[In honor of Ryan Hanley, the author of a very fine book on Adam Smith, and my host this week, I do a post on Smith's philosophy of religion--ES]
Discussions of Adam Smith's views on religion are bedeviled by two obsessively posed questions: (i) does the so-called 'invisible hand' instantiate or rely on a providential order?; (ii) is Smith a Humean skeptic about the existence of God? In what follows I ignore these. Consider, first, the following passage:
In the Decalogue we are commanded to honour our fathers and mothers. No mention is made of the love of our children. Nature had sufficiently prepared us for the performance of this latter duty. Men are seldom accused of affecting to be fonder of their children than they really are. They have sometimes been suspected of displaying their piety to their parents with too much ostentation. The ostentatious sorrow of widows has, for a like reason, been suspected of insincerity. (The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS), III.3.13)
Here Smith treats the Ten Commandments sociologically. The Decalogue offers insight into which of our moral duties are innate (i.e., they don't need to be mentioned in the them) and which duties require sanctions (the ones listed). Given that at least for this item on the list he treats it as a reliable authority, he understands Moses or Moses' source as a wise-lawgiver (on this matter). This has affinity with chapter three of Spinoza's Theological Political Treatise. (I return to this below) As an non-trivial aside, if we are allowed to treat the whole list in such sociological terms then it appears that Smith thinks that the very idea of a mono-theistic God is not natural (nor innate) to us but requires social reinforcement mechanisms. (This echoes the first chapter of Hume's Natural History of Religion.)
DD Raphael once noted that in treating Smith’s views on God and theology that for Smith, a “theology is unacceptable if it fails to accord with ‘all our moral sentiments’ (TMS III.II.33)” (Raphael 2007, 104). Yet, Raphael does not pause to consider how, echoing Spinoza, Smith anticipates Kant in subordinating theology to morality:
“[R]eligion enforces the natural sense of duty. . . . And wherever the natural principles of religion are not corrupted by the factious and party zeal of some worthless cabal; wherever the first duty which it requires, is to fulfill all the obligations of morality; wherever men are not taught to regard frivolous observances, as more immediate duties of religion, than acts of justice and beneficence; and to imagine, that by sacrifices, and ceremonies, and vain supplications, they can bargain with the Deity for fraud, and perfidy, and violence, the world undoubtedly judges right in this respect,” (TMS, III.5.13, 170).
Smith is very careful not to spell out what the “natural principles” of non-frivolous (or "true") religion are, although presumably they involve not treating God as an agent who can be moved by incentives. That is, true religion does not include God in our political and moral economy. (This echoes Plato's Laws, Book X.) It is, of course, possible that we are in His/Her economy.) Given that many religions do include lots of mechanisms by which adherents can try to gain God's favor, this suggests that such "natural principles" may be rarely instantiated in actual religions. (Thoughtful readers of Smith conclude that his use of 'natural' is very tricky!)
Smith gives a further hint of what non-frivolous or true religion might be when he discusses Voltaire's play, Mahomet: "False notions of religion are almost the only causes which can occasion any very gross perversion of our natural sentiments in this way; and that principle which gives the greatest authority to the rules of duty, is alone capable of distorting our ideas of them in any considerable degree." (TMS, III.6.12, 176;) Now (I have argued that) Smith operates with a distinction between natural sentiments, which are more or less innate dispositions, and moral sentiments, which based on our natural sentiments and propensities are cultivated by the various institutions of society. So, Smith recognizes religion as a very powerful social force--in fact it is singled out here as the most significant source of the corruption of our moral sense (self-deceit, admiration of rich and powerful, political faction are others he discusses). Moreover, it is unlikely that Smith thinks that true religion contains adherence to particular doctrines, because as he writes in the same passage: "concerning the particular commandments which that will may impose upon us, they differ widely from one another. In this, therefore, the greatest mutual forbearance and toleration is due; and though the defence of society requires that crimes should be punished, from whatever motives they proceed, yet a good man will always punish them with reluctance, when they evidently proceed from false notions of religious duty." (TMS III.6.12, 176) And here, again, we find Smith subtly introducing Spinozistic themes: he defends upholding obedience to the law as a supreme duty, while at the same time advocating doctrinal tolerance. (See also Smith's hope in Wealth of Nations that with absolute freedom of religion (something neither Spinoza nor Hume advocated), competition among religious sects will lead to a "pure and rational religion, free from every mixture of absurdity, imposture, or fanaticism, such as wise men have in all ages of the world wished to see established").
Even when Smith explicitly relies on providential language, some care is required to tease out his position. Take, for example, this passage:
“Sentiments, designs, affections, though it is from these that according to cool reason human actions derive their whole merit or demerit, are placed by the great Judge of hearts beyond the limits of every human jurisdiction, and are reserved for the cognizance of his own unerring tribunal. That necessary rule of justice, therefore, that men in this life are liable to punishment for their actions only, not for their designs and intentions, is founded upon this salutary and useful irregularity in human sentiments concerning merit or demerit, which at first sight appears so absurd and unaccountable” (TMS, II.III.III.2, 105).
In the quote, Smith relies on the fact that what may seem proper from the point of view of rationality is not always really the right thing to do in this world. Either way, again, in effect he agrees with Spinoza’s argument that in this world there should be freedom of thought.
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