I want to re-open a discussion we have had before somewhat indirectly on NewAPPS. In a recent review of Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A German-English Edition, translated by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann , Arnulf Zweig writes,
"Gregor and Timmermann are not only faithful to his words; they replicated his syntax. Take a comparatively short and simple example; Kant writes: Man denke doch ja nicht, daß man das, was hier gefodert wird, schon an der Propädeutik des berühmten Wolf vor seiner Moralphilosophie, der von ihm so genannten allgemeinen practischen Weltweisheit, habe, und hier also nicht eben ein ganz neues Feld einzuschlagen sey. The translation: However, let it not be thought that what is here called for already exists in the guise of the propaedeutic of the famous Wolff for his moral philosophy, namely that which he called Universal Practical Philosophy, and that we do not therefore have to open up an entirely new field. (IV, 390 l.20 ff.) [the passage from Zweig continues after the fold--ES]
"The [Gregor-Timmermann] translation mirrors Kant's construction (I believe grammarians call it the optative subjunctive). There is of course a certain pleasure in deciphering Kant's lengthy sentences, looking for the referent of his pronouns, and puzzling over the sequence of his clauses -- a pleasure that helps to motivate Kant translators! For many readers, however, reading Kant would be more rewording if it were less like an obstacle course....I am probably biased therefore in disagreeing with Timmermann when he asserts that all translations "inevitably obscure the author's arguments." I think Kant's arguments become less obscure when one takes into account the needs and limitations of readers. Of course that entails some compromise with the ideal of an exact translation. In this rigorous translation even dummy words like "aber" and "doch" are not neglected. Whether this enhances one's philosophical understanding is another question. Granted, it's a joy to struggle with and triumph over some of Kant's sentences, and from the point of view of historical and linguistic interests, the ideal of absolute fidelity cannot be faulted. But word for word and clause for clause translation is no favor to the struggling reader who seeks to grasp the arguments buried in those sentences. One way to mitigate the difficulty of Kant's style without distorting his arguments would be to divide up his elegantly opaque and overly long sentences into "accessible bites" (as Francine Baker puts it, in her Kantian Review discussion of recent Groundwork translations). That is evidently not a procedure countenanced by Gregor or Timmermann."
Now, let me first say that a facing-page German-English edition of Kant is a great idea! (I adore working with De Dijn's facing page Latin-English edition of Spinoza's Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect; and I couldn't have made it joyfully through graduate school without the Loeb editions of Plato and the others.) Second, in an earlier exchange with two amazing scholars, our very own Dennis des Chene and one of our loyal readers, Benjamin Goldberg, the issue of literalism came up obliquely.
Now, here I firmly disagree with Zweig: translations shouldn't change the style of an original (without regular reminders to the reader that they are doing so) nor should they focus on making the arguments more accessible (at, say, the expense of other features of a text). I am struck by Zweig's obsession with the arguments in the quote above. In fact, I am confident that if anybody followed Zweig's precepts in their translations they would be producing not a translation of Kant, but something like Kant* (it would be a rational reconstruction).
But I also do not endorse the idea that in a translation one should mirror the underlying syntax and word-structure. There all kinds of useful gimmicks that one can use in mimicking a style of writing while conveying accurately the content of the underlying text. (Of course, all translation ought to be an act of holistic interpretation.) I like Guthrie's approach to Cicero, who decided that in the 18th century Cicero would have been speaking and writing like Pitt or Pulteney. A modern Kant would sound like a pedantic, provincial university professor with a fondness for archaic, formalistic-legalese writing style and habit of introducing vaguely familiar sounding vocabulary. (Maybe s/he would be trying to emulate Kant! But that's no problem because I think after the First Critique Kant, who knew how to write differently, self-consciously emulated himself.) So, a contemporary translator of Kant into American English should spend a few years in the protestant heartland of America (Nebraska?) (or, if a port needs to be nearby, Portland) and find some local exemplars to emulate. Maybe the Humboldt Foundation would sponsor it?
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