When I wrote an extensive commentary on Milton Friedman's evolving views on methodology and how it related to the furore over his involvement with a Chilean dictator, I mentioned that most of the initial generation of Chicago Boys did not have a PhD in economics (only a MA) when they started serving Pinochet. It wasn't the focus of my argument, but it made sense in context to explain that these were not types with extensive research experience. Barbara Forrest did something analogous when she explored the details of how Beckwith's credentials and his arguments got used by his allies to promote a religious agenda in the public sphere. (She did not comment on Beckwith's character outside the public sphere.) All philosophers that enter the public sphere -- Heidegger, Mill, Socrates, Adam Smith, Rousseau, etc -- can expect that people will be interested in more than just their arguments, but also how those arguments relate to their public activity. (I call the relationship between philosophical argument and public scrutinity an instance of the "Socratic Problem"--more about that soon.)
Some contributors to this blog (in echoing the editors of Synthese) suggest such scrutinity somehow lowers our professional standards. If they and the editors of Synthese, can't handle public facts they shouldn't publish on topics that deal with the world. (But, please, stop the uneven treatment of Forrest and Beckwith.) Like the cold-war-traumatized heirs of the Vienna Circle, they can retreat to the lofty safety of logic and justification.
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