In a recent post, I proposed an intellectual division of labor between General Philosophy of Science (GPOS), which rests on a quasi-transcendental assumption (QTA): if anything counts as knowledge it is fallible science, especially physics (chemistry, biology, whatever), so let's now articulate how this is possible or, more formally, justified (and develop, say, norms appropriate to this); by contrast Gettierized Epistemology (hereafter GE), which from the vantage point of ordinary cognition (perception, locution, observation), deals with a variety of skeptical challenges to any purported knowledge claims and works out the norms that govern, say, ordinary testimony, etc. Of course, a naturalistic GE can draw on scientific knowledge about cognition (etc). A naturalistic GPOS can draw on empirical work (history, sociology, or case-studies) on scientific practice, or rely on work done in philosophy of a particular science (PoX), while recognizing much of the autonomy of PoX [some other time more about the relationship between GPOS and PoX]. This division of labor recognizes that both enterprises (GE & GPoS) can be normative, explanatory, descriptive, etc. Moreover, it protects practitioners of GE from saying silly things about science (and so their reliance on outlandish and toy-examples does not embarrass us to our colleagues in the sciences); it protects GPOS from saying silly things about whether it is raining or not.
Now, Mohan resists my way of thinking about this division. First, in doing so, he asks " how does GPOS deal with scientific knowledge?  How does it deal with sceptical challenges to science?" Mohan pretends not to realize that  are not  identical. From the vantage point of GPOS the answer to  is simple: it simply doesn't! In light of QTA it simply takes for granted that science is the best form of knowledge we have. So, Mohan's diagnosis of a crisis in GPOS simply misses the point of GPOS. Of course, on  GPOS can explore problems of demarcation (a topic that Massimo Pigliucci and my colleague, Maarten Boudry, are reviving), and it can with the help of PoX explore the immanent norms of particular sciences to see if best practices live up to such norms (this is how I read Carl Craver's brilliant Explaining the Brain). It can also be a store-house for an analysis of best practices in the sciences, including induction, abduction, measurement, inferential processes, confirmation, simulation, model-portfolio-management and experimentation, etc (and in doing so call attention to abuse of statistics, flawed referee practices, irresponsible policy experts, etc). Because the sciences practice induction, abduction, measurement, inferential processes, confirmation, simulation, model-portfolio-management and experimentation most rigorously, GPOS and not GE is our main source of understanding in these areas. (This is not to deny that there cannot be healthy exchange between GPOS and GE in areas like confirmation theory!) Moreover, GPOS can develop models to think about the interface of science and policy, the role of values in science, science and ethics, the role of consensus in science education and progress--all topics which are highly relevant in our complex, technological, and data-generating societies. I predict that the Weberian bureaucratic states will demand a steady, increasing supply of skilled thinkers in such areas. It is true that GPOS is silent on some very important, philosophical questions--the problem of skepticism and (as I suggested in my earlier post) the role of freedom within scientific enterprise.
Second, Mohan thinks it is irrelevant that when it comes to measurement or (more generally) data-gathering science is rapidly mechanizing: "resist parochial scientific judgements about the fundamentality of data provided by machines." But other than name-calling ("parochial"), he offers no argument for his stance. Such a stance is a disaster because it re-opens the so-called science wars(with the epistemologists in the role of historians of science)! It also ignores that GPOS with the aid of an affiliated PoX is in a good position to provide the evaluative framework for the use of particular measuring machines, while GE, which -- by Mohan's own lights-- deals with "content general" and "structural" claims, has no such resources at all.
Third, finally, Mohan, enjoys his fair share of name-calling (I think we are supposed to shudder when "we think of Popper, think of Feyerabend"). More seriously, he mistakenly thinks that in the context of GPOS "conventionalism, pragmatism, and other anti-realisms" are somehow species of skepticism. Properly understood they are simply ways of characterizing the fallibility of scientific knowledge. What they share in common is that they let philosophers re-interpret in some more general framework the deliverances of science without questioning the truth-status of scientific knowledge. In doing so the GPOSer is in a much better position than the GEer, who like a modern-day Don Quixote -- armed with his brain in the vat or the sleeping beauty problem -- "resist parochial scientific judgements."