In Louise Antony’s thought-provoking interview, Gary Gutting asked her about the rationality of her atheism if she were confronted with a theist who is an epistemic peer, someone who is equally intelligent, who knows the arguments for and against theism, etc., this was her response:
"In the real world, there are no epistemic peers — no matter how similar our experiences and our psychological capacities, no two of us are exactly alike, and any difference in either of these respects can be rationally relevant to what we believe.” — She further clarifies “How could two epistemic peers — two equally rational, equally well-informed thinkers — fail to converge on the same opinions? But it is not a problem in the real world. In the real world, there are no epistemic peers — no matter how similar our experiences and our psychological capacities, no two of us are exactly alike, and any difference in either of these respects can be rationally relevant to what we believe…The whole notion of epistemic peers belongs only to the abstract study of knowledge, and has no role to play in real life”.
I disagree with Antony’s analysis, and think that the criteria for epistemic peerage can be very much loosened. I do agree with her that the notion, as it is outlined in epistemology, in terms of equal access to evidence, cognitive equality etc is quite stringent, and indeed is very rare in real life. For instance, perhaps two graduate students, trained at the same department with the same advisor and the same specialization, and who are equally smart, would count as epistemic peers with respect to that specialization. However, our philosophical concept of what an epistemic peer is should not be drawn up a priori, but should be informed by how the concept is used in everyday practices, like forensic research, two doctors or midwives discussing a patient’s circumstances, or two scholars who disagree about a key issue in their discipline. Indeed, the idea of epistemic peer is thoroughly entrenched in scientific research, for instance in peer review and open peer commentary. If the notion of “epistemic peer” does not reflect this practice, it is not a sound philosophical notion, and would need to be replaced.
Similarly, for the question of religion there are, I believe, many epistemic peers who meet this condition (philosophers of religion) - they are familiar with the arguments, such as the evidential argument from evil, the cosmological arguments etc.
Focusing on a narrow reading of the evidence, we need not worry about, say, religious (or areligious) experience that is not shareable as an obstacle for epistemic peerage. This modest notion of epistemic peerage is, I believe, in line with how we understand this term when evaluating experts, and if it is correct, there are many epistemic peers for any domain of knowledge. The problem remains that epistemic peerage not only involves evidence, but also cognitive powers (indeed, Gutting’s original formulation of the concept of epistemic peer was couched in terms of cognitive virtues like attentiveness).
Antony says “we have no idea how to seriously compare the cognitive powers of two people.” Is this needed to determine whether two people are epistemic peers? Rather than an objective assessment of qualities, epistemic peerage in science and other fields has an important social dimension: in how far do people recognize expertise (which involves not only access to evidence but also cognitive virtues) in others? It seems that people are naturally adept at recognizing expertise (note that they are better at doing so for others than for themselves, as people tend to overestimate their own cognitive capacities, something that needs to be born in mind when one is disagreeing with whom one believes to be an epistemic peer). For instance, even children as young as four or five have some emerging knowledge of the cognitive division of labor, knowing they should turn to a medical doctor for health problems, but to a car mechanic for problems with the car engine.
This social dimension provides a way out of the impasse of having to compare people’s cognitive capacities, but it does come with a cost: some groups of people are systematically marginalized, and their expertise might not be fairly evaluated. Social practices often do not reflect expertise accurately, hence not reflect epistemic peers accurately. Whether this is problematic for identifying epistemic peers, I suspect, depends on the issue. For instance, in philosophy of religion there is a tendency to focus on theism as broadly outlined in the Abrahamic traditions, and in fact, there is a strong focus on Christianity. This bias might make valuable and interesting work in, say, Mormon or Wiccan philosophy of religion go unrecognized. Also, researchers who work at non-elite universities may have a lesser say in the debates than, say, prominent senior professors who are recognized as world experts, for reasons that have little to do with their expertise or cognitive virtues.
Nevertheless, with the proviso that some voices may be less heard, there are many epistemic peers on the question of religion, if one focuses on philosophers of religion. Which still makes Gutting’s question relevant: “But suppose you and your theist friend are equally adept at reasoning, equally informed about relevant evidence, equally honest and fair-minded — suppose, that is, you are what philosophers call epistemic peers: equally reliable as knowers. Then shouldn’t each of you recognize that you’re no more likely to be right than your peer is, and so both retreat to an agnostic position?”