Even most Kuhn-haters are committed to the popular idea that an important measure of scientific truth is consensus among the experts. The downside of this commitment is on display in Roberta Millstein's important piece on "the removal of gray wolves from endangered species status in the U.S." One could debate the merits of the proposal, of course, but a scary aspect of her account is the manufacture of scientific consensus by a government-agency. I quote the relevant bits first, and comment below the fold:
The problem is, as the authors of the proposal acknowledge, that there is a lack of consensus among scientists on what species are, what subspecies are, and how many species and subspecies of wolves there are. Nonetheless, they declare that one paper, Chambers et. al (2012), "is the only peer-reviewed synthesis of its kind conducted for North American wolves and summarizes and synthesizes the best available scientific information on the issue."...Chambers et al. (2012) appears in the journal North American Fauna, a publication of the FWS [Fish and Wildlife Service] itself; it is unclear why the paper wasn't sent to a more recognized peer-reviewed journal in the field, such as Conservation Biology. According to the website for North American Fauna, Chambers et al. (2012) is the only publication since 1991; it appears as though the journal was reborn specifically to publish the wolf study only to languish again afterward....In short, the FWS service has taken one of the most well-studied animals, about which there is great controversy...and benighted one paper, authored by itself (perhaps by some of the same people who wrote the proposal) as "the best available scientific information"....What is the urgency – so urgent that the FWS must hastily designate itself as the source of the best available science – to make policy when the science is so unsettled?"
(i) The Albuquerque office of the FSW serviec has been 'captured' by local pro-hunting groups: "the authors all work for the FWS: S.M. Chambers (Albuquerque, New Mexico), S.R. Fain (Ashland, Oregon), B. Fazio (Albuquerque, New Mexico), and M. Amaral (Concord, NH). The proposal itself does not name authors, but includes FWS employees from places such as (hmmm) Albuquerque, New Mexico."
(ii) At some point the FWS agency directors have been 'captured' by a coalition of interests that want to undermine or push back the Endangered Species Act (ESA) -- e.g., the NRA, hunting groups, industry, developers, etc. -- and have started create not-so-subtle hints that anybody that wants to move up the FSW food-chain, needs to show pro-active flexibility on removing animals from ESA. Such hints need not leave a paper-trail; all that's needed is a human resources policy that promotes the right sort of people and sends difficult types to harmless desk jobs (or ranger stations in Alaska).
So-called "public choice theory" is the part of economics that predicts and analyzes regulatory capture (recall here). But writers as diverse as a Chicago economist, George Stigler, and Karl Marx have also diagnosed it. Once one assumes that government is populated by non-saintly humans (and why have government if there were a lot of saints?), the possibility of regulatory capture is on the table.
This form of regulatory capture -- government manufactured scientific consensus -- is, in part, the by-product of an image of science heartily endorsed by much philosophy of science; this philosophy of science has encouraged courts and regulatory agencies to put a high value on scientific consensus. In doing so, it has, perhaps unintentionally, created a valuable commodity that can be bought and sold. Yet, this rigged market -- with barriers to entry, non-transparency, etc. -- will, while potentially lucrative to scientific experts and bureaucrats alike, almost certainly not be truth-conducive.
Of course, (a) just because a particular philosophy of science systematically creates a permanent temptation in the application of science in public policy does not mean it must be false as a philosophy of science an sich. Moreover, it is possible that (b) that consensus-embracing image of science is also less harmful than any competitor images of science in policy environments. Both (a) and (b) need to be discussed on their own merits. Yet, we should not ignore the fact that right now we philosophers of science are peddling this image of science and that we may be negligent for not exploring alternatives--yet, too often we in philosophy are trapped in the idea that our philosophy must also aim at consensus.
Finally, the case described by Millstein is so transparently not 'normal science' that it is fairly easy to call a spade a spade. We are not always so lucky.
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