The Lutherans, Descartes, and Spinoza on Innate Ideas

Cuiuscumque humanae mentis ideae aliae adaequatae sunt, aliae autem mutilatae et confusae.--Spinoza, Ethica 3p1dem

Last week I had the good fortune to examine a PhD dissertation, "Lutheran Astronomers after the Fall (1540-1590): A reappraisal of the Renaissance dynamic of religion and astronomy," by the Ghent historian of science, Nienke Roelants (now: Dr. Nienke Roelants). One thing (among many) that I learned is that Luther and Melanchthon promoted an epistemology that includes a doctrine that has something like these five components: (i) in our Post-Lapsarian state, we need (ii) a mental emendation, that (iii) makes exact/clear (iv) the (innate) confused idea [of God] we already posses; (v) this emendation is rarely complete in an ordinary life.  Part of the process of such emendation is (a) by way of the rigorous (mathematical) study of nature, and (b) by copying the right sort of exemplars.

Descartes' version of the doctrine of innate ideas is that these are always clear and distinct in us. (Is that so? Descartes scholars should feel free to correct me.) So, that once one learns to recognize what is already in one's mind by way of the study of geometry, one has access to clear and distinct ideas. (He attributes a version of this to Plato's Meno in a letter, I think, to Voetius.)

Not surprisingly, the Lutheran doctrine is more pessimistic than Descartes' approach. It takes a lot of empirical enquiry and other hard work to make one's confused ideas, less confused.

Let's turn to Spinoza. In recent years, there has been a revival of interest in the significance of experience in Spinoza (De Deugd; Moreau; etc.). Even so, E3p1 seems to suggest that Spinoza accepts some innate ideas because it is hard to say how else all minds would have adequate ideas (Marshall 2008; here's a link to a pre-print). Now, I used to think that 'clear and distinct' and 'adequate' were synonymous in Spinoza (because of, say, this: "adaequate sive clare et distincte percipi" E2p38C). Let's stipulate that in Spinoza clarity and distinctness always go together. But given that Spinoza is a critic of epistemic reliance on geometry (recall; see also recent work by Alex Douglas and Alison Peterman), he does not have Descartes' move available to him.

In reflecting on the Lutherans I asked myself the following question: does it follow that for Spinoza if an idea is adequate, it always must be clear and distinct in a finite mind? For, it's possible as Abe Stone has long urged on me, that in Spinoza an idea when referred to the divine intellect is always adequate, but the very same idea is unclear and confused when referred to a finite intellect. (This works if the individuation of an idea goes by way of its object and that object remains the same in adequate/inadequate ideas; I have long resisted this particular move.)  If something like what I said in this paragraph is right,* then Spinoza's view comes remarkably close to the Lutheran epistemology (leaving aside the Fall), I described above, especially because Spinoza also accepts (b). [From what I have said above, Spinoza has a complex stance toward (a).]

Now, what interests me here is not 'influence.' For all I know the Lutherans and Spinoza both are drawing on variants of Seneca and Plato. Rather, Spinoza's account of ideas is closer to the Lutherans than to Descartes--something that is easy to miss given that most of us nearly always teach Descartes prior to Spinoza (and Spinoza as an extension of Descartes, etc.). Here's why I find this fascinating (it involves some paradox): one thing that has always puzzled me is the relatively speedy uptake of Descartes' ideas in the Protestant 'North' (Netherlands, Sweden, etc). My suggestion is that the family resemblance between these Lutheran ideas and Descartes' ideas facilitated the quick uptake of Descartes in countries that were looking for an alternative to Scholasticism. Ironically enough such acceptance prepared the way for Spinoza's position, which -- in crucial respects -- is even closer to the Lutherans. We might say, then, that the main debate between Spinoza and the Lutherans is on the interpretation of John.++

 

*Let's leave aside the common notions.

++ I thank Noa Shein, Abe Stone, and Alison Peterman for facebook discussion.