Philosophy is often viewed as akin to a normal science (I quote Mohan,, philosophers understand themselves as investigating "reality, using transparently objective methods (even in the realm of values). In this sense, they regard philosophy as continuous with science..."[or: "philosophy as extension of science or PES.") One consequence is that PES is accompanied with some of the vices that are characteristic of normal science in its contemporary institutional settings (e.g., mythic histories that promote a picture of progress (Cf. Soames), excessive boundary policing, etc--read your Kuhn or Feyerabend). In particular, folk that do normal science need not answer all objections to ruling theories. This attitude is often accompanied by a lazy, dismissive attitude toward those working on different puzzles (or who reject philosophy as puzzle solving altogether [see Brian Leiter's comments here]). One important sign or proxy that one is dealing with such attitudes is the presence of taboos that allow a community to focus on problems it deems worthy of interest and systematically ignore alternative approaches.
These remarks were prompted by reflection on a recent review by Robert Hanna, who writes the following: "The reason for this sadly asymmetric state of affairs [Kantian ethics is treated with some respect Kantian M&E not in contemporary philosophy--ES], I am afraid, is simply that idealism is a taboo...for most mainstream contemporary analytic metaphysicians and epistemologists. Anti-realism, phenomenalism, panpsychism, and panprotopsychism are all philosophically respectable, but idealism is unacceptable. And the thoroughly ugly label transcendental idealism only makes it worse. If you are an "idealist," then you are obviously a bad philosopher; and if you are a "transcendental idealist," then you are obviously a very bad philosopher." Now maybe Hanna is exaggerating, and maybe he is conflating his (angered) sense that Kantian M&E deserves more attention with a general taboo against Kantian M&E. But he is right that there are taboos in contemporary philosophy. In my undergraduate youth these taboos came accompanied with derision toward certain mysterious sounding names (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, etc), as well as unnamed others to be discerned in our ur-texts (Bradley, Hegel, etc). I open the thread to attempts at articulating a list of such present taboos. (Some other time I will explore why these taboos are a vice and the variety of ways they are harmful to the future of philosophy.)