If this collection leaves it unclear just what naturalized metaphysics comes to, its advocates are at least making a serious attempt to engage with our pre-eminent knowledge-producing disciplines. Newton famously compared his efforts to those of a boy on the seashore who succeeded in picking up a smoother pebble or a prettier shell while the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before him. While naturalist metaphysicians are at sea trying to oversee the reconstruction of Neurath's boat, many a contemporary analytic metaphysician remains on the beach embellishing his or her own sand castle, oblivious to the incoming tide.--Richard Healey.
I mentioned Healey's review favorably a few days ago. Even so, the polemical closing paragraph above, which gives voices to "the deep suspicion" of "many naturalistically inclined philosophers," is unfair and dangerous myth. Before I turn to argue this, some terminological clarification. Healey's review is about a book about "scientific metaphysics" and he calls the practitioners of it, "naturalist metaphysicians," which are contrasted with so-called "analytic metaphysicians." He never settles on definitions, but after some empirical analysis, he writes, "Whatever naturalized metaphysics comes to, it is clearly less enamored with logical analysis of language but pays much closer attention to actual science than a lot of what goes by the name of analytic metaphysics." This is a decent first approximation (and captures nicely the contrast between those that, say, start-from-David Lewis and those that, say, develop their views from grappling with the Scientific Image, or Structure).*
Second, while it may be true that on balance naturalist metaphysicians pay much closer explicit attention to the sciences than analytic metaphysicians (Healey's is a comparative claim), I have grown skeptical of the claim that naturalist metaphysicians engage "actual science;" rather they tend to engage a stabilized image of (recent) science. (I have explored this issue in far more detail earlier in the week.) This is not to deny, of course, that the activities of some naturalist metaphysicians (say, philosophers of physics or philosophers of biology) shades into certain scientific activities (say, cosmology or theoretical biology). Even within philosophy of science there are considerable differences between folk that engage in the philosophy of scientific practice (which has its own society) and naturalist metaphysicians. In so far as Healey's polemical rhetoric is meant to be prophetic (viz. "incoming tide"), it obscures reflection on the myths that will make the prophesied future possible.
Third, in my experience analytic metaphysicians are extremely cautious about not overplaying their scientific hands. (Maybe this is a consequence of Ladyman & Ross.) In fact, analytic metaphysicians are perfectly happy to appeal to the sciences when it suits them. Here's an example from Schaffer (writing with Townsen Hicks); here's an example from L.A. Paul (the citations start with Husserl and end with PloS One). Among the best of the analytical metaphysicians, even when they make scientific mistakes (even Homer nods, after all), such mistakes do not tend to undercut the core of the position. (Of course, it is possible that it does.) This is not to deny that one could quote many passages from works by analytic metaphysicians and make them look very silly (see chapter 1 of Ladyman & Ross). But all this shows -- let's call a spade a spade -- the anti-intellectual stance that was once part of the DNA of North-American analytic philosophy (especially endemic once among folk who also had an advanced degree in some science and still widespread in European analytic philosophy). This superficial move (not one that Healey engages in) is the kind of crap that analytical philosophers routinely direct at continental philosophers and English professors (recall discussion of Clark Glymour here and here; of course, the analytic metaphysicians do know what the Ramsey sentence is).
Fourth, given that analytic metaphysicians do not build their ontologies on privileged scientific content and naturalistic metaphysicians often do, analytic metaphysicans are taking fewer risks when it comes to dealing with science. (Healey's old review of Maudlin is instructive on this score.) Now, I am not endorsing such risk-aversion (philosophy should be bolder today), but Healey's polemics fail to promote asking the right sort of questions here. For, given the contrastic methods of analytic and naturalistic metaphysicians one ought to expect far more mistaken (or at least dated) scientific claims in the naturalistic camp.
Fifth, Healey wisely writes that "science may craft concepts...for its own purposes, but these do not encompass all our interests." But he does not pause to reflect on the significance of this. The naturalist metaphysician is either going to be partial or draw on extra-scientific resources in order to do justice to the concepts that can engage all our interests. I do not claim that in practice analytic metaphysicians are in a better position on this score, but they do not have such a principled, self-imposed limitation. (Given the role of aesthetic values within the sciences and morals, I wish more folk were alarmed by the lack of interest in aesthetics in our top departments.)
Furthermore, in a review of Ladyman & Ross, Katherine Hawley points to the intellectual virtues endemic in analytic metaphysics: "Much of what has lasting value in the metaphysical literature...consists in the careful, detailed work of distinguishing conflated questions and issues, investigating the space of possible theories, and establishing relationships of confirmation or even entailment between different claims." As I reported a few weeks ago (especially my exchange with Kent Staley), once sensitized by a few years of engagement with analytic metaphysics I did notice that when I went back to my beloved naturalistic metaphysicians I noticed that important issues had been left imprecise.
Thus, Analytic Metaphysics & Naturalized Metaphysics need to get over the mutual suspicion and disinterest; they need a verstandshuwelijk (a Dutch word). Google.translate translates verstandshuwelijk as a "marriage of convenience." Yet, this does not capture the original entirely; "verstand(s)" means "intellectual" or "understanding" (a "verstand" is our intellectual faculty). That is to say, beyond all the citation-cliques and mutual echo-chambers, philosophy needs our analytic and naturalistic metaphysicians to learn from and, of course, criticize each other in a serious fashion on a regular basis.
* The asymmetry in this contrast is deliberate. As Healey notes, both groups are interested in "fundamental ontology." The work of David Lewis (and some of his privileged interlocuters) provides analytic metaphysicians with a shared conceptual framework from which they claim to progress. (This also accounts for the persistent temptation among analytic metaphysicians to adopt the [Kuhnian] stance of Philosophy as a Normal Science (PANS).) Naturalistic metaphysicians -- many of whom admire Lewis, too -- do not have such a shared framework.
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