[E]veryone who works as a mathematical philosopher [a] knows some papers in which the respective authors hide behind the symbols—where mathematical clothing is meant to conceal lack of philosophical content. Or [b] where mathematics does not do much other than complicate some states of affairs that could, and should, have been described in more elementary terms. Or [c] where a mathematical method is applied blindly without any awareness of its potential limitations. In other words: just like all other tools, mathematical methods can be abused. But clearly that should not stop us from putting them to good use in philosophy. (Leitgeb, "SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY, MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY, AND ALL THAT" 274-5) [a-c, added to facilitate discussion.--ES]
The forthright paragraph above is the main one devoted to substantiating one of the aims announced in the abstract of Leitgeb's (2013) nine-page manifesto, that is: "it aims to undermine some worries about mathematical philosophy."* Clearly, Leitgeb's "clearly" skips over an argument and a lot of potential concerns. For, the potential abuses of mathematical methods developed, explored, and taught in philosophical circles are not exhausted by [a-c]. (To be clear: elsewhere in his piece, Leitgeb addresses other concerns about the use of mathematical methods in philosophy -- including a very interesting engagement with Kantian concerns -- , but these do not concern me here.) Moreover, without evaluating the significance or costs/benefits of the unmentioned potential abuses, it is unclear how clear Leitgeb's "clearly" really is. (Note, too, that even if one were to grant that mathematical methods primarily have good uses inside philosophy (and we ignore concerns over non-philosophical abuses/applications), it still might be the case that they displace better methods within philosophy, or are oversold. I leave this aside.) First a brief historical detour.
Formal philosophy has a long-standing relationship with the war-making machinery of the modern state. During the cold-war the main conduit for this activity was the Rand Corporation, when it was primarily funded by, first, the Douglas aircraft corporation and then the U.S. department of defense (I think it still is); many of the most celebrated formal philosophers (and economists, artificial intelligence, operations researchers, cybernetics etc.) passed through Rand at point or another. (This started, I think, with Olaf Helmer -- a student of Reichenbach [later also prominently involved at Rand] and a member of the original die Berliner Gruppe.) Even today, if you scan the CVs of senior figures in the field you will find stints as visiting reseacher, fellow, (etc) at Rand. Undoubtedly, in addition to a nice pay-check and a wonderful research environment, for many it must have seem a noble calling in the fight against Totalitarianism. For some it meant working on topics related to improving education, linguistics, data-storage and other potentially beneficial civilian enterprises. To the best of my knowledge, Daniel Ellsberg (the great decision-theorist and leaker of the Pentagon papers) was the first of the Rand-funded insiders to question publicly this cozy nexus during the Vietnam war.
Some of this history has been told (by Amadae, Mirowksi, and more focused on philosophy, George Reisch, who is also philosophically sophisticated), but the full story of scientific philosophy's entanglement with the military-industrial complex has not been explored either from within formal philosophy or without. (I would love to learn otherwise.) This is not to deny -- on the contrary -- that there have not been conscientious and heroic formal philosophers who have individually distanced themselves from such funding. I was raised philosophically on inspiring, even heroic accounts about Carnap's pacificism and resistance to loyalty oaths, and about Malament's stance during the Vietnam War. (I would love to learn more!) Clearly, there is nothing within formal approaches that prevents a politically self-aware stance; in fact, I am very impressed by the ongoing, political role of some formal philosophers in their attempts to warn about and limit the reach of the surveillance state.
To the best of my knowledge the war-making and surveillance role(s) of formal philosophy's developments have not been theorized from within. (Again I would love to learn otherwise.) This is a blind-spot that is manifest in Leitgeb's manifesto; he only lists (a-c) abuses of mathematical methods in philosophy. In fact, he does not describe the (presumably self-correcting?) mechanisms by which these abuses can be prevented or minimized. A manifesto (written as a reflection on the significance of changing "Erkenntnis’s subtitle") may not be thought the main place to reflect on such mechanisms (although given the potential role of journals in such correction, it might have been quite appropriate).
Of course, Leitgeb only intended to write about certain ways of doing philosophy. Fair enough.
Except that if Leitgeb had explored how mathematical philosophy can correct for its own abuses, he would have immediately had to confront the fact that mathematical methods, however fruitful they are in ethics, social choice, and mechanism design (etc.), alone are not sufficient to explore how we should think about the responsibilities associated with intellectual advancement--this has always been the achilles heel of scientific philosophy ever since -- my intellectual heroes! -- Russell's initial insistence that philosophy was about understanding, not practice (recall here) and Carnap consigning 'optative' values to 'external' questions. [This is compatible with both Russell and Carnap having very strong, principled ethical motives for these stances (see here). In fact, these motives connect, in part, to the historical grounds for Leitgeb's rejection of the Kantian scruples against mathematical philosophy.] There is simply no easy route from one's formalism(s) to values that can ground the responsible practice of mathematical philosophy.
Rather, it is a recurring, dangerous temptation to think that formal tools are mere, topic neutral (conceptual) tools. There is a sense, of course, in which this true. But it does not follow that the tool-maker ought not be held accountable for the uses of the tools. For, even the tool-maker has some (base-line) responsibilities and obligations concerning (at minimum) the foreseeable uses of one's tools; one may also have obligations on preventing abuse of the tools, even if these are primarily developed for (by stipulation) humanitarian and noble goals.
Now, it is possible that even our very best formal philosophers have become useless and irrelevant to the bureaucratic-surveillance-military-state. I am open to the argument that much of the formal technologies we develop in philosophy is of no interest to data-mining and other surveillance technologies; undoubtedly the main action is in computer science, statistics, and adjoining disciplines. (Data-mining is now central to lots of sciences.) But given that we are one of these, I am a bit skeptical of a total-uselessness claim, especially because in recent years European research grant agencies have been willing to grant considerable cash on formal philosophy (including at my home department, Ghent; I am not an innocent bystander, but a beneficiary of this development). While I doubt any philosophical grant has been designed or ever awarded to improve surveillance, the variety of formal, foundational developments might improve data-base management, causal pattern-recognition, and inferential techniques in large-scale data environments. To give two examples: it is my understanding that the application of paraconsistent logiscs in database-management is not sci-fi anymore, and Bayesian techniques are routine in data-mining software. I welcome arguments to the contrary, but it won't do to merely point at the fact that these technologies are being explored for other (intrinsic) reasons within philosophy.
We philosophers have a regrettable tendency to think that we don't need to apply ethics to ourselves (fill in your favorite example!)--we're only human after all. Moreover, formal philosophers are by no means the only ones that might face ethical questions about their research--in recent years, I have blogged about philosophers who advised genuine tyrants, bio-ethicists that get too close to pharmaceutical industry, and military ethicists, who go rather far down the road in sanctioning torture. Sometimes our departments are rather eager to educate or collaborate with present and future elites of very unsavory regimes--have you been to Beijing lately? (See: I am not picking on formal philosophers, really!) What matters is not the stance of individual formal philosophers, but the ways in which developments in formal philosophy can end up in surveillance technology (and other abuses). More generally, philosophy's role in society needs to be theorized anew.
Some might believe that the threats faced by Liberal-Democracies trump all concern about misuse of the fruits of our collective efforts. If that were so, then folk should welcome tough questions about our current best practices.
Pure intentions and a terrific humanitarian track-record are not sufficient for disowning responsibility for other people's use of one's philosophical technologies. In Carnap's day, the wise and humane stance was to embrace formal methods in philosophy, and through these aim to improve science and society. In our age of cheap computing and data-mining, it is worth reflecting on the possible costs of this stance.
*I thank Hannes Leitgeb for his generous comments on an earlier draft.
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