As a professional (US-trained) philosopher working in the (the still existing) Eurocore-zone, I found it striking that the recent PGR ratings do not rank departments like Carnegie-Mellon very highly despite their being (as Brian Leiter notes) "well-rated in certain specialties." CMU has a very significant presence and influence on the way analytic philosophy is practiced in Europe. I would characterize this approach as a commitment to formal (or mathematical) philosophy. (There is also an underlying sense -- nicely expressed by Sebastian Lutz -- that the spirit and, perhaps, substance of logical empiricism is still very much alive.) If anything some of the most exciting analytically oriented departments (Munich, Groningen, University of Amsterdam, LSE, Tilburg, and, perhaps, Bristol [as well as a few in Scandinavia]) seem increasingly committed to formal philosophy (in the way that descends -- in the felicitous phrase of Mohan -- roughly from Carnap, Bayesianism, Suppes, etc.)
See, for example, this strategic plan by one of its most formidable proponents, Hannes Leitgeb. I am by no means an advocate of formal philosophy; when I was younger I offered some critical reflections on Leitgeb's program here. But I have come to think that on balance it is a very welcome development.
Strikingly, CMU, LSE, and Bristol (the only departments mentioned above that fall under the scope of PGR) all fail to crack the world top 50 in the rankings and all do so by getting more or less the same overall scores. (I find it striking, maybe none of the members of these departments or the formal oriented departments in mainland Europe find it striking at all!)
Of course, a focus on formal philosophy is not confined to these departments--the science & logic group at Irvine also comes to mind (and no doubt others can expand this list), and there are excellent formal philosophers in lots of highly ranked departments. But there is, I think, a genuine divergence taking place within analytic philosophy (one prefigured by earlier intellectual division within the tradition).
Now, more controversially, this divergence is also, in part, driven by sociological factors: much graduate training in North America (where the majority of Leiter judges resides) presupposes that professional philosophers will teach a wide variety of courses to undergraduates and teaches for breadth (even if in top departments there is a reasonable expectation that most of their folk will end up in research-oriented departments). Indeed, in many of these departments, by contrast with the formalist ones mentioned above, breadth is a mark of philosophical competence. While philosophy is certainly a possible part of vocational training Stateside (pre-law, applied ethics, etc), part of its role is civic and (don't get upset with me) ornamental. By contrast, in the increasingly grant-driven environment of Europe, clustering in relatively specialized research clusters that can relatively easily fit the template of our modern scientific metrics pays off and can even produce philosophy congenial to (the rule-driven technocrats of) the Weberian state. If something like this is right, then it is possible that we are seeing two very different bets on the future of analytic philosophy in Europe and in North-America.