Promissory note.
I want to say something here about
- embodiment, invocations of the 'first person', why phenomenology remains respectable in some quarters and why it shouldn't
- 'biochauvinism' (I forget whose phrase this is but it comes up in papers in the special issue of Topoi on embodied cognition, in which I've read Di Paolo and Thompson & Stapleton so far)
- in 2 weeks there is a special workshop in Sydney on such themes, but focusing on memory, culture, cognition, etc., with people doing cognitive archaeology and the likes. I will be trotting out a version of my forthcoming paper on Organism (HPLS 32:2-3, 2010).
- thus I also need to say something about the concept of organism.
- For people who are on the Virno/Negri wavelength(s) it is an odd fact of recent intellectual history that some of the loyal Negrists attacked the Virnians (and their erstwhile journal Forme di vita) for being too "naturalistic", too inclined to talk about philosophical anthropology, the body, etc. There is something odd here to be worked, and future intellectual historians will find it odd, I bet.
OK that is a longish promissory note !
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