Copernicus, Spinoza, Rheticus, and Accomodation

True understanding of everything contained in the sacred writings is to be sought from them, and not elsewhere...we do not study the passages about nature as if Scripture were a philosophical textbook [of nature], but rather as books in which the Holy Spirit desired to teach us something necessary for our salvation...For who would deny that if God, the creator of nature, had desired to describe the nature of things for us by His Word, nothing in the whole world could have remained hidden to us, of which we now would not know exactly, the nature, causes, and powers?--G.J.Rheticus, translated by R. Hooykaas.

Rheticus is Copernicus sole student. I was reminded of his significance by examining a PhD dissertation, "Lutheran Astronomers after the Fall (1540-1590): A reappraisal of the Renaissance dynamic of religion and astronomy," by the Ghent historian of science, Dr. Nienke Roelants (recall here and here). The quoted passage was probably written around 1541 (so before Copernicus death and the publication of On the Revolutions) as part of a short treatise on biblical interpretation in light of the embrace of mobility of the earth. It was only published as an addition to Gorleaus Idea Physicae in Utrecht in 1651.

Throughout his very short treatise, Rheticus's strategy is to appeal to Augustine's De Genesi ad Litteram Imperfectus  in order (a) to distinguish sharply between the moral-political aims of Scripture and the study of nature, in order to make the two domains irrelevant to each other: "who would maintain that the knowledge of physics is necessary for salvation?"; (b) to insist that Scripture should be interpreted only in light of itself; (c) that Scripture speaks to the "superstitious and idolaters" so that Scripture accomodates itself "to the people's understanding" and, thus, more subtly, describes "apparent motions" not true motions;  (d) that Scripture is only authoritative on matters that it teaches simply and clearly; (e) that Scripture teaches that we should have non-dogmatic study of nature in order to improve humanity's estate on earth. Finally, (f) the doctrine of God as sole creator is ultimately taken on faith not reason, especially because it has many earthly benefits to do so.

Now, Rheticus anticipates essential features of Galileo's better known approach in the more polished (and lengthier) The Letter to Christina. (Galileo could not have read Rheticus.) More pertinent for my present purpose, in (a-f) Rheticus also anticipates the fundamental parameters of Spinoza's stance in the Theological-Political Treatise (TTP). (Readers may challenge me on this, of course.) We cannot rule out that Spinoza read the piece by Rheticus, especially because -- as I learned from Helen Hattab -- there are tantalizing connections between Gorleaus' atomistic monism and Spinoza's philosophy.

The reason why this is striking is that the status of Copernicanism is marginal to the main arguments of the TTP. In fact, the TTP's official relationship to Copernicanism can be summarized nicely in one paragraph: in the TTP Spinoza argues that in the study of nature, “the definitions of natural things are to be inferred from the different actions of nature” (TTP 7/G 3:99 [I am grateful to E. Curley for his translation--ES]). So, in understanding nature we cannot rely on, say, revelation in interpreting it. But we also cannot rely on reason (or the PSR). In fact, this seeming throw-away line opens the door to, for example the endorsement of Copernicanism on empirical grounds. In the previous chapter of TTP, in his treatment of the miracle of Joshua, Spinoza had already ridiculed the idea “that the sun moves, as they say, with a daily motion and that the earth is at rest” (TTP 6/G 3:92).

Now, until reading Rheticus (and re-reading Galileo), I had not realized that the outlines of a future Spinozism are discernible in texts primarily designed (to speak anachronistically) to accommodate religion and science to each other, while leaving science room for autonomous inquiry. Paradoxically, this points the way to an overdue re-evaluation of Spinoza as a true friend of religion.