By Gordon Hull

Several months ago, I argued here that big data is going to make a big mess of privacy – primarily because of a distinction between “data,” understood as the effluvia of daily life, generated by such activities as moving around town or making phone calls, and “information,” which implies some sort of meaning.  Privacy protects the disclosure of “information,” since this can be an intentional act; big data allows surveillance of areas traditionally considered private without any act of disclosure, since the analytic computers will take care of turning the data into information.  My standard talking-point here is a recent study of Facebook likes which determined that all sorts of non-trivial correlations could be deduced from what people “like:”

Individual traits and attributes can be predicted to a high degree of accuracy based on records of users Likes …. For example, the best predictors of high intelligence include “Thunderstorms,” “The Colbert Report,” “Science,” and “Curly Fries,” whereas low intelligence was indicated by “Sephora,” “I Love Being A Mom,” “Harley Davidson,” and “Lady Antebellum.” Good predictors of male homosexuality included “No H8 Campaign,” “Mac Cosmetics,” and “Wicked The Musical,” whereas strong predictors of male heterosexuality included “Wu-Tang Clan,” “Shaq,” and “Being Confused After Waking Up From Naps.”

More ominously, likes provided good evidence of basic personality types, which of course means that they can be considered predictive of future behaviors:

For example, users who liked the “Hello Kitty” brand tended to be high on Openness and low on “Conscientiousness,” “Agreeableness,” and “Emotional Stability.” They were also more likely to have Democratic political views and to be of African-American origin, predominantly Christian, and slightly below average age.

I just finished reading a paper by Katherine Hayles (Literature, Duke) that looks at RFID tags and poses some of the same questions, productively I think.  Hayles – whose work is cited by folks like Andy Clark (he cites her How We Became Posthuman in his Natural Born Cyborgs; she cites the Cyborgs book in this paper.  I think the paper has interesting implications for the extended mind hypothesis, but that’s material for a separate post) – treats the tags as part of the development of the “internet of things,” and looks at the ontological implications for subjectivity that emerge in literary representations of RFID-like technologies.  In her words:

While surveillance issues are primarily epistemological (who knows what about whom), the political stakes of an animate environment involve the changed perceptions of human subjectivity in relation to a world of objects that are no longer passive and inert. In this sense RFID is not confined only to epistemological concerns but extends to ontological issues as well” (48)

I think the epistemological/ontological distinction is useful here – and she later says that the epistemological question is where we can and should discuss privacy – because it gets at some of the same sorts of things I was trying to think about in the data/information distinction: namely, that something more fundamental than disclosure of information is at stake. I think Hayles’ formulation of the question as one that changes how we need to think of human subjectivity is particularly useful; the general direction is “Deleuzian,” as she indicates on the last page.

Here, I want to notice just one part of the argument: RFID tags, on her account, exist as both “devices” and “virtual presences,” negotiating this boundary by transmitting data from the world of things to the world of information.  As such (what follows is my extrapolation, not her argument, though I don’t think anything I’m saying here disagrees with her in any fundamental way), they are active participants in what one might call the “informatization” of subjectivity: treating subjectivity as primarily informatic, as the product of or constituted by information. The first thing to note about this formula is that it is directly biopolitical, insofar as subjectivity is neither Cartesian (as ultimately generated and guaranteed by something other than the interactions of the material world) nor juridical (in the sense that Locke uses in Essay II.27 against Descartes, and in which Foucault means the term), but instead necessarily an emergent property of the interactions of humans and their environment. This informatization of subjectivity presents a special case of a more general informatization of biology (see this book by Eugene Thacker for the way genomics blurs the biology/informatics distinction; and this one by Nikolas Rose for biopolitical implications); as I’ve argued elsewhere, I think it’s the key to understanding biopolitics more generally.

The second implication is that this formulation allows one way to address the question of resistance and how we might work to ensure that RFID tags are part of a better world and not a worse one.  As she suggests, resistance in the epistemological register is reasonably well understood (if not all that effective yet!), but ontologically things are more difficult: “Epistemological issues lend themselves to strategy and tactics (from sophisticated counter-surveillance techniques to brute force methods like smashing RFID tags with a hammer or frying them in a microwave), but how do we understand the ontological effects of animate environments” (49-50).  Her reading of Phillip K. Dick’s Ubik convinces her that “capitalism alone … cannot be trusted to bring about salutary results” (65), and she closes by noting that “The idea that meaning and interpretation can occur across and between human and mechanical phyla contributes to an expanded sense of ethics necessary when the contexts for human actions are defined by information-intensive environments and include relational and context-aware technologies such as RFID” (69).

It seems to me that, insofar as RFID chips negotiate the boundary between informatics and objects, and transitions between those, they should be studied as sites for the primitive accumulation of capital.  That is, they are places where objects can become subsumed into capitalist market structures, while being dispossessed (following David Harvey's terminology) of whatever value they might have had before.  When RFID tags contribute to that process – as when, for example, they are used to produce revenue-generating metadata for large corporations by tracking consumer purchases – is when they ought to be scrutinized most carefully, and their political economy subject to the most careful critique, precisely because it is at these moments that they constitute us as subjects of global capital, or where such constitution needs to be resisted.

 

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10 responses to “RFID Tags, Informatized Subjects and Biopolitics”

  1. Robin James Avatar

    Hi Gordon–I really really like this. Your focus in the last two paragraphs about the ontological implications of ‘animate enviornments’ resonates with a lot of what’s going on in feminist new materialism–things have agency, ‘voice,’ etc. There the agentification/envoicement of inanimate things is presented as a good thing, a liberation, but I really like how your last paragraph raises good reasons to feel less good about the envoicement of things…because it’s the subsumption of things. Would you say that it’s not enough for things to be capital or commodities, but they have to generate value as digital laborers, too?

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  2. Gordon Avatar

    That’s an intriguing suggestion – because of course in a way it’s a radical intensification of complete subsumption: first we (people) had to provide surplus value in the factory. Then we did it all the time. Now things themselves have to provide surplus value. I’m not sure what to do with that, exactly, but I think it’s a plausible thesis…

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  3. ck Avatar

    Very interesting, Gordon! I am pursuing something similar in my current project on what I call ‘informational persons’ (a preview is in my nyt stone piece from a little while back). Your piece prompts two thoughts for me.
    First, and I think you would agree, there is a long back history to what you are calling ‘informatization of subjectivity’. My genealogical hunch would be that RFID tags are an instantiation of a set of capacities whose conditions stretch back to at least to the 1880s/1890s, but likely not much further than that.
    Second, and one reason the first historical point really matters and deserves more emphasis, is that I am not clear on why you are so keen to characterize the politics of RFID as ‘biopolitical’ (indeed you call it ‘directly biopolitical’!). First you suggest that it is neither ‘Cartesian’ nor ‘Juridical’ — but from that one cannot infer that it is in fact biopolitical. Leaving that to the side, a second and more substantive concern is that biopolitics is just not the right concept here. If biopolitics is about the regulation of living populations, then in what sense is RFID an instance of that? If it’s not, then we need another concept to capture the politics of RFID, etc., &c..
    My hunch for my project is that there is an emergent modality of power (I call it ‘infopower’) that develops out of biopower but later on, beginning in the late 19th century, takes on a gravity all its own. So on my view an adequate conceptualization of the politics of RFID would have more to do with infopower (or some such concept) than with biopower.
    An interesting example of this I’ve been reading about recently is the reciprocal influence of the life insurance and early computing industries (mostly in the mid-twentieth century). One might think that the politics of life insurance is inherently biopolitical, but one can see in the industry’s influence on the development of computers (and pre-computer tabulating machines) that there is also another kind of politics at stake there which looks less like the public health agency’s regulations on hygeine and sexuality (if that is a paradigm of biopolitics) and more like consumer credit reporting (if that is a paradigm of infopolitics).
    I suppose all of this depends in part on how broad one wants to make the concept of biopolitics. So what is biopolitics? I’m not sure I fully buy your argument (as I remember it) in your JSP/SPEP paper that information, data, and statistics is central in biopolitics. One is hard pressed to find evidence for that sort of view in Foucault who, I have argued, makes only a few passing references to this sort of stuff in his published work. It really takes a book like Hacking’s Taming to make the point. But even still there is a step or two yet to take there. Even if the step is taken, a further question opens up as to whether or not statistical styles of reasoning are necessarily biopolitical. I don’t see that it helps to claim that they necessarily are. They might be. But it’s a question to be asked. We need inquiry. Such inquiry is an antidote to the extrapolation of favorite concepts.
    So all of that suggests this question: What’s the argument that it really is biopolitical rather than beyond biopower?
    (Sorry to ramble on at such length, but there’s lots of interesting ideas in your post. Thanks for it.)

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  4. Ed Kazarian Avatar

    Gordon, I’m going to be spending some time processing this one, but I want to tag that last paragraph as a really, really interesting move and say how much I appreciated it.

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  5. Ed Kazarian Avatar

    Your reply to Robin (which I just saw), points to at least one question that I have. I’ve always seen mechanization as the moment when the extraction of surplus value becomes difficult, at least in classical Marxian terms. How, exactly, do you get surplus value out of something inanimate and which simply wears out–is materialized as part of the value of the commodity it is engaged in producing–at a fixed rate? But if we shift to information, and the function of these mechanisms is now to realize the labor we produce via our interactions with them, well then, the problem begins to disappear–especially since, as you make clear with your primitive accumulation reference–the vast majority of such ‘labor’ is unrecognized as such and uncompensated.

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  6. Gordon Hull Avatar

    Hi Colin,
    Glad you found it productive! You’re right that if you don’t find my attempt to link biopolitics and statistics/informatics persuasive, you’ll find what I’m saying here a bit of a stretch. You’re also right that the SPEP/JSP paper doesn’t say enough to convince a skeptic. Let me offer a couple of reasons here, or at least a couple of factors that I’m trying to account for.
    First, I’m very interested in the congruence of biopolitics and the regulatory state. It’s the institutional structure in which terms like “population” happen, and it seems to me that Pasquino and Hacking make the case that the German Polizeiwissenschaft especially is enabled by techniques for data production and management. If you take that into the mid 20c, it seems to me that public health policies like vaccines are based on the same sorts of principles. “Risk” becomes operative around mid-century (as toxicology develops, and techniques like mass spectrometry force a replacement of old any-detectable-amount-is-too-much standard for carcinogens). So I think there’s a narrative to be told about the development of optimization strategies (this narrative also requires that I win the argument that bios and not zoe is the right metric here. The argument there will be that human zoe is a fiction; human life is always bios).
    Second, and relatedly, I think the expanded concept of biopolitics gives me a handle on the development of neoliberalism. Things like the disaggregation of insurance risk pools, and the whole move to make people responsible entrepreneurs of themselves, is enabled (again) substantially by information, especially now with big data. It seems to me (and I’m following people like Nikolas Rose) that neoliberalism basically treats the population on both a mass and an individual level at the same time (alternately: it’s the theory that the best way to optimize the population is to regulate individuals, especially by creating markets where they have to behave according to economic rationalities).
    Now, I don’t know that statistical styles of reasoning are necessarily biopolitical, but I think that’s part of what drives their development, and they’re certainly deployed as the population is constituted in increasingly informatic terms. So on my reading, there’s a lot of continuity between early Polizeiwissenschaft and the regulatory state.
    I’m not wedded to the term, but I think a similar argument could be made about infopolitics: your examples of infopolitics in the Stone piece are often characterized as biopolitics, and the development of infopolitics probably goes back pretty far. So we may be using different terms to describe the same thing. I’m not sure there’s anything wrong with that… as for RFID, one of Hayles’ first examples are embeddable RFID’s like you can put in your pets and livestock (etc) to track them if they run away; babies wear little RFID bracelets to keep them in the maternity ward. So I do think the technology has application for biopolitics in the narrower sense you’re urging.

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  7. Gordon Avatar
    Gordon

    So you’ll notice the last paragraph ends somewhat abruptly – it’s because I had this sense I was onto something but couldn’t figure out the next step to take. If it turns out to be the case that adding RFID tags to objects enables surplus value extraction from them, and if it is also the case that they enable the generation of more surplus value than they cost (given how cheap they are, that seems plausible), that’s a pretty big deal on Marxian terms. Here’s a few things that occurred to me:
    1. The labor/labor power distinction will get replicated at a level so small that it becomes nearly invisible – all the activity will be automatically and always-already presented in a term cognizable to the system. I’m being deliberately sketchy on the terms here, because of course one already has to revise that narrative once Fordism declines and time stops being the measure of labor power. I also think the definition of ‘labor’ would have to be revised – I’m not sure what this would mean – since labor generally implies intentionality (this analysis would apply to big data too, since you don’t generally intentionally disclose a lot of the data in question)
    2. My initial impulse is to look at originary accumulation – but I’m not entirely sure how well it will work here. What will matter for that analysis, I think, is the extent to which the RFID-enabled objects can be viewed as “dispossessed.” I’m not sure how that analysis will turn out.
    3. The biggest implication might be in a revision of the labor/fixed capital relation, and specifically w/r/t the narrative of falling profit rates in Vol.3. On the old version, capital has to let machines do more and more of its production, in order to drive down the cost per item produced, and then to make up for the lost profit-per-item (represented by the reduced percentage of its value which derives from labor) by selling a lot more of them. This is of course a losing game in the long run, and so the thesis is that the overall profit rate will decline to zero, at which point the system blows up. If somehow you could get RFID to change that basic narrative, it would be a really big deal. I can’t connect the dots in my head yet, but I’d want to align that discussion with Melinda Cooper’s (in Life as Surplus – there, she looks at how the rhetoric of biocapital is concerned most of all with overcoming structural limits (eg population, geology, etc). This might be another way that capital tries to present accumulation as indefinitely extendable.
    4. The easiest story is probably the one I alluded to about intensification of subsumption – I think that follows on autonomist grounds pretty readily.
    btw, I’ve read a fair amount of Hayles’ work, and it’s always really provocative.

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  8. ck Avatar

    Thanks, Gordon, for the further thoughts, which help clarify your view. I am definitely on board with you on hooking up Foucault’s biopolitical diagnoses to a welter of social reforms for which the regulatory state is often seen as a pinnacle. I agree that the discourse of gets ‘risk’ gets articulated to that assemblage at some point.
    That said, I am not convinced that this means that risk is always biopolitical, but maybe that’s not your point anyway. If it’s not the point, then it seems to me that we (all of us) need to work hard to separate out what’s not identical. And that to me is really the point in my worries about your assessment of RFIDing as biopolitical. What gets lost if we make that assessment too quickly? What work are we doing anyway? Is the job of philosophy to paste old concepts over emergent practices? I thought our special work was that of creating concepts.
    Thus, I am not convinced that Foucault’s concept of ‘biopolitics’ helps us explain ‘neoliberalism’. First, I think ‘neoliberalism’ is probably the most useless word circulating in the academy today. It’s our new name for the shadow that haunts us: something that everybody knows is scary but nobody really knows how to describe. Good! so academics can all agree and feel good with one another at their conferences: but nobody else is listening. I agree that there is something new that we ought to be trying to get our handle on, but I am not sure that it’s an ‘-ism’ (i.e., an ideology).
    I think if one were to disaggregate so-called neoliberalism into its components, then one could begin a labor of inquiry that would show that some of these components are biopolitical and some are not. You mention the ‘entrepreneur of self’ component but that sounds to me more disciplinary than biopolitical (why call it biopolitical? what exactly has it got to do with biopolitics? maybe there’s an answer to that, but it’s certainly not obvious). Another famous component would be ‘financialization’ but my hunch would be this has more to do with informational-politics than with bio-politics. But, by contrast, a component like ‘the security state’ would some to me to be a biopolitical inflection of sovereignty. In any event, these are all hunches: leads for inquiry, not conclusions. The point is just that we need to not identify what’s different.
    So I am not really convinced that in the end we are “using different terms to describe the same thing”. To me, there’s alot at stake in the differences in terms, especially those that are wedded down with so much baggage already. Also (if you can’t already tell), I’m not necessarily interested in finding common ground for agreement in this manner. Let’s do that in politics, yes, but in philosophy we may as well disagree with one another. Hopefully, that’s not terribly unwelcome.

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  9. Ed Kazarian Avatar

    Thanks, Gordin, this is really interesting.
    I think I follow most of that, and I see the issues.
    The only part of this that I’m inclined to try to add to at this point is your point about originary accumulation. You say that you can only make this work if you see the objects as dispossessed, but what if RFID’s are instead viewed as mechanisms of a kind of seamless and almost unnoticeable dispossession of the value embedded in the constant production of data-streams by various agents (human and non-)? Super-sketchily and with almost no details (since I’m not even sure where to begin working them out), doesn’t this provide another (at least apparent) way past the falling rate of profit scenario by shifting from surplus value extraction to dispossession (so we’re on something like Harvey territory, at least generally, where post-Fordist / Neoliberal capital is all about dispossessing, rather than extracting surplus value)?
    Having said all that, I’m not at all sure I buy the dispossession model–and especially not as a model for what’s going on vis a vis this sort of data. There’s some really interesting stuff to be said for the model of contemporary capital as not only financializing but also inherently circulatory, and which makes logistics start to seem like the other big deal alongside finance. RFID, of course, has a huge role to play in this kind of a model, and if what’s driving it isn’t so much dispossession but the ability to optimize flows so as to take maximal advantage of (and extract surplus from) spatiotemporal variations in a global system, then perhaps, echoing Colin above, the ‘bio’ part of this may not be the most crucial aspect. I saw a very cool piece on this over the weekend that made reference to both an old paper of Alberto Toscano’s in Mute and the essay on logistics in the most recent Endnotes. I’ve read neither of those yet, but they’re moving rapidly to the top of my list. Setting those aside, this seems to me the point where Deleuze becomes at least as useful as Foucault: the notion of control societies, after all, seems to be perfectly suited for RFIDs to play a really basic structuring role — and if Colin’s right, we’ve been working toward that capacity beneath the perfection of older biopolitical disciplinary techniques for nearly a century (which would feel about right in terms of the genealogical rhythm of these sorts of developments).
    Enough with my riffing, though. I’m really just trying to get my head around this stuff…and there’s a lot to learn. Thanks for the comments. They’re helpful and give me a lot to read and think about.

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  10. Gordon Avatar
    Gordon

    Disagreement is good! – and I’m certainly open to being convinced that ‘biopolitics’ needs the narrower reading (and I seem to remember that people like Rabinow say this too). For the moment, I find it productive, partly because it helps to think more precisely about the social phenomena you’re listing – but as I learn more about admin law, toxicity regulations, and so forth, I’m assuming I’ll either have a better argument about categories, and/or new categories.
    I will say a couple of things about neoliberalism, though, b/c I think you’re right the term gets bandied around a lot. For me the really important (and individuating) characteristics of neoiberalism (or at least some of them) are (a) the view that markets are the most efficient way to allocate social goods and resources, because of the epistemic efficiency of the price mechanism (in other words, Hayek). One of the main concerns here thus becomes transaction costs, since they create inefficiencies in markets. The nature of property and other entitlement claims becomes important here because, for example, adopting a liability rule rather than a property rule might be a lot more efficient for certain kinds of goods; (b) the view that markets can be created where there wouldn’t be one ‘naturally.’ So remedying ‘market failures’ becomes important; the goal is to reduce the number of things that aren’t amenable to market-based governance, and government can legitimately get pretty big in its efforts to create markets. I think this view also entails a willingness to tolerate monopolies, something classical liberalism won’t do. I think I see this point so readily b/c I work on intellectual property, where the market is wholly artificial. Foucault points this out pretty well, I think, and Harcourt’s discussion of the Chicago futures markets (in The Illusion of Free Markets,) is pretty helpful here, too. (e) some sort of disaggregation of social and or public goods. This is the move from pensions to stock-market based funds that Harvey talks about, but it’s also present in, for example, the way healthcare gets discussed, where the idea is to have individuals bear a good deal of the risk of their own health. The ACA doesn’t stop this, but it limits it in some ways. So I think the way risk gets deployed changes somewhere around the mid 20c; the “financialization of everything” probably needs to be contextualized this way; and (f) the view that people are or should be economic rationalizers – in other words, homo economicus has the status of something like the ‘truth function’ of humanity. This undergirds both the emphasis on ‘entrepreneur of the self’ rhetoric and things like forcing people to work to get welfare. I don’t know that any of these are individually necessary, and I doubt that you’d need all of them to plausibly apply the term ‘neoliberalism.’
    All of that by way of where I’m coming from…

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