filibusters and the fetishizing of procedures

Aside from the nauseating mythological reminiscences of the Kennedy presidency, news today is dominated by discussion of the US Senate's decision to eliminate the possibility of filibuster for certain nomination votes.  All manner of dire consequence has been suggested on both sides of this procedural issue.  (Has there ever been a more hyperbolic characterization of anything than calling this change in voting procedures a "nuclear option"?) It seems to me that there is a deeper issue here that points to a rather depressingly misguided focus of intellectual thought on collective rationality, one that cuts across a wide variety of disciplines.  

There is, of course, an enormous literature - in philosophy, economics, political science, decision theory, etc. - on the rationality of voting procedures. And while focus on procedural matters is not universal in any of these disciplines, it is surely fair to say that such considerations dominate the intellectual discourse.  But such a focus requires ignoring one very simple, uncontroversial, and devastating fact: No voting procedure, nor any other definable procedure for arriving at a group decision is guaranteed to be rational.  To see this, one need not look at fancy cases. Indeed, let's take a case which is as straightforward as it can be. Say we have an election for department chair in a department of 100 people.  There are two candidates neither of which are voting.  99 of the department members favor A and 1 favors B.  So obviously the department should vote for A, right?  Well, maybe not. Suppose that each of the 99 are nearly indifferent. They think both A and B would do a great job, but have a tiny preference for A.  The one dissenter, however, is deeply opposed to A being chair, believing her election to be a disaster, one that will be crushing and probably fatal for that voter's continued participation in the department. (Add in, if you like that the dissenter is the only member of some minority group in the department.)  

In this case, I take it, a rational department will discuss the matter and decide to elect B.

And what can we say about this rationally required move? Well, that reasonable people will accept it, and that a well functioning department will have the sort of discussion that leads to that decision.  And that a department that fails in this is going to devolve into infighting, dissention, etc. One could add lots more details, in terms of how we appropriately ought to treat one another, what sorts of "social affect" are best encouraged in a functional department, ways of "actively listening," etc. But there is little prospect of such epistemological suggestions becoming determinate procedures.

But could voting procedures be amended to guarantee the right result? I think not. One can certainly move to a consensus model in which one person has the ability to "block" a case.  The Senate until yesterday had a modified version of this - 1/3 of the Senators could block.  But as the last 6 years show, this is no solution. If members of the body do not respect one another, do not instatiate virtue, do not show respect, collective rationality, know how to listen and compromise, etc. then the block will simply be used to prevent meaningful action.  

The fundamental point here is that these things are not to be fixed by obsessing on procedures. Procedures are merely tools, and in the hands of vicious craftsmen - to steal a phrase from Ani Difranco - every tool is a weapon if you hold it right. If philosophers and others want to contribute to more rational deliberative bodies, they need to stop obsessing with problems that can be formalized, and turn to messier issues of moral education, the socialization of habits of rationality, even, dare I say it, the cultivation of care and perhaps a beloved community (to steal from another social visionary.)  Again, I am aware that there is literature in this area, but I don't think anyone will claim that the cultivation of Aristotelian civic virtue is a dominant thread in the academic discussion of collective rationality.

For those who are interested, I wrote a paper on this idea a few years back. It is written not in academic style or primarily for academics - though it applies as much to academic communities as any other - but rather directed at disputes internal to activist movements.  

It is called "Fetishizing Process".