This hard-hitting review is getting thumbs up from my fellow analyticals. I agree with a core underlying complaint: "The insulation of French philosophy, often marketed as a thoughtful dismissal of the ideals that underlie Anglo-American philosophy, is in fact rooted in nothing loftier than a systematic disregard for linguistically inaccessible literature." If the reviewer's description of De Fontenay's approach (which apparently is highly critical of features of analytical moral philosophy) is accurate, she deserves a lot of castigation. Even so, I do not recall that we analyticals are widely noted for our linguistic prowess and careful citation of French (and other non-English) authors! When in glass houses...
Okay, on to a more philosophically outrageous aspect of this review:
But to suggest that such awareness of shared pain can substitute for more principled approaches -- as De Fontenay does -- is to regressively return animal ethics into an extension of sentimental care for animals. It is (arguably) the lasting collective achievement of animal ethics from Singer on to show that the treatment of animals should not be limited to momentary spurts of compassion for cute and furry animals. Animal ethics should, rather, offer a conceptually disciplined framework through which moral restrictions on what may be institutionally done to members of other species can be evaluated and generated.--Tzachi Zamir
2. Note how Singer's approach is described as a "conceptually disciplined framework." The good are disciplined; the bad are clearly undisciplined.
3. Zamir shows no evidence of worrying about the unintended side-effects of entrusting self-ascribed moral experts with conceptually disciplined frameworks; I am constantly struck by the utter lack of care or sympathy with communities and individuals that are on the receiving end of the disciplined agenda of institutional reform. (To say this is not to condone cruelty toward animals.) The "generation of institutional restrictions" is newspeak for "we will use the coercive power of the state to prevent activities we deem morally objectionable." I am not suggesting there can't be circumstances in which the coercive power of the state can't end moral disagreement; but in the face of such eagerness to embrace state coercion to end moral disagreement, I prefer Deconstruction anyday.
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