It is a common trope to deplore the lack of consensus in philosophy (recall the first two paragraphs of the Introduction to Hume's Treatise). As I have pointed out before (here), Sidgwick tried to create consensus in economics by splitting economics from philosophy. Now as I remarked Rawls was aware of this. Sidgwick's way of splitting economics and philosophy was not as successful as Robbins later. Below I quote Robbins and then I suggest how Rawls met the implied challenge.
And, quite apart from all questions of methodology, there is a very practical justification for such a procedure in the rough-and-tumble of political struggle, differences of opinion may arise either as a result of differences about ends or as a result of differences about the means of attaining ends. Now, as regards the first type of difference, neither Economics nor any other science can provide any solvent. If we disagree about ends it is a case of thy blood or mine—or live and let live, according to the importance of the difference, or the relative strength of our opponents. But, if we disagree about means, then scientific analysis can often help us to resolve our differences. If we disagree about the morality of the taking of interest (and we understand what we are talking about), then there is no room for argument. But if we disagree about the objective implications of fluctuations in the rate of interest, then economic analysis should enable us to settle our dispute….Surely, for the sake of securing what agreement we can in a world in which avoidable differences of opinion are all too common, it is worth while carefully delimiting those fields of enquiry where this kind of settlement is possible from those where it is not to be hoped for —it is worth while delimiting the neutral area of science from the more disputable area of moral and political philosophy. (Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science)
Now, in context Robbins had re-defined and delimited the nature of economics as being the science that is about means-end reasoning (or instrumental rationality). In that context Robbins suggest an intellectual division of labor between economics, which in virtue of being about establishing (efficient) means, can generate consensus and philosophy, which is about ends/values and, therefore, cannot establish consensus (and can even lead to violence). In particular, Robbins establishes economics as the paradigmatic science that within its limited domain permits conflict resolution. This moves secures economics the privilege of being the paramount policy science.
As I have pointed out before (here and here), Rawls was also a very attentive reader of Robbins on these matters. In fact, we can understand Rawls as meeting Sidgwick and Robbins on their own grounds:
By way of summing up, the essential point is that despite the individualistic features of justice as fairness, the two principles of justice are not contingent upon existing desires or present social conditions. Thus we are able to derive a conception of a just basic structure, and an ideal of the person compatible with it, that can serve as a standard for appraising institutions and for guiding the overall direction of social change. In order to find an Archimedean point it is not necessary to appeal to a priori or perfectionist principles. By assuming certain general desires, such as the desire for primary social goods, and by taking as a basis the agreements that would be made in a suitably defined initial situation, we can achieve requisite independence from existing circumstances. The original position is so characterized that unanimity is possible; the deliberations of any one person are typical of all. Moreover, the same will hold for the considered judgments of the citizens of a well-ordered society effectively regulated by the principles of justice. Everyone has a similar sense of justice and in this respect a well-ordered society is homogeneous. Political argument appeals to this moral consensus. (A Theory of Justice); emphases added
Now Rawls is certainly not the first to have promoted the idea that philosophy can generate consensus. This is, in fact, a commitment one regularly finds in all manners of "scientific philosophy." What I had not really noticed before, however, is that in context Rawls is definitely responding to the challenge from the economists (hat tip to David M. Levy and Sandra Peart!) On the very next page Rawls explicitly notes that he is responding to Arrow, who calls attention to the significance of Robbins on this matter early in his Social Choice. [Some other time I return to Rawls/Arrow!] Now, what is striking is that Rawls doesn't merely assert that he has constructed a decision-procedure within political philosophy capable of generating consensus (and, thus, re-establish equal standing with the economists when it comes to policy), but that he also adopts the economists' ideal of the representative agent ("deliberations of any one person are typical of all")! Now, I know that Rawls argued for a different kind of overlapping consensus in Political Liberalism (although to the best of my knowledge he never gave up on the decision procedure of TJ--but no doubt I will be corrected on that if mistaken); and I also know that recently folk have become excited to establish empirically that Rawls was right to assert that we have similar sense of justice. But...ahem...now that we have learned how disastrous the consensus/unanimity assumption has been in economics, maybe we should not be so eager to keep it in philosophy?
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