During the (ongoing?) methodological discussion about physics and metaphysics, Robert Williams stated, "I tentatively suggest that some of the gestalt of "but they're saying p! they should know that's false!" that bugs people isn't that ~p is clearly argued for in obvious places one should know, but that p is part of the folklore, and so the sort of thing folks are used to taking for granted." In many ways this gets to the sociological nub of things. Often p is needed to get a shared research project off the ground and, thus, make progress possible. By the time outsiders are aware of p, it may be deeply embedded and almost invisible to niche-insiders and outsiders alike. (This is a phenomenon that goes well beyond philosophy, of course. David Hume pointed to something like this when he complained that rarely are unmasking philosophers around when a prophect captures popular imagination.) Now, sometimes p is a hard won result, but sometimes it is product of contingent factors (as Dave Baker points out with a generous reference to a book by the much missed Cushing).
In his comment Williams points out that blogs can play a crucial role in foregrounding such folklore. (I certainly enjoy generating discussion about such matters here on Newapps!) But bolder referee choices on behalf of editors can also play a role in alerting folk to the presence of folkore. One reason why I have been trying to promote the practice of publicly naming referees (here and here) of accepted papers (and making their referee reports available online) is that then readers can track to what degree we are dealing with sociological echo-chambers, or not, as well as learn what kind of concerns referees had. (Not all folklore needs to be rejected, of course!)
Recent Comments