A while ago I read the new theist, a particularly thorough CHE article on WL Craig's natural theology as apologetics. Together with Eric's recent blogpost on religion and changing epistemological fashions, it got me thinking about the role of natural theology in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, and its wider role in apologetics. What I am wondering is whether analytic philosophy of religion (henceforth aPoR) really is as intellectually respectable as its proponents think it is, and how this connects to the role of natural theology within current aPoR as apologetics. I think these questions are related, somehow, although I would have to think more about how they relate. As someone who does aPOR and who has received Templeton funding, I am obviously not a neutral observer, but I hope to provide some balanced observations nonetheless.
As Klaas Kraay notes, there is a standard triumphalist narrative on the rise of analytic philosophy in second half of the 20th century, which is often iterated by theistic aPoRs. The narrative goes something like this: until the mid 20th century, many analytic philosophers, under the influence of logical positivism, even thought that talk about God and related matters (such as religious experience) was not just false, but meaningless. Reasoned arguments for the existence of God simply had no place in this way of doing philosophy, and natural theology finally seemed dead and buried, after its last spasms in the 19th century with the Paley and the Bridgewater Treatises. However, once logical positivism and its criterion of meaning were abandoned, analytic philosophers could once again turn to philosophy of religion. We then have the rise of authors like Alston, Plantinga, Swinburne and others who - with their sophisticated argumentation - made philosophy of religion intellectually respectable. No longer was it possible for philosophers to simply dismiss God's existence on the basis of the logical incompatibility of evil and the divine omniproperties, etc. Moreover, arguments that were perceived as hopelessly inadequate, such as the ontological argument and the kalam cosmological argument got refurbished (lest you be in any doubt of their efficacy, one of them is called the "victorious modal ontological argument"). Even fideism became again a respectable position, given arguments for the proper basicality of theism.
Theist aPoRs are indeed positively triumphalist. See, e.g., Charles Taliaferro introduction to Craig & Moreland's 2009 Handbook of Natural Theology.
The face of Anglo-American philosophy has been transformed as a result. Theism is on the rise; atheism is on the decline. Atheism, although perhaps still the dominant viewpoint at the American university, is a philosophy in retreat.
Or Nick Wolterstorff, one of the architects of the new aPOR, proclaims in Crisp and Rea's Analytic Theology
Never since the late Middle Ages has philosophical theology so flourished as it has during the past thirty years. There have been intensive and extensive discussions by philosophers on such topics as the relation of God to evil, the precise nature of God’s omnipotence, whether God knows what persons will freely do, whether or not God is eternal, impassible, simple, and so forth.
The picture is complete with a new journal, specifically devoted to aPoR (The journal of Analytic Theology). However, I wonder, with Kraay, whether this triumphalist picture is correct. For one thing (this is a purely qualitative observation) grad students are still counseled against specializing in aPoR, and encouraged to focus on something respectable like metaphysics or epistemology ('wait to do aPoR until you have tenure'). The philosophical community looks with distrust at the monetary influence of the Templeton Foundation on philosophy, in particular, its propensity to incentivize PoR (see, for instance, here). As I found in my recent survey, in agreement with PhilPapers, philosophers of religion are much more likely to be theists (around 70-75%, depending on the segment of the profession) than philosophers without PoR as an AOS.When I briefly look at the Philosophy of Religion, arguments for theism category in PhilPapers most of the work in natural theology in the aPoR tradition appears either in books (e.g., most of Swinburne's work), or in specialist journals (Faith & Philosophy, Religious Studies, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion etc.).
Nevertheless, I found in my survey that, controlling for religious belief, philosophers of religion tend to find some natural theological arguments stronger than people without this AOS. For instance, atheist PoRs tend to find the cosmological argument stronger than atheist non-PoRs. Theist PoRs find the divine hiddenness argument stronger than theist non-PoRs. As both of these are actively pursued in Philosophy of religion, I think there are reasons other than a person's religious beliefs for why they are both actively pursued. This is a positive development. I think analytic philosophy should help us gain justified beliefs, and abandon unjustified ones, and argumentation can play an important role in this. Divine hiddenness is a problem for theists, and it's a positive development that it gets a lot of attention in aPoR.
This is why I think a systematic usage of natural theology qua apologetics, as detailed in the CHE article, such as the Reasonable Faith Ministry is problematic. Suppose NT becomes the exclusive domain of theist analytic philosophers, who want to argue against the likes of Dawkins and his more philosophically sophisticated ilk. The danger lurks that such purely proselytism driven aPoR abandons its quest for truth, and becomes a weapon in the (very messy, politics-cluttered etc) crusade against secularism. In such an endeavor, there is not much place for intellectual humility, confirmation bias and other biases go unchecked, and ultimately, I fear the connection with mainstream philosophy and its developments may get tenuous. There may be an indirect role of aPoR as apologetics, namely as presenting theism at least as a rationally viable position. But paradoxically, by using aPoR arguments (in particular natural theological arguments) in a proselytism-driven fashion, this role can come under threat. Suppose I am a friendly atheist, genuinely wondering about the merits of such arguments. I think I would be most impressed with them if I did not find they were engineered, so to speak, to convince me not only of the truth of theism, but to buy into the whole package of anti-secularism (for instance, in the political domain). Indeed, if I found that current natural theology was done by people with a conservative, anti-secular agenda, specifically for the purpose of furthering that agenda, I would be deeply distrustful, and I would be justified in this.
There are, of course, often personal reasons for why someone engages in a philosophical project (e.g., in practical ethics or political philosophy). But human cognitive biases being what they are, aPoR is in danger if it remains the playing field of theist philosophers (most of which are also Christian, white and male).
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