It is the profession of philosophers to question platitudes that others accept without thinking twice. A dangerous profession, since philosophers are more easily discredited than platitudes, but a useful one.--David Lewis, Convention.
Of course, as philosophers, our commitment to challenging and questioning norms is real, and important. Far be it from me to claim that we’d be better off if we all had to be more conventional or couldn’t play around with taboos. Doing so is essential to both the philosophical method and the high quality of life we enjoy as philosophers.--Rebecca Kukla.
Recently, Rebeca Kukla published an insightful post at Leiter on the significance of the norm of social-norm violation among philosophers, including the one that encourages avoiding the appearance of concern with looks and dress. She argues that the benefits (i.e., "high quality of life") of the norm of social norm violation are unevenly distributed within philosophy. Her cogent argument against the norm turns on "the cost of the most vulnerable members of the profession." While Kukla does not spell it out entirely, it seems she thinks that if we adjust the internal-to-philosophy norms we could distribute the current benefits to philosophizing more widely within philosophy without "undermining our commitment to challenging and questioning norms." She, thus, views philosophy as a moral or at least professional community.
Seneca, too, is concerned with the norm of social norm violation and warns against "repellent atire, unkempt hair, slovenly beard..." (Letter 5.) Seneca rejects the excesses now associated with the Cynics, but apparently commonly thought to be the 'philosopher's way' (even if "discretely pursued"). Anticipating Mandeville and Veblen, Seneca treats these instances of social norm-violation as expressing the desire to be conspicuous [conspici]. The "self-display" associated with self-punishing [poenam] norms (or what Hume would label 'monkish virtues') comes at the expense of making a contribution to society [proficere].
So, rather than undermining social norms, philosophers need to help institute the right sort of shared norms for the larger political community they are part of. Seneca presupposes philosophers cannot succeed in this moral-political enterprise, if they are thought to stand apart from the community they are supposed help make common. The norm on social norm violation frightens and repels "those whom we are trying to improve" [emendari]. (On emendation, see also here and here.) So, Seneca explicitly presents Stoicism as a means not just to self-improvement, but also to social improvement.** Now, one might well wonder: how one can improve norms that one does not explicitly violate?
An important part of Seneca's answer is that not unlike Kukla, Seneca understands philosophy as a moral community. But his philosopher qua social improver is an exemplar that can be imitated. As he puts it succinctly: our mores should be admirable, but the socially visible ones should also be understood. So, Seneca rejects rigorism about matters that primarily draw attention to ourselves without either being efficacious in improving society or necessary for philosophy as a moral community.***
These days philosophers are, on the whole, distinctly uncomfortable at being an exemplar to anybody. Unlike Spinoza or Hume we are generally not prepared to turn our lives (and ways of dying) into semi-public spectacles (as Seneca was willing to do with his own death). If we care about social improvement, we tend to prefer to let our arguments speak for themselves, or more actively work at improving social institutions through politics, law, activism, and teaching.
Moreover, being an exemplar to others turns out requiring considerable psychic depth: "inwardly, we [philosophers] ought to be different in all respects, but our exterior should conform to people's norms" [Intus omnia dissimilia sint, frons populo nostra conveniat.] We have already seen that Seneca works with two axiological frameworks (recall, one appropriate to the market-place and politics, the other more appropriate to philosophy), but it turns out that in the philosopher these two are combined. This is why even though the axiologies often seem opposed, they are, in fact, not contrary [non...contrarium], even connected [coniuncta]. So, one daunting aspect of Seneca's conception is that the philosopher is capable -- like the Sufi who is a mathematical economist -- of inhabiting (at least) two axiological universes at once.
To be clear: Seneca is not saying that one should be insincere (this offends our sensibilities greatly). Rather, he is quite clear that our interior lives should be visible (and then to be admired --> imitated) for those willing to see. In addition, Seneca's way does not mean giving up questioning platitudes or challenging norms.
In fact, Seneca reminds us that one can question, even hope to transform, a social norm without violating it by being different in the right sort of way. This insight is even available to a community of professional philosophers that wish to be useful.
*Kukla can assume that professional philosophers are employed (primarily) by universities. (In this professional philosophers are closer to Sophists than to Socrates.) Clearly many professional philosophers struggle to make ends meet by way of philosophy. In Letter 5, Seneca is silent on the sources of philosophical income; his intended recipient and Seneca have both grown rich by political means (although in an earlier letter Seneca hints at him having given away his fortune to Nero.)
**This letter is the first in which Seneca explicitly speaks as a member of the Stoic school. He allows that his recipient is already aware of this fact.
***Obviously, norms that are integral to a moral community may be invisible to outsiders and strictly enforced such that violation means being expelled from the community. We see remnants of such an attitude in the once-austere norms against plagiarism and faking-data (recall).
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