This is my son Thomas (the littler guy, to right). He's a pretty awesome four year old. The picture is from two days ago, when we skipped church and ate at Cracker Barrel instead. I don't know if they have these outside of the American South, so let me explain. They are good places to take kids because the service is fast and, before seating, you can sit on the front porch and the kids can run around in a safe area. They also have tables with checker sets on them.
As the picture reveals, Thomas was pretty obsessed with two other people playing checkers, so when they got up I decided to try to teach him. As of today he sort of gets it. I have to prompt him to take his jumps sometimes, and occassionally he'll still attempt an illegal move, but he basically gets it.
This is all good and fine. But here's the problem, in every single game I've played with him I consciously make stupid moves so that he wins. I've been very misleading if not downright dishonest with him. And now I worry. Is this good parenting? Is it even morally permissible?
But I just haven't been able to do it with respect to Santa Claus. First, it brings him too much happiness. Second, it's just a fact taht if he's being beastly to his little sister Audrey (who will turn three in December) the threat of Santa Claus not delivering the goods is extremely effective.
But I feel pretty guilty about this. In part because the Santa Claus myth entails the despicable Romneyesque view that poor kids who get crap presents are bad kids, but also just because I'm lying to him. I don't look forward to a few years from now when I have to admit to him that I let him think he was winning all those games on the strength of his own mad skills and that we lied to him about Santa Claus. . .
I realize that on utilitarian, Kantian, and social contract theories one can justify lying to children. Obviously for utilitarianism, and maybe that works. But with Kantian and social contract theory I think it's a bug, not a feature. Like animals, four year olds aren't rational agents nor are the signatories to the social contract, but then these views entail that at best we have derived obligations to children and animals (e.g. being horrible to them might make us more horrible to humans that can speak and reason).
I'm teaching MacIntyre's Dependent Rational Animals in a few weeks, and maybe that will shed some light on our obligations to the proto-sapient such as chimpanzees, dogs, and human children. As noted, at least with my paltry knowledge of ethics I don't think any of the big three get this right, but I'll be interested to find out what's out there from any ethicists reading this, as well as how other parents face this issue.
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