Mohan was startled by my question if we should hold philosophers responsible for the public impact of their words. Consider, Jason Brennan's remarks: "“Since writing ‘The Ethics of Voting,’ I’ve actually become more sympathetic to the idea that maybe people should be formally excluded from voting,” Brennan said." [When I wrote my original post, I had no idea that Brennan had already slipped down the slope of my not so "idle concern."] As a community, we are politely witnessing (refereeing, reviewing, etc) the philosophic ground-clearing being done for --and the accompanying public marketing of -- ideas that will justify a certain kind of elite rule. (My approach also presupposes there is a non trivial difference between teaching Plato's anti-democratic sentiments and advocating these today.)
Now Mohan and I agree that philosophy has independent value. He believes this is so because it makes progress. (By contrast, I think philosophy has value even if no progress is made.) I grant there can be progress in philosophy. But as I argued before unquestioned constraints (or taboos) make progress possible. (Of course, an excess of constraints may prevent progress.) Now it is true that within those constraints (enforced by graduate training, referees, editors, etc) there is and should be uncensored debate some of which can transform the nature or content of the constraints. So, if you want progress you will need taboos. And if this is right there is no reason to suppose that some taboos that are politically consequential may in fact be necessary for philosophy's progress, not to mention that they may be prudential for survival in local political regimes. So, Mohan's main argument for laissez-faire fails.
Let me briefly consider some of Mohan's other arguments. [A] Mohan subtly misrepresents how I characterize the, debate on double effect, which, he reports me as saying serves as “a rhetorical fig-leaf [for] politicians and generals.” But I had made another, empirical point: "in practice the main function of the principle is" to serve as a rhetorical fig-leaf. So, I am claiming that given current conditions the main foreseeable effects of improving the law of double effect is to help mass killers justify their actions. (I may, of course, be wrong about this, and maybe there are non-trivial real world benefits to having this principle act as fig-leaf rather than others!) So, under those circumstances it is legitimate to ask if as a philosophic community we should embrace blanket rejection of the principle and end further inquiry in it.
To return to the example of Brennan's advocacy of disenfranchisement. (In the book he argues for a sub-set, self-disenfranchisement.) Let me allow that very smart minds can make philosophic progress in engaging Brennan's arguments, some of which may help improve the long-term health and vibrancy of political philosophy and many related areas in philosophy (and perhaps a few unexpected other areas). They may revive interest in some of the historic debates on these matter, and improve upon them. Let's allow that in the very long run this is all possible. But another quite foreseeable short-term consequence is to legitimize Brennan's views and to facilitate the growth of an academic and public policy discourse that will find a ready ear among politically motivated donors and interests. (As I said in my original post there are also cultural and socio-economics trends that conspire to make mistrust of ordinary folk fashionable again.) Even if we allow that the market-place of ideas can function smoothly, it does not mean there won't be any social externalities (recall the more technical treatment here.)
Now in response, [B] Mohan's places touching faith in the idea "the end-result of philosophical discussion cannot be bad." (Emphasis in original.) We are offered no conceptual analysis for this claim and no empirical argument. For the sake of peace at NewAPPS let me grant Mohan's position. (I also have some sympathy for such Panglossian doctrines!) But I also remind him that he needs to show that the end-result of good or even excellent philosophical discussion cannot be dangerous to society or (more prudentially) the survival of professional philosophy in the Academy. He has not even started to engage with these issues.
Mohan's way of conceiving philosophy's progress trivializes the possible impact of progress worth having and, thus, philosophy.
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