Unlike geometry, economic theory does not consist of theorems which must be a sacred seal set upon some part of a man's, or a woman's, life. The ethics of commerce must draw on ethics as a whole, and for this, we, however “we" are constituted, must draw on ourselves through an inward look, of picturing something that we cannot see, of making a composite and being satisfied with a rough outline that allows us to cope and carry on. The question, and now I keep repeating myself as in a stutter, is how are we to do this? How is one to foster an optimal blend of competition and cooperation in society and in theorizing about that society, to control self-interest and to acknowledge the possibility of self-deception, to prevent one particular picture overshadowing the composite, putting the analyst and the analyzed, the theorist and theorized, on the same plane of existence so that an ethics of theorizing, rather than a narrative of self-serving or group-serving domination, can emerge? (Khan 2003: 19)
M.A. Khan, a mathematical economist (whose career I helped celebrate this week-end), concludes an important essay on Alfred Marshall, Frank Hahn, Joan Robinson, and Keynes (all Cambridge economists who engaged in serious reflection on their craft and its role(s) in society) with the lines quoted above. Now as Khan puts it, “Economists do not have a comparative advantage when it comes to ethics,” (Khan 2005: 40) so he turns to philosophy, but not philosophical theory (recall his criticism of Singer). Rather, inspired by Wittgenstein and Cavell and aided by philosopher-economists from the past, Kahn turns primarily to an extended self-examination. Now, the aim of his ethic is “to cope and carry on” without domination. So, the aspirations are in some sense quite minimal. But, of course, a moment's reflection makes one realize that a society without domination and with an "optimal blend of competition and cooperation" is, of course, far beyond present existence anywhere. Even a dominance-free theorizing about such a society may still be beyond our reach. (Yes, I expect protests from our political philosophers and ethicists.) Khan's focus on "society" (and not, say, a system of individuals [recall here]) makes him altogether a strange bird among contemporary economists, yet an heir to Adam Smith.
In Khan's hands “picturing” is the introducing of concepts that make the previously invisible visible (cf this). But what guides the introduction of the new apparatus is a moral demand; as Khan puts it we need concepts or “a vocabulary for exploring alternative possibilities for social, political, and communal bonding” (Khan 2005: 39; recall my account here and here). Now, some other time I explore how we might think about society and bonding. But here I just note that Khan appears to think that the task of the creative (if not philosophical) economist isn't just to describe the world as it is, but also imagine the world that might be and that can be made to be, in part, by these concepts.
There is an irony in Khan's vision. Khan is a staunch defender of the theorist's autonomy from policy considerations. Even so, his "ethics of commerce" is a kind of "applied" economic theory, but not the sort that is now unfamiliar to (and unfashionable among) economists, who (recall my treatment of Koopmans, Alchian, and Harberger) have increasingly grown to value policy oriented economic research (within present institutions); it's also not quite the moral science that is sometimes promoted by economists concerned with the loss of direction of the discipline (recall my piece on the Schillers). Rather it is much closer to Adam Smith's science of the legislator.
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