Quite a few of my posts originate in my reflections on book reviews. But it was pointed out to me I rarely point to or characterize reviews that I like. So consider this fantastic review by Stephen Read. The volume under review "constitutes a valuable survey and rigorous examination of the categories of being, of the development of metaphysics over two and a half thousand years." Read gives what seems like a fair and critical summary of the volume's contents without sacrificing readability and philosophical informativeness. This is quite an achievement in its own right given the range of material under review. But there is also an unmistakable polemical undertone. Consider the following three passages:
1: "Lagerlund's paper is salutary in revealing the continuity between medieval and early modern theories, which is often overlooked or even denied..."
2: "[G]iven the lack of historical awareness among many analytical philosophers in the twentieth century, it is easy to overlook the influence that medieval thought had right through until the nineteenth century. We need to be reminded, as Peter Simons does..."
3: "This wonted ignorance of the history of philosophy, particularly of the period between Aristotle and Descartes, is often excused by the claim that the ills of metaphysics arose from the logical mistake of thinking all propositions are of subject-predicate form, an error identified and overturned by Frege. The right metaphysics, on this reading, distinguishes concept and object, more generally unsaturated functions from saturated or complete entities. Haaparanta, indeed, in her paper 'On "Being" and Being: Frege between Carnap and Heidegger', claims that while Aristotle had ten categories, Frege's corresponding categorial distinction was between concept and object (p. 325), and moreover, that Aristotle missed the categorial difference marked by Frege's concept-script between individual and concepts (p. 329). But the concept/object distinction generalizes the particular/universal distinction, which is another dimension of Aristotle's taxonomy: the vertical dimension of primary versus secondary substance contrasted with the horizontal distinction substance and accidents, themselves subdivided into the Aristotelian categories (and arguably, themselves admitting a particular/universal distinction, glossed in Categories 2 as those which are "in a subject but not said of any subject" and those which are "both said of a subject and in a subject")."
What I like about this particular polemic is (a) it calls attention to recent-ish scholarly trends to a wider audience; (b) it is revisionary; (c) it engages critically with the reviewed material (something we need a lot more of it), but not at its expense (quite rare); (d) it is technically sophisticated while lucid; (e) it offers ways to redraw taken-for-granted historical and conceptual distinctions, thus prompting new avenues for thought.
None of this is to say that I agree with all of Read's claims, but about that maybe some other time.
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