Nagel's Philosophic Prophecy...Or How Analytic Philosophy as We Know It Was Invented...

“A stranger frequently hears important truths at the fireside”—Tocqueville

[This post continues our recent discussion on NewAPPS (see, e.g., Catarina Dutilh Novaes, my plugs for Schlick here and earlier here, and especially Jeff Bell's terrific post and my response to Jeff); what follows below is also a draft of a section of a paper on the methodology of the history of philosophy I am writing, so there is some cross referencing to earlier stuff [much of what I blogged about], comments much appreciated. Special Thanks to Greg Arnold-Frost, who insisted I look at Nagel.]

The first part of this entry provides evidence for Nagel's significance as the source of the now present self-conception of the origin of analytic philosophy--it shows this. The second part of this entry argues that Nagel instantiates "true philosophic prophecy," even if *I* cast doubt on Nagel's narrative.

The way we think about the origins of analytic philosophy can be traced to a remarkable two-part narrative published in 1936 by the American philosopher, Ernest Nagel.[N1] Ostensibly it is a disarming report from his tour of the continent.[N2] Nagel was probably the first to coin “analytic philosophy” in the sense that became influential the next decades, but he also picked out the schools of thought associated with it (Cambridge of Bertrand Russel with Wittgenstein and Moore, the Vienna Circle with special focus on Carnap in Prague, and the Polish logicians in Lwow and Warsaw). In particular, he deliberately “excluded mention of the men whose thought does not bear directly on questions of logic and method.” (1936a, 5)

He also emphasizes what the different schools “have in common, methodologically and doctrinally” (1936a, 6). In particular, he writes that: In the first place, the men with whom I have talked are impatient with philosophic systems built in the traditionally grand manner. Their preoccupation is with philosophy as analysis; they take for granted a body of authentic knowledge acquired by the special sciences, and are concerned not with adding to it in the way research in these sciences adds to it, but with clarifying its meaning and implications. Philosophy for these men holds out no promise of settling questions which only the empirical sciences are competent to settle; nor does it assume the function of legislating what sort of things it is permissible or possible for the empirical sciences to investigate. Those who seek in philosophy a substitute for religion or a key to social salvation will not find it here. The intellectual temper cultivated by these men is that of ethical and political neutrality within the domain of philosophic analysis proper, however much they may be moved by the moral and social chaos which threatens to swallow the few extant intellectual oases upon which they stand.” (1936a, 6; emphasis in original)

Nagel then goes on to emphasize the common “method” which “dominates all these places” as well as the fact that “students whose primary interest is the history of ideas will find that, with some important exceptions, they will profit little from talking with these men.” (1936a, 6) Finally, he ascribes to them a (minimal, but non-trivial) a “common doctrine, the men to whom I refer subscribe to a common-sense naturalism. They do not believe that the everyday world is an illusion, or that science or philosophy reveal a contrasting reality.” (1936a, 7) I trust this characterization is familiar to most contemporary readers; this is despite the existence of much revisionary philosophical[N3] and more scholarly literature, how we have been taught to think about analytic philosophy.

Yet, there is plenty of suggestive evidence within Nagel’s narrative that we’re in the realm of myth-making. Let me offer two kinds of evidence. First, Nagel is not a dispassionate bystander. For Nagel contrasts “the shining sword” of “analytic philosophy” ((1936a) favorably with unnamed opposing schools described as “a romantic irrationalism that has completely engulfed Europe;” (1936a, 5) “community of seers;” (1936b, 6) and with remarks such as, “traditional speculative philosophy frequently cultivates mystification and conscious irrationalism.” (1936a, 9) That is, he instantiates something like what I have described above as a dialectic between true and false philosophy, but with two interesting twists: i) within his account of analytic philosophy there is, for example, a further contrast between the “gentle force of a luminous mind” of Carnap (1936b, 44) and the secretive, homo-erotic cult surrounding Wittgenstein.[N4] (This is not the only such implied contrast; for example, within the discussion of the Vienna Circle, “Schlick and Waismann” are treated as a foil for describing the views of Carnap, but that their own views do not receive sustained scrutiny.) ii) For all his admiration for analytic philosophy, Nagel is also a critic: For example, “it seems to me that a better knowledge of the history which they contemn would have saved many of the analytical philosophers from serious error; for, it will be seen, the latter frequently discuss the traditional problems however disguised they may be by a different terminology. Moreover, the historical approach, when wisely cultivated, can frequently produce the same kind of intellectual catharsis and dissolution of pseudo-problems as does the analytic method.” (1936a, 7)

Second, Nagel offers enough hints that he is aware that he is drawing the domain of analytic philosophy rather narrowly as well as misleading. So, despite the fact that he treats analytic philosophy as hostile to the history of philosophy, Nagel is fully aware that one of the main heroes of his narrative, Lukasiewiez, is deeply immersed in the “history of logic” and has made important contributions to modern logic because of it (1936b, 50). Because he excludes anything other than “logic and method,” Moore’s work in ethics is passed over in silence; by contrast, Carnap’s views on ethical statements are treated extensively and found wanting (“perhaps the least satisfactory part of Carnap's views is his analysis of the propositions of ethics and esthetics.” 1936b, 48ff)

But the exclusion goes deeper than history of philosophy and ethics. Nagel addresses the issue in the first footnote “I am excluding Broad from this account, partly because being the only philosopher at Cambridge who publishes at any length Broad is adequately known through his writings, partly because discussions at Cambridge do not for the moment center around him, and partly because I myself am only mildly interested in the themes with which he is at present occupied.” (1936a, 10, n. 1) We may have forgotten, but between 1925 and 1935 Broad published major books in the philosophy of mind, free will, ethics, history of philosophy and even an extensive engagement with McTaggart’s metaphysics.[N5] But this was once “adequately known.” Nagel then concludes the note with, “For lack of space I must also forego comment on the Peircean-pragmatic turn which the discussions of induction and probability have taken in the eases of Braithwaite and the late Frank Ramsey.” This omission is significant for two further reasons: i) if he had included Braitwaite and Ramsey, he would have had to pay attention to what we may label analytic philosophy of social science not just in Cambridge, but also at Vienna (e.g., Neurath); a focus on Ramsey would have forced him to consider the ways in which analytic philosophy and Cambridge political economy in the wake of Sidgwick overlapped. (Moore and Russell were students of Sidgwick.) ii) It prefigures one of his main more tacit themes of Nagel’s two-fold essay: the continuity between Peirce and analytic philosophy (e.g., “Much of this reads like a page from Peirce” 1936a, 18.) In particular, “Without being aware of it, they have taken seriously Peirce's advice that expert knowledge of some empirical subject-matter ought to be part of a philosopher's equipment.” 1936b, 30; see also, 37.)

I very much admire Nagel’s focus on the “wise cultivation” of history that makes self-awareness as well as “intellectual catharsis and dissolution of pseudo-problems” possible. But this is not the place to further analyze why Nagel would have engaged in philosophic prophecy in his Impressions and Appraisals from his journey to Europe.[N^]

Notes:

1. Ernest Nagel (1936a) “Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe. I” The Journal of Philosophy 33(1): 5-24; (1936b) “Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe. II” The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 33(2): pp. 29-53 . These papers are not unknown in the burgeoning, historical literature of the origin of analytic of philosophy, but I know of no work that treats it as a source of study in its own right. I thank Greg Arnold-Frost for repeatedly calling my attention to these.

2. Nagel insists that he is “reporting less what certain European schools of philosophy profess, and more what I got out of a year’s study abroad.” (1936a, 5)

3. See, especially, Michael Dummett (1994) Origins of Analytic Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994. 4. Cf. “It is easy for anyone at Cambridge to perceive excellent reasons for the fascination that both men [Moore and Wittgenstein] exercise upon their students. It is not easy, without lasping into the personal and impertinent, to convey those reasons to strangers to Cambridge.” (1936a, 10) And “While I was at Cambridge a letter from a friend in Vienna assured me that in certain circles the existence of Wittgenstein is debated with as much ingenuity as the historicity of Christ has been disputed in others. I have seen Wittgenstein, though only casually, and therefore feel competent to decide that question. I did not receive his permission to attend his lectures, and since except to small, exclusive groups at Cambridge and Vienna his present views are not accessible, I feel extraordinarily hesitant in reporting on the doctrines he holds. For various reasons Wittgenstein refuses to publish; and even among his students of years' standing there is considerable doubt as to what his beliefs are on crucial issues. My information about Wittgenstein's views depends upon certain notes on his lectures which are in circulation and upon conversations with students and disciples both at Cambridge and Vienna. Mystery and a queerly warped personality lend charm to many a philosophy which otherwise is not very significant; but in spite of the esoteric atmosphere which surrounds Wittgenstein, I think his views are both interesting and important.” (1936a, 16-17)

5. The Mind and its place in nature. London: Kegan Paul, 1925; The Philosophy of Francis Bacon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926; Five types of ethical theory. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1930; War Thoughts in Peace Time. London: Humphrey Milford, 1931; An examination of McTaggart's philosophy. Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press, 1933; Determinism, interdeterminism and libertarianism. Cambridge University Press, 1934!

6. “Impressions” evoke Hume; it’s unclear to me what “Appraisals” is supposed to evoke.