For those of us under the domain of Lewisian metaphysics, it may seem like remote history to remind ourselves that the origin of analytic philosophy was, in part, a revolt against metaphysics. But when (more or less exactly) did metaphysics return to analytic philosophy? (Let's stipulate that when Quine turned his fire on the analytic-synthetic distinction and blurred the boundaries between philosophy and science, he not only opened the door to naturalism, but also to metaphysics.) Lewis' publishing career dates to the mid 1960s. An obvious earlier source is Strawson's Individuals (1959). But while clearly significant in all kinds of ways (and certainly Oxford philosophy has a starring role in the revival), this was essentially a conservative metaphysics of the everyday--leaving everything as is. (Michael Della Rocca would argue that this is characteristic of analytic metaphysics/philosophy more generally.)
Another, more easily overlooked source is José A. Benardete's Infinity: An Essay in Metaphysics (1964). This beautiful, megalomaniac book (284) defies easy summary. But despite the many references to Wittgenstein (and a very ironic epitaph from LW on the frontispiece), this monograph embraces the stance of the Metaphysician not content with the everyday; without shame it endorses the search for an actual infinite. In the austere climes of Upstate New York (Rochester/Syracuse) metaphysics was, thus, nurtured (especially after Bennett and Alston joined) with one of its indirect offspring now the Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Oxford. When future historians will write our history, they will discover this irony: in the preface, Infinity acknowledges its debt to analytic philosophy's unnameable other, Leo Strauss.