In Mohan's critical response to the modest proposal by Mark and I, he writes, "[A] restrict your actions to what is in your domain. [B] Don’t interfere with or trespass on the autonomy of others." ([A&B] added to facilitate discussion.) Let's grant the two principles [A&B] that Mohan relies on. I endorse [A]. Something like [A] animates a lot of my blogging and it motivates me to try to get our philosophical house in order with achievable means and ends. (Of course, my judgment about what it takes may be wrong.) Such a principle matters for intrinsic reasons (ought implies can, etc), but it also makes us philosophers more credible when we address society's ills.
As several commentators on Mohan's post have noted, Mohan restricts what is in our domain and "feduciary responsibility" too narrowly. Mark and I claim there is collective negligence in professional philosophy in the face of a pattern of exclusion. We have identified a strategy that allows us to focus on people -- the disciplinary leaders -- who collectively can make a difference in changing the norms of our profession. (Mohan does not challenge that being a keynote is a decent proxy for being a disciplinary leader.) If we are wrong about the way the disciplinary norms operate (and it will take some time to learn this), the harm from this assumption is relatively small given that we focus on people who receive lots of privileges from the status quo. These are are also people who have ample resources to respond to any public criticism. Of course, there will be cases where public criticism may turn out to be very unfair, and in those cases frank public apologies should be expected and given.
Mohan also claims that it would be "disrespectful of invitees to instruct organizers how to run their events." Now, first, such disrespect is quite common in philosophy--I have hosted more than thirty workshops in philosophy and I often get quite a few urgent (sometimes politely formulated) requests (about starting times, ending times, who else to invite, who not to invite [in order to avoid feuds, etc]), the kind of hotel needed, pick-up arrangements, etc. [See also Kent Staley's testimony.]) Disciplinary leaders are used to trying to get their way, after all. That's the whole point behind the proposal.
But, of course, sociological facts do not address Mohan's moral claim, although it suggests that our proposal may well be effective quickly. Surprisingly I do not see much difference of opinion between us on the moral issue. As he says, an invited keynote speaker can "decline respectfully and politely" if he feels "uncomfortable about the line-up." That's, in fact, what is requested by Mark and I. It can be a matter of respect to explain why one declines, too. Once keynoters send out a consistent message about this we are more than halfway to a change of norms. This change of norms will not end the pattern of exclusion, but it may well aid in facilitating the prospects of other necessary steps in removing the shame on all of us.