Philosophy of biology is pluralistic, or so my friends tell me. Or maybe it would be more accurate to say that many philosophers of biology believe that biology is pluralistic. One friend recently used the phrase "irreducibly pluralistic." But I am not so sure.
There seem to be at least two sources of this pluralism. One is John Beatty's excellent essay, "The Evolutionary Contingency Thesis." Beatty points out that all generalizations in biology are the outcomes of evolution, and as such, are subject to exceptions (either in the present or the future), and could be otherwise (due to the chance order of mutations and the possibility of solving the same selective challenge in different ways). And if there are no universal generalizations necessitated by nature in biology (i.e., no laws), then we should expect pluralism. Beatty highlights pluralism of theories in particular, such as between neutralist and selectionist theories in evolution, or alternative theories about the origin of sex.
Another source of pluralistic thinking in philosophy of biology surely results from decades of debate over species concepts. Many philosophers of biology think that different areas of biology reasonably use different species concepts, e.g., one might rely on a morphological definition of species while another might rely on an interbreeding one. As Marc Ereshefsky so elegantly argues in "Eliminative Pluralism," this is due to the multiplicity of evolutionary processes that divide up the natural world in multiple ways.
I am persuaded by both Beatty and Ereshefsky. But if Beatty and Ereshefsky are right, does that mean that, when faced with a new area of biological inquiry, we should assume pluralism from the outset? Is it a mistake not to do so? Old fashioned, even?
Recently, I have been involved discussions over the concept of "population," which, surprisingly, has not received nearly the philosophical attention that "species" has. I defended a particular concept of population, which I dubbed the causal interactionist population concept. In other words, I took the position of a monist. Is that just wrong-headed from the start?
I don't think that it is. My view is that we should try to see if one conception, or one theory, or one process, can do all the explaining for a given domain, even if we think pluralism is likely. Maybe my monist conception will go down in flames, but if it does, we are likely to learn something from the attempt. Or maybe it won't. Just because pluralism is prevalent doesn't mean it is omnipresent. I even think it is possible that a defensible monist conception of species might still emerge (I know of at least one person who is working on one).
To me, it is just common sense, or maybe prudence, not to simply assume pluralism. Then my friends shake their heads at me. So clearly my sense isn't common. Should it be?
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