work of law, administration, and regulation within the European Union, making an effective administration and juridical body.
The distinctions are eroded by the way the European Union works, and while there is never complete certainty about what the distinction is between these functions is, or should be, for any state, the European Union is in a disturbing situation in this respect. For example, the Commission has the unique right to initiate legislation and its members are political figures nominated by member states. While a lot of bile directed at Eurocrats in the Commission is ill informed or malicious, its role is inherently unsatisfactory in providing political leadership and legislative initiative that should come from elsewhere. Its powers are sometimes compared with the executive branch in France, but in France executive power is exercised by a directly elected President and a Prime Minister who can command a majority in the National Assembly, proving a political base that is lacking for the EU institutions.
The EU-sceptic criticism that the powers of the Commission lack democratic legitimacy are disingenuous in that the sceptics oppose democratisation of European Union institutions, because they do not wish to give them increased legitimacy. However, it is not good enough for EU-philes to simply denounce those criticisms as populism, and treat maximum integration as the only option decent people would mention. EU-sceptic criticisms refer in the inevitably rough language of politics, to real problems that the EU has in gaining democratic legitimacy in the sense of informed engagement by citizens within the nations, or in fostering any kind of European public space beyond the political, and associated, elites. The increasing powers of the Parliament since it was first elected in 1979 have not done anything to ameliorate the situation.
The Commission should disappear in its current legislation initiating political form and should simply be the civil service of the European Union, with no Commissioner or President of the Commission, or any kind of political chief other than the leadership that comes out of clearly political institutions.
The Council of Ministers should be abolished and the European Council should become a limited form of European government with members nominated by the political groups in the European Parliament in proportion to representation in the Parliament (in a rough approximation to the Federal Council in Switzerland). That Council should make major decisions in consensus with a formal body for gatherings of heads of of national governments, which I shall designate as the Council of Nations. That combination of the European Council and the Council of Nations would be an appropriate recognition of the dual nature of the European Union: transnational body and union of states.
Some right of citizens of the European Union to initiate a referendum should also be recognised, again on a rough approximation with the Swiss model For the European Union, the initial aim should be for the referendum mechanism to act as balance against any tendency to try to bring in top down integrationist polices, which do not command majority consent, or even maybe much understanding, from the European public. It can potentially appeal to EU-sceptics as a barrier to overreach by EU institutions and EU-philes as a cross EU mechanism. Over time it might evolve in a more positive direction of suggesting new measures.
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