[During the last few days I have received a number of informal queries from American colleagues about why European philosophers of science seem so eager to defend the reputation of Synthese and its editors come what may and why these seem not to understand the political ramifications of the disclaimer. What follows is inspired by reflecting on blog comments in support of Synthese around the net; I will be terse, partial, and no doubt superficial in my sociology of European philosophy (on the Western part of the Continent). I list my observations as separate points for clarity but they are meant to be mutually enlightening.]
First, the general editors of Synthese have a sterling reputation for quality and probity. Johan Van Benthem, in particular, is arguably one of the most important analytic philosophers of Europe. His work in logic(s) and formal semantics is widely respected (not to mention his appointment in Stanford).
Second, in European philosophy (and the Humanities more generally) *research* funding has become *zero-sum*. (Such funding pays for PhD, post-doc, and research-intensive positions.) Grants are distributed by national and European grant agencies to favored individuals and, increasingly, (international) research groups. These grants are increasingly decided by ‘objective’ scientific metrics. In particular, publications in journals that have an ESF ‘A’ ranking, have reasonably high impact factors, and/or are listed in reputable indexing services such as Thomson’s Web-of-Science/Knowledge, are favored over all other forms of publications.
Third, to be a professional philosopher in Europe is increasingly to be identified with a narrow sliver of philosophy. Programs of work for PhDs are relatively short (and getting shorter), and because PhDs are entirely research oriented, there is no opportunity for coursework that exposes one to a broad range of professors and other PhD students from many areas of specialization. (Of course, teaching undergraduates post degree broadens some horizons!)
Fourth, the revival of analytic philosophy on the European mainland is in many was a recent phenomenon. It is largely focused on formal approaches to philosophy, philosophy of science, and decision theory. (There is surprisingly little metaphysics, meta-ethics, normative ethics, philosophy of biology, and even philosophy of mind in an analytic vein in mainland Europe.) Formal approaches, philosophy of science, and decision theory are (thus) just about the only areas where European (analytic) philosophers are not at a five to ten year disadvantage relative to cutting edge Anglophone work.
Fifth, Synthese is an important journal not only because it is well managed (prior to this blowup), but also in virtue of it being A-listed and well covered by indexing services. Moreover, it is one of the few places where analytic, general philosophy of science and formal approaches to philosophy (especially Bayesian) can expect to receive a favorable hearing. (If you spend just a few moments on Synthese’s website, you’ll see that decision theory is one of its core commitments.)
Sixth, a large group among European analytic philosophers has a quite justified anger at, or suspicion of, the nepotistic, patronage based way European universities used to be run—where reliance on local influence could ruin whole departments. (They often associate this, rightly or wrongly, with what they call “continental philosophy.”) To this day, folk that build up very impressive CVs publishing in international refereed journals cannot get permanent positions while folk with inferior credentials (and talents!) secure jobs through the intervention of some powerful, and extremely local, big-shot. (This is true in LOTS of places; something like this helps explain the intensity of the anger and mutual distrust in, say, Hungary, as we glimpsed here at NewAPPS not so long ago.) So, it is no surprise that European analytic philosophers embrace proceduralism and civility, and are less interested in subjective claims to reputation.
Seventh, Van Benthem’s Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) in Amsterdam is a massively important research group in terms of quality and size. It is not only an interdisciplinary success story, but it has avoided the malaise of much European research funding; it has a large number of permanent and temporary positions. It sits at the nexus of ongoing research, and international cooperation in thriving fields. (To put the matter historically: outside Carnegie Mellon, it is one of the research institutions most responsible for the continued survival and renewed flourishing of formal philosophy when much of analytic philosophy has taken a ‘naturalistic’ or interpretive turn--one can find folk with some connection to ILLC throughout formal philosophy.)
Eight, in Western Europe there are debates over religion, of course, but these either involve questions about tolerating Islam or about the vestiges of the social and political dominance of the once dominant state Churches. In almost no place is there a genuine public debate over Creationism/Intelligent Design; almost everywhere a vote for a nominally religious party is a vote for the status quo. Everywhere science and the content of public education is decided by elites. So there is little experience with the peculiarly American ID / “stealth creationism” issue.
No doubt there are some European philosophers who simply find Synthese’s editors convincing. And no doubt there are a few European philosophers who only know of debates over intelligent design from afar. But I suspect that the first seven notes help explain why many European analytic philosophers are hesitant to help tear down one of the crucial pillars that holds up (our) philosophic building that is being developed. This is why, thus far, the petitions contain mostly Anglophone signatures. I
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