On the Shoulders of Others

Three illustrations of why scientists need to know history:

[1] Biologists often appeal to founders in the field such as Darwin or Haeckel, either as a point of contrast or as intellectual ancestor - but are their depictions accurate?

[2] Scientists need to know the nature of the scientific practice, e.g., the refutations of well accepted theories, the failures, the dead ends.

[3] Terms like "fitness" may be loaded with historical baggage that scientists are not aware of, but which affects their reception.--Roberta Millstein. [Numbers added to facilitate discussion.--ES]

The image(s) of science that philosophers of (the) science(s) describe and promote often has an afterlife in (the) science(s).

Ever since Kuhn projected his experiences within and about physics onto a persuasive and widely discussed image of science, philosophers of science and the scientists that embrace Kuhn and his image [see here], have thought that progressive science requires certain features (paradigmatic consensus, mythic history, puzzle-solving, etc.)* In the exchange over her post, Millstein offered three reasons for thinking that praticing scientists need to know an accurate history. Let's grant a critic that [1] is not very persuasive. For those kind of appeals are primarily rhetorical techniques; there is a sense in which the truth does not matter in such appeals. Let's grant a critic that [2] can be achieved without knowledge of history (which now is conceived as a repository of error). So, [2] is not intrinsic to scientific practice, but it does not mean that history does not have this useful, therapeutic role. 

However, [3] strikes me as one important argument for the constitutive role of history in scientific practice. For, science's past nearly always infects how scientists conceptualize their possible future(s). In her comments, Millstein focuses on one feature -- that concepts often reach beyond their intended and even operationalized use; pre-existing concepts have resonances, associations, and conceptual linkages with other concepts. Let's call this phenomenon: "conceptual surplus." Mathematical treatments may reduce such conceptual surplus, but they need not eliminate  it. For example, Newton's mature mathematical treatment of mass, included a dimensional/geometric feature that was inherited from earlier approaches. (See this terrific piece by Biener & Smeenk.)  

But Millstein's insight is not limited to concepts. [4] Past data and phenomena also play a constitutive role in present science. (Or so I argue here and here.) Ongoing science is the product of an evidential basis that is often a feature of complex technological and statistical assumptions and subtly different practices that may not easily be fitted in present best-practices (or terminology). So, in addition a conceptual surplus there may also be an evidential surplus. Sometimes present scientific obstacles (or apparent success) are the product of a bad interpretation of past evidential claims. This is, of course, more likely in sciences where empirical results are extremely sensitive to assumptions about parameters.

Both [3] and [4] can be recognized without much revision to one's image of science. The existence of conceptual and evidentual surplus does not require that working scientists become (philosophical) historians of science, but they do require that they remain open to discussions with (philosophical) historians of science. I agree with Millstein that biology -- itself, of course, a science that is very aware of the significance of history -- is an impressive exemplar of a science that gets this orientation right.

Finally, [5] the past of a science may have many possible futures latent in it. By cutting oneself off from the past one may, thus, narrow one's possible future. (One need not do so, of course.) In the best of times the price for such elimination may seem small; but sometimes we need a new, and better possible future (recall my stuff on philosophical prophecy). This observation is especially important in the reflexive sciences.

 

*One can claim this while recognizing that Kuhn did not originate the image that we now associate with his name.