During the past week I engaged in a polemic with Prof. Williamson (here, here, and here). Along the way I claimed that "in his piece Williamson is scathing of Dummett and the kind of philosophy promoted by Dummett." In a patient series of letters, Professor Richard Heck has convinced me that I am certainly wrong to claim that "Williamson is scathing of Dummett." In his piece, Williamson makes a clear distinction between Dummett's position and the community of those that followed him: "Dummett’s posing of the issue between realism and anti-realism provides a case study of an occasion when the philosophical community was offered a new way of gaining theoretical control over notoriously elusive issues... The community spurned the opportunity, if that is what it was." (8) So, I apologize to Prof. Williamson and our readers for claiming otherwise.
I had also thought that Williamson held Dummett responsible (in the manner, say, of Socrates's responsibility for some of the vices of his students) for the follies and intellectual vices (stereotypically associated with 'continental' philosophy [about which more below]) of those that followed the "opportunity" Dummett had created (note, for example, the qualifying "if that is what it was.") So, for example, after commenting on Dummett's willingness to give up on the law of excluded middle, Williamson added: "When law and order break down, the result is not freedom or anarchy but the capricious tyranny of petty feuding warlords." (17) I took Williamson to be blaming Dummett for the bad consequences. (This is compatible, of course, with Williamson admiring Dummett in lots of other ways.) After my exchange with Heck, I am less confident about my interpretation, especially because Williamson is -- to quote Heck -- "fully aware of Dummett's efforts at answering the question "which principles of logic are supposed to carry authority.""
Now, Heck and I agree (I think) that Prof. Williamson is using (to quote Williamson) "crude stereotypes" about "'continental' philosophers" (11) shared by people working in analytical philosophy in the wake of Dummett to hold people in analytical philosophy accountable and to encourage them to live up to their own professed values. (That was also my original reading.) I wish to make four points about this (two of which due to Heck). First, Heck points out to me that (quoting Heck) Williamson's "use of scare quotes around `continental' is another nod in the direction of Dummett, who bemoans the analytic-continental divide in his book Origins of Analytic Philosophy and specifically notes the inappropriateness of the terminology." I agree with Heck's interpretation of Williamson. I feel dumb missing this because Dummett's book looms so large in my own disagreements with Dummett. I am unsure if Williamson entirely agrees with Dummett because he writes that "We who classify ourselves as ‘analytic philosophers’ tend to fall into the assumption that our allegiance automatically confers on us methodological virtue." (11)
Second, Heck observes astutely that Williamson's polemical point does not depend "upon his audience's being committed to the stereotype. It's enough that they know about it, and that to some extent it shapes the way they think of themselves as philosophers. To put it differently, the bias could (interestingly enough) be wholly implicitly, and it would not affect the point Williamson was trying to make." I think this is entirely right.
Third, the polemical use of the stereotype need not imply, of course, that Williamson himself is committed to the stereotype. Even though the stereotype is indispensable to the emotional effectiveness of the kind of polemical shaming that Williamson is engaging in, it does not require Williamson to accept it as long as he can be confident that it will activate the right kind of response in his audience. This is a bit tricky, in fact, because on my reading, Williamson is not speaking as an outsider to a community, but as a (the?) privileged member of the community (see my quote about self-classification above). For, there is evidence within the text (and outside the text) that Williamson does accept the idea that at its very best analytical philosophy has "precision" and "rigour" lacking in work associated with 'continental' philosophy. But as Heck points about to me it is not entirely conclusive. Williamson writes, "According to the crude stereotypes, analytic philosophers use arguments while 'continental' philosophers do not. But within the analytic tradition many philosophers use arguments only to the extent that most'continental' philosophers do." (11) As Heck puts it "there's a many/most contrast here, which one might think cast aspersions on the 'continental' folks. But Tim doesn't say "all", or "almost all", but just "most"." Now, granted Williamson is clear that using argument (and even clarity of prose) is not unique to analytical philosophy. But this is not what Williamson seems to associate with "high standards" (12) or "precision" and "rigour" (15). He identifies philosophical obscurity as occuring in texts where "the structure of its claims is fudged where it really matters." (11) I see no reason to think that Williamson thinks 'continental' philosophy avoids such obcurity. He insists that "To be precise is to make it as easy as possible for others to prove one wrong. That is what requires courage." (15) Let's grant it requires some courage. But I do not see Williamson recognizing that alternative approaches may have a different kind of precision (as in the manner of say, Wallace Stevens' philosophical poetry, or -- let me insist -- Derrida's writing), and even courage.
Finally, even if I grant that Williamson does not endorse the stereotype (and even if he does not embrace univocal accounts of "high standards"), he should not have relied on the the stereotype. For, even if the stereotype were true (as I deny), relying on it facilates a self-understanding within our community that makes us less open to learn from others and gives us a false sense of entitlement. A community's philosophical life necessarily involves self-examination, and if that very (possible) self is intrinsically constituted by an intellectual-moral boundary that makes certain 'others' invisible and lower, we fall short of common humanity and decency.
I leave it to another time to explore if polemics ought to have any place within a philosophical community, but I hope to have made it clear where I was wrong in my criticism of Prof. Williamson, and I thank Prof. Heck, who should not be taken to endorse Prof. Williamson's positions, for helping me see so.
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