New APPS: Art, Politics, Philosophy, Science

Nagel and the Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism

Evolutionary naturalism provides an account of our capacities that undermines their reliability, and in doing so undermines itself...I agree with Alvin Plantinga that...the application of evolutionary theory to the understanding of our own cognitive capacities should undermine, though it need not completely destroy, our confidence in them. Mechanisms of belief formation that have selective advantage in the everyday struggle for existence do not warrant our confidence in the construction of theoretical accounts of the world as a whole. I  think the evolutionary hypothesis would imply that though our cognitive capacities could be reliable, we do not have the kind of reason to rely on them that we ordinarily take ourselves to have using in them directly--as we do in science. Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, 27-28 (emphasis in original)

A non-trivial (albeit not the most fundamental) feature of Nagel's book (recall my here, here, here; see Feser's response to me and also Mohan's posts: here, here, here and here) is his reliance on Plantinga's so-called evolutionary argument against naturalism (hereafter EAAN; see also pp. 74-78). Let's leave aside the fact that Nagel pretends in his book that this (evolving) EAAN argument has not been subject to significant criticism. (It must be convenient to think that one is obliged to engage only with one's referee [Sober, although even his criticism of EAAN is ignored], one's colleague [Street], one's cheerleader [Plantinga], and one's deus ex machina [Hawthorne & Nolan].) Here I explore a response to this style of argument that is overlooked by Nagel and, I think, not explored in the literature (but would love to learn otherwise--it's not my field).  So, let's grant -- for the sake of argument -- the claim that "Mechanisms of belief formation that have selective advantage in the everyday struggle for existence do not warrant our confidence in the construction of theoretical accounts of the world as a whole." What follows from this?

My quick and dirty answer is: nothing. For the crucial parts of science really do not rely on such mechanisms of belief formation. Much of scientific reason is or can be performed by machines; as I have argued before, ordinary cognition, perception, and locution does not really matter epistemically in the sciences.

Threat to philosophy study at Cedarville University

Another in an already too-long list of such appeals: 

It has just come to the attention of current students and alumni of Cedarville University that a recommendation has been made to the board of trustees that, upon approval, will result in the removal of the Philosophy program and perhaps even the professors who have invested their lives into creating a community of philosophical thought.

Indirect proofs in the Prior Analytics

(Cross-posted at M-Phi)

A few days ago I wrote a post on a dialogical conceptualization of indirect proofs. Not coincidentally, much of my thinking on this topic at the moment is prompted by the Prior Analytics, as we are currently holding a reading group of the text in Groningen. We are still making our way through the text, but here are some potentially interesting preliminary findings.

I am deeply convinced that the emergence of the technique of indirect proofs marks the very birth of the deductive method, as it is a significant departure from more ‘mundane’ forms of argumentation (as I argued before). So it is perhaps not surprising that the first fully-fledged logical text in history, the Prior Analytics, offers a sophisticated account of indirect proofs. 

Brazilian music on Fridays: best of 2012

Rolling Stone Brasil has now released its much-waited (by me, in any case) ‘Best of 2012’ lists: the 10 best records, and the 10 best tracks. Not that I’m a ranking fanatic, but these lists allow me to discover stuff I knew nothing about and thus stay more or less abreast of the latest developments in Brazilian music. And indeed, there are lots of musicians on these two lists that I had never heard of, and from a brief inspection some of them very promising.

The number one track is the Racionais MC song I posted last week (sorry dmf, I know you were not impressed…), but otherwise most of the ‘winners’ have not been BMoF guests so far. Some exceptions are Caetano Veloso (new record ranked as best of the year, in the year he turned 70!) and CéU. I still have lots of work to do to listen to all this new stuff, but for now let me post three songs: ‘Essa é pra tocar no baile’ by BNegão & Os Seletores de Frequência (4^th in the song ranking, 3^rd in the album ranking), ‘Falta de ar’ by CéU, (4^th in album ranking) and ‘A Bossa Nova é foda’ by Caetano Veloso (1^st in album ranking, ^3rd in song ranking).

Philosopher's Carnival Number 147

is HERE.

Joe Bob says "Check it out."

Go Figure...a thought on Deleuzo-Cartesianism...and painting

In an earlier post, I made reference to Jacob Klein’s essay about Husserl’s history of the origin of geometry. Klein’s own work is very impressive as well (Burt Hopkins has a recent book on both Klein and Husserl [a NDPR review is here), and reading through Klein's book has helped me to see one reason why Deleuze so freely and regularly draws from both mathematics and art, though not just any mathematics or any art. Deleuze was interested in a problematic as opposed to axiomatic mathematics; and he was interested in a figural as opposed to figurative art. What the two have in common is a certain form of abstraction.

"The working conditions of college faculty are ultimately the learning conditions for college students"

So writes Michael Bérubé, [update: citing the slogan of the New Faculty Majority], in his Presidential Address to the MLA. He reminds us that we can't let the internal rewards or "psychic wage" cover for the material conditions of many of our HE colleagues who are worse off, materially, than K-12 colleagues: "The truth, of course, is that contingent college faculty members earn lower wages, have less professional autonomy, and endure significantly greater job insecurity than unionized teachers in the K–12 system." On this point, see the Adjunct Project. And here also.

Speaking of K-12, t wouldn't hurt to recall this point I'm fond of making, and start thinking in terms of K-16: 

Flash: The International Standard Kilogram Has Put On Weight

Here.

RIP: James M. Buchanan (1919-2013)

Tyler Cowen reports that the economist, James M. Buchanan (Nobel, 1986), has just passed away. Together with his sometime co-author and colleague, Gordon Tullock, Buchanan 'invented' public choice economics. Buchanan had a non-trivial impact on the development of political philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century; he was a keen student of and interlocutor with philosophers, especially Rawls. I will always be very proud to have a paper published alongside the Buchanan-Rawls correspondence.

I also owe a personal debt to Buchanan: he participated in the very first conference on Adam Smith that I co-organized. He was very generous and critical, and made all the young scholars present feel that they were active in an important enterprise. (It's the conference where New Voices on Adam Smith was conceived.)

Some other time I may post a bit more on Buchanan's intellectual development alongside the 'Chicago' and 'Virginia' economists (Nutter, Vining, Knight, etc.) that are part of my scholarly focus (and occasional blogging here).

A dialogical conception of indirect proofs

(Cross-posted at M-Phi)

In his commentary on Euclid, the 5^th century Greek philosopher Proclus defines indirect proofs, or ‘reductions to impossibility’, in the following way (I owe this passage to W. Hodges, from this paper): 

Every reduction to impossibility takes the contradictory of what it intends to prove and from this as a hypothesis proceeds until it encounters something admitted to be absurd and, by thus destroying its hypothesis, confirms the proposition it set out to establish.

Schematically, a proof by reduction is often represented as follows:

[~A]

.

.

.

⊥

------

A

 It is well know that indirect proofs pose interesting philosophical questions. What does it mean to assert something with the precise goal of then showing it to be false, i.e. because it leads to absurd conclusions? Why assert it in the first place? What kind of speech act is that? It has been pointed out that the initial statement is not an assertion, but rather an assumption, a supposition. But while we may, and in fact do, suppose things that we know are not true in everyday life (say, in the kind of counterfactual reasoning involved in planning), to suppose something precisely with the goal of demonstrating its falsity is a somewhat awkward move, both cognitively and pragmatically.

asshole academia?

The Chronicle of Higher Education has a nice discussion of UC Irvine philosopher Aaron James' recent Asholes: A Theory.

James argues that what is characteristic of assholes is that they systematically "act out of a deep-rooted sense of entitlement, a habitual and persistent belief that they deserve special treatment." He develops a typology of different kinds of assholes, and also theorizes about the rise of "asshole capitalism," which is where:

Weekly Philo of Economics: Adam Smith's Third Invisible Hand.

Since an article by Macfie (1971), scholars have recognized that Smith uses the phrase “invisible hand” three times in his corpus; once in Wealth of Nations; once in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Recently the great, late Warren Samuels bequeathed us a lifetime of scholarship on the enormous variety of interpretations  that Smith’s “invisible hand” has generated. In this post I focus on the "third" use, which occurs in Smith's "History of Astronomy" -- one of the founding documents of the philosophy of science (and simultaneously the history of the philosophy of science) -- published posthumously in 1795.

Hence the origin of Polytheism, and of that vulgar superstition which ascribes all the irregular events of nature to the favour or displeasure of intelligent, though invisible beings, to gods, daemons, witches, genii, fairies. For it may be observed, that in all Polytheistic religions, among savages, as well as in the early ages of Heathen antiquity, it is the irregular events of nature only that are ascribed to the agency and power of their gods. Fire burns, and water refreshes; heavy bodies descend, and lighter substances fly upwards, by the necessity of their own nature; nor was the invisible hand of Jupiter s ever apprehended to be employed in those matters. But thunder and lightning, storms and sunshine, those more irregular events, were ascribed to his favour, or his anger. Man, the only designing power with which they were acquainted, never acts but either to stop, or to alter the course, which natural events would take, if left to themselves. Those other intelligent beings, whom they imagined, but knew not, were naturally supposed to act in the same manner; not to employ themselves in supporting the ordinary course of things, which went on of its own accord, but to stop, to thwart, and to disturb it. And thus, in the first ages of the world, the lowest and most pusillanimous superstition supplied the place of philosophy.

Channeling bell hooks on the construction of masculinity? or Material for an entire gender/sexuality class in one tweet

It appears that Azealia Banks has lost a record deal over a string of homophobic tweets.  I'm too busy at the moment to write anything detailed, and I doubt I'd have anything to say that wasn't obvious anyway, but I couldn't resist bringing the following bit of accidental wisdom to everyone's attention.

Ms Banks: "A faggot is not a homosexual male. A faggot is any male who acts like a female. There's a BIG difference."  

Indeed there is.  Big and important in fact.

Is Teleology Conceptually Impossible? And If Not, When Should We Resort to It?

We all know—don’t we?—that modern physics is inconsistent with teleology, at least with real teleology, as opposed to the substitute version that so many of us have tried to fashion for use in “teleosemantics.” But what is it, exactly, that modern physics bans? What form would a teleological theory take? When pressed, most of us would be hard pressed to come up with an answer. (Do pause and think about it, Dear Reader. I can almost guarantee that if you are not familiar with the material I am about to discuss, you’ll get it wrong. I certainly did, and I am supposed to be an expert! Ha!)

This is the target of a brilliant 2006 analysis, “What Would Teleological Causation Be?” by John Hawthorne (Oxford) and Daniel Nolan (ANU). I’ll summarize the paper here, and reflect some more on it in a follow-up post.

(The paper was published in Hawthorne’s 2009 Essays in Metaphysics. I only heard of it recently, when it was cited by Tom Nagel in his recent book and mentioned in Eric’s insightful post on the Principle of Sufficient Reason.) 

It is often said that teleology is impossible because it involves backward causation—Aristotle says that the acorn sprouts “for the sake of” the mature oak, but (so the criticism goes) this cannot be a causal relation because the mature oak cannot make the acorn sprout. (Spinoza: "That which is really a cause, it considers an effect.") H&N demur. Teleology and backwards causation are different things, they show. (This, by itself, is one of the surprising and most valuable parts of the analysis.)

Suppose we observe the following strange occurrence, which I’ll call BAM. . .

It's highly probable that the Munich mathematical philosophers only invite boys

Our friends in Munich still don't get it. This is the third time (recall here and here) I have posted about the gender-exclusive nature of invited speakers at workshops at MCPC. Given that the MCPC is quickly becoming one of the leading and most influential philosophy groups in Europe it is important that they (and the all-boy "steering committees" they invite to oversee these workshops) set a "best practices" example to the rest of us.
Ove a thousand philosophers have signed the petition initiated by Martin Kusch and Mark Lance, and a few more the "official GCC petition."

farce repeats itself as history

Will the web transform philosophical praxis? If so, how?

Let's stipulate an expansive notion of 'technology' such that (a) linguistic, mathematical, and logical developments also count as 'technology' and, thus, (b) a lot of philosophical breakthroughs are  preceded by technological ruptures. (Sometimes they redefine philosophy so much that we do not recognize the successor disciplines as "philosophy.") If so, is the web transforming or about to transform philosophical praxis? I use "praxis" to distinguish this question from the one about to what degree professional philosophy is being transformed by the web.

Let me first say what I do not mean with this question. The web *is* transforming philosophical scholarship by facilitating amazing storage & information retrieval (etc.) capacities. I used to spend huge amount of time in libraries (to look at old books and and to scan journals)--now I am genuinely surprised when I enter a library. There are regular on-line/skype seminars on papers, books, topics, etc. The web brings together distributed audiences previously unknown to each other. Blogs have created dedicated intellectual communities, and spawned philosophical movements and catapulted some echo-chambers to professional prominence. (We are probably living in a new golden age of philosophical correspondence--I bet Leibniz would have adored email.) Citation practices are being influenced by blog communities, phil papers, and google.scholar., etc. All of this is swell, but it does not challenge what we mean by "philosophy." (So here I am also ignoring all the exciting ways the web changes how we teach philosophy, and maybe I shouldn't.)

Should we be persuaded by Lynas's conversion from GM critic to GM proponent?

It is always impressive when someone is willing to publicly state that they were wrong about a controversial topic. Such things happen rarely, but there have been a number of recent cases. For example, last July Richard Muller declared himself to be a "converted skeptic," saying that he now acknowledges that global warming is real and that humans are almost entirely the cause. Two days ago, another such example emerged when Mark Lynas publicly apologized for having helped to start the anti-GM movement in Europe, thus "demonising an important technological option which can be used to benefit the environment."

However laudable such recantations are, they can still be called into question, and indeed, I question the basis for Lynas's, as least as it is presented in the transcript linked to above. He begins by calling the anti-GMO movement "anti-science," a claim that I debunked here and here, at least with respect to the labeling of GMOs. Lynas subsequently states that "one by one [his] cherished beliefs about GM turned out to be little more than green urban myths," and lists six such purported myths. Below, I examine each of these, and show why they are not, in fact, myths.

Brazilian music on Fridays: best videoclips of 2012

I’m waiting for Rolling Stone Brasil’s list of best albums of 2012 to comment on it and post some of my favorite songs of the year. But they have already posted a list of the best videoclips of 2012, and among those there are two videos by previous BMoF ‘guests’: ‘Mariô’, one of the many great tracks from Criolo’s 2011 album Nó na Orelha, and ‘Mil faces de um homem leal (Marighella)’ by Racionais MC. The Racionais MC clip is a particularly special event, as it is their first new track in 10 years, en route for a new album (recall that Racionais MC is without exaggeration the most important Brazilian rap band of all times). It is part of the soundtrack of the documentary on Carlos Marighella, a Marxist revolutionary and opponent of the Brazilian military dictatorship in the 1960s. The Racionais MC videoclip was chosen as ‘video of the year’ by MTV Brazil.

For Our Danish Co-Blogger

From the January 7th New Yorker

Not long ago, the Times of London published an article examining "why everyone wants to be Danish." It covered Danish society (according to scientists, Danes are the world's happiest people), Danish fashion ("a leather trim here, a matelot stripe and an edgy trilby there") . . . Danish sperm donation (last year, more than five hundred British women were artificially inseminated in Denmark—an ad for one clinic read, "Congratulations, it's a Viking!"). A "How Danish Are You?" quiz asked, "You like your skies a) Blue b) slate grey c) slate grey with vultures circling the carrion of slaughtered youth." 

Graduate School Recommendation: The A-Bomb

In the latest round of graduate school recommendations that lighten one's winter break, I have noticed that not satisfied with asking whether your protégé is in the top 1, 5, 10 % etc, some schools now offer the option: "Best ever." Some decades ago, 5% was the top cut, and marking that meant "Definitely take her/him", while marking 10% meant: "Take her/him if you have room." (All the other categories were definitely "I do not recommend.") 

Then the 1/2% question was introduced, and ticking that meant: "I am going out on a limb for this person: you'd be insulting me if you didn't take her/him." So that was a test of your own clout, and not just about the student. It was particularly bad for you if your former graduate school failed to admit one of your 1%ers.

But what does the "Best Ever" option mean? Obviously, it isn't meant to be taken literally. None of these questions is. I figure it means "I am a liar." So only Cretans tick that box. Right? And does it benefit your protégé or not if you are a Cretan?

Conceptual genealogy for analytic philosophy

As some readers may recall (but most probably don't), I’ve written a few blog posts on the significance of the history of philosophy for systematic philosophical analysis (here and here, for example). I used the term ‘conceptual archeology’ to refer to the kind of investigation that seeks to unearth the origins and development of philosophical concepts that are central for contemporary philosophers. I also suggested that this exercise is important in that it highlights the contingent and potentially contentious assumptions that led to the establishment of a given philosophical concept, and the dogmas and truisms surrounding it.

Now, NewAPPS’er Jeff Bell is working on a project for a volume on (if I understood it correctly) establishing fruitful dialogues between continental and analytic philosophers. When he invited me to contribute, I figured this could be the occasion I had been waiting for to finally flesh out these ideas of mine in a more systematic way.

[punkrockmonday #22] Iris Dement - Easy's Gettin' Harder Every Day

I completely misnamed a paper (written with Jason Megill) after this song:

It was actually Dan Farrell who turned me on to Iris Dement.

#InvisibleNoMore

Why aren’t more people talking about #Idle No More in the United States?  Why isn’t there more (or any) formal media coverage of the movement?  Why did #OWS have that #INM does not?