Slavoj Žižek calls attention to and connects the following two passages in Kant:
A
people should not inquire withany practical aim in view into the origin
of the supreme authority to which it is subject; that is a subject
ought not to rationalize for the sake of action about the origin of this
authority, as a right that can still be called into question with
regard to the obedience he owes to it....[this] sets forth an
idea as a principle of practical reason: the principle that the
presently existing legislative authority ought to be obeyed, whatever
its origin. (6: 318-9 and the German).
For
a people already subject to civil law these subtle reasonings are
altogether pointless and, moreover, threaten a state with danger. It is
futile to inquire into the historical documentation [Geschichtsurkunde]
of the mechanism of government, that is, one cannot reach back to the
time at which civil society began (for
savages draw up no record of their submission to law; besides, we can
already gather from the nature of uncivilized human beings that
they were originally subjected to it by force). But it is punishible to undertake this inquiry with a view to possibly changing by force the constitution that now exists. For this transformation would have to take place by the people acting as a mob, not by legislation. (6:339-40 and the German [The parts in bold are omitted by Žižek (because he is focused on a slightly different question--ES.])
As Žižek notes, Kant legislates a philosophical taboo (recall here.) A
people cannot call into question obedience to present (lawful) government. This
is not the place to explore if Kant allows either exceptions to such
obedience or if a government stops being lawful (say because its
laws become at odds with itself (recall my recent posts on Smith and Emerson and Thoreau) or because it has no de facto authority (recall my posts on Hobbes, Hume, Smith) etc.), such that no obedience is warranted anymore. Moreover, I am also going to pretend as if the events of the French Revolution have nothing to do with this doctrine of Die Metaphysik der Sitten. Rather, Kant's taboo limits the possible philosophical role of history (as a form of inquiry) on practical grounds (if not plain raison d'État).
For, history has to stop just where it gets interesting. Moreover, if
history is not allowed to tell the origins of (any) us as a political
unity, it cannot provide a genuine causal account of our unity and,
thus, is incapable of offering full explanations. (It's only when one
lowers one's expectation of what a proper causal account is that such
history gets allowed back in.) The taboo is especially striking because
it goes against the classical ideal that inquiry into politics is among
the highest philosophical goods (I'll remain agnostic on what the
correct reading of Aristotle is).
Kant's taboo helps us better understand the demise within philosophy (and history) of history as a genuine philosophical enterprise. This has caused a so-called Kuhn-Loss for philosophy: we are incapable of recognizing much of Xenophon, Polybius, Machiavelli, and, say, Hume's History, as properly philosophical, nor (as I noted recently in response to Hazony's book), the main narrative of The Hebrew Bible.
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