One might think that one bias that has entered into this weekly most underrated post (cf. the rules; new nominations welcome!) is my history as journeyman philosopher (around the world). Indeed, after my two year stint at WashU in St. Louis, I am familiar with its excellent philosophic community (with its many splendid philosophers at UMSL, SIUE, SLU, Webber, etc). So, one might think that this week's 'winner,' Kent Staley, 'benefits' from that particular bias. But Staley, who publishes in philosophy of physics, philosophy of science more generally, and the history of the philosophy of science, has been on my radar-screen since I saw him give a mind-blowing talk at The University of Chicago more than a decade ago. It was on the role that Hegelian background beliefs played among a community of Japanese particle physicists, which played a prominent role in developing the so-called Standard Model. (I have not seen the paper in print, but maybe I missed it.)
While within science studies it is a cliche to claim that science has become "big science" and, essentially collaborative, Staley's work is significant among philosophers in exploring the methodological and epistemic implications of this (as it is in Brad Wray, an earlier 'most underrated'). My favorite Staley papers (and his book) dig deep into experimental and statistical practice to analyze how evidential arguments work in the sciences without degenerating into purely descriptive philosophy (for a lovely example here). Staley often does so while building on Deborah Mayo's influential work. Staley's most cited paper is this paper on robustness. My favorite paper is this one, which mixes a subtle appreciation of Pierce as a philosopher of scientific practice with careful analysis of how to think of bias when using statistics. And for those of you with an interest in fine-tuning arguments this paper is worth exploring!
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